

SOCIAL RESEARCH

AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

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THE PROCLAIMED EMERGENCE OF COMMUNISM IN THE USSR

BY ALEXANDER S. BALINKY

AT THE peak of the typhus epidemic that raged throughout western Russia during the winter of 1919, Lenin urged the Soviet people to action: "Comrades, either the lice triumph over socialism, or socialism will triumph over the lice!"¹ By inference he was thinking of the primitiveness, illiteracy, superstition, and economic backwardness that would have to be surmounted in order to build socialism out of a semi-feudal Russia. Four decades later, on January 27, 1959, Khrushchev informed the Twenty-First Party Congress that the "lice," so to speak, had been conquered. Proclaiming the period of socialist construction at an end, he declared that the Soviet Union was now ready to take its "first step into communism."

The emergence of communism had been periodically announced since the 1930s, and even earlier, but until now had been given little official attention beyond lip service. Khrushchev's 1959 speech, however, set the issue squarely in the limelight, and the Twenty-Second Party Congress, scheduled for October 1961, was assigned the task of formulating a new constitution that would reflect the emergence of a communist society. Communism, as contrasted with socialism, is envisaged in Marxist theory as having the following main characteristics: the "state" has "withered away"; there is economic abundance, with all the "reasonable and cultured" needs and desires of man met in full; everyone contributes to the best of his ability and receives according to his needs; the nature of man himself has changed (the "New Soviet Man"); physical and mental labor command equal respect; industry and agriculture are organized identically and run on the

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Report to 7th Congress of Soviets" (December 5, 1919), in *Selected Works*, vol. 8 (New York 1949) p. 72.

same principles; there is freedom from war, because there are no longer any capitalist imperialists.²

The fact that the USSR, in our eyes, has by no means met all, or any, of these requirements for the emergence of communism need not be belabored here, for this is one point on which there is unanimity of opinion among Western specialists on Soviet affairs. The intent of this paper is rather to answer three questions raised by this most recent Soviet development. First, how seriously does the Soviet leadership really take the broad issue of transition to communism? Second, why has Khrushchev chosen this particular moment in Soviet history to declare that the USSR is ready to enter a new era, the era of communism? And third, what is the likelihood of the USSR actually attaining full communism in the foreseeable future?

I

In the face of the realities of forty-odd years of Soviet rule, it is highly tempting to dismiss the secular eschatology of Marx and Engels as ritualistic nonsense. R. W. Campell, for instance, says that "The vague Marxist goal of achieving communism is something they can make ritual obeisance to but their motivations and preoccupations are connected with more immediate problems."³ Herbert Ritvo puts it even more bluntly: "Given the present nature of the party dictatorship, the vision of a future society where persuasion and sweet reason reign supreme must be dismissed as utopian nonsense at best, political cynicism at worst."⁴ But to brush aside this ideological pillar of Soviet society, as so many do, is to obscure the importance of the psychological role it has played and continues to play in the lives not only of the Russian masses but, and especially, of the genuine Bolsheviks.

² This is only a convenient summary of Section I of my article, "Has the Soviet Union Taken a Step toward Communism?" in *Social Research*, vol. 28, no. 1 (Spring 1961) pp. 1-14.

³ R. W. Campell, *Soviet Economic Power* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 8.

⁴ Herbert Ritvo, "Totalitarianism without Coercion?" in *Problems of Communism*, vol. 9, no. 6 (November-December 1960).

I do not wish to exaggerate the force that the promised land has had in luring the post-revolutionary masses to voluntary sacrifice. The absence of alternatives has been a far greater factor. But the dream has had and continues to have some effect. It is said that much of the power of the mediaeval church over the minds of men was based on its bipolar concept of heaven and hell, reward and punishment in the hereafter. Correspondingly in the communist world the spirit of the masses is anchored in anticipation of a terrestrial ideal—an anticipation that is strengthened by the utopian streak that has always been present in Russian thought. And the inevitable emergence of communism—as salvation not only from capitalist exploitation but from the admitted sacrifices pursuant to socialist construction—has been one of the few gratifications the Kremlin oligarchy has had to offer the Russian masses in any abundance.

But the hopes of the masses, according to Leninist doctrine, are not what really matters. During the period of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" it is the small, hard-cored, disciplined, and dedicated elite which provides the leadership for the march into communism. The rest follow. The true Bolshevik is propelled by the rainbow at the end of the road. It is to keep him on the right path—overcoming obstacles, warding off external and internal enemies of socialism, elevating the masses—that the communist utopia is essential. To dismiss the utopia as visionary propaganda is to forget that since the middle of the nineteenth century communist leaders have justified most of their actions by the Marxian apocalypse of an earthly paradise, one far richer, far more just, brotherly, and aesthetic than any that appeared in the blueprints of the Utopian Socialists. And for the true Bolshevik, belief in this utopia is not a simple matter of rendering lip service, of a mechanical recital of Marxist dogma. It is the force that drives him not only to personal sacrifice but to the imposition of sacrifice on others. Much in the manner of the early Christian missionary, it compels him to save souls, by kindness and persuasion if possible, by fire if necessary.

Thus if the opiate of utopia has done less than is assumed for the Russian masses, it has done more than is generally recognized for those who rule them. It has provided the Bolshevik with the simplicity of a single and known goal, and has immunized him from any scruples in attaining it by any or all means. By the splendor of its artificial illumination this vision of a radiant future has enabled the believer to soothe his conscience, resolve his doubts, and reconcile humane objectives with inhuman practices. In short, as so eloquently expressed by the Polish poet Czeslaw Milosz, it has enabled the Bolshevik to rationalize everything by the historic necessity of attaining the ultimate good.⁵

These, then, are some of the reasons why the "specter of communism" has never been permitted to fade out in the Soviet Union,⁶ even during the darkest days of the civil war. As Schumpeter insisted, it is the assurance of inevitable salvation and not the cold economic logic of scientific socialism that has given Marxism its survival value and whatever universal appeal it may have.⁷

⁵ Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (New York 1959) p. 225.

⁶ On the eve of the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin reminded everyone that "Mankind can pass directly from capitalism only into socialism . . . but . . . our Party looks farther ahead than that: socialism is bound sooner or later to ripen into communism": V. I. Lenin, *The Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution*, published in 1917 (English ed. London 1932). The prospect of achieving communism surrounded the launching of the First Five-Year Plan in the spring of 1929. *Agitprop* succeeding to some extent in convincing the people that soon after the successful completion of the plan a "bright future" in the form of communism would begin to appear: see Wiktor Sukiennicki, "The Vision of Communism—Marx to Khrushchev," in *Problems of Communism*, vol. 9, no. 6 (November-December 1960) p. 8. In November 1936 Stalin announced "the complete victory of the socialist system in all spheres of the national economy," and concluded that "in the main we have already achieved the first phase of communism—socialism": J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow 1947) p. 548. Again in March 1959, at the Eighteenth Party Congress, and in October 1952, at the Nineteenth Party Congress, it was officially proclaimed that the building of socialism had been completed, and that the Soviet Union was about to embark on communist construction: *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniakh sezdov konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, 7th ed. (Moscow 1954) Part 3, pp. 340 and 579.

⁷ Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 2nd ed. (New York 1947) pp. 3-8.

The point is sometimes made that while rank-and-file Bolsheviks may be motivated by a communist utopia, the sophisticates in the Kremlin are not. But the notion that Soviet leaders merely use the instrumentality of utopia, while cynically disbelieving it themselves, is not a tenable or at least a provable one. There is little basis on which to presume that men like Khrushchev are ordinary, if high-powered, pragmatists, out after personal gain in whatever form. Nor is there any solid ground for the view that Khrushchev has been able to escape from the hypnotic effect of dialectical materialism, or that he believes Marxism is meant only for lesser men.

Another view often expressed is that no *apparatchik* would believe in or work toward a goal that would render him powerless and place the entire governing apparatus in a museum alongside other antiquities. But to view the matter in this light is to ignore one of the characteristic differences between Marxism-Leninism and other ideologies leading to a different brand of totalitarianism. Marxism-Leninism teaches its disciples that the emergence of communism is not something to be linked with any one man or group of leaders. Each individual, living in a particular historical moment and subject to immutable historical laws, has a specific role to play toward the attainment of the ultimate objective. As long as full communism remains in the future, as long as the Bolshevik can remain on his historical path in pursuit of the goal, his claim to total power is not threatened—especially since Leninist doctrine holds that communism is not achieved “by the subsiding of the class struggle, but by its intensification. The State will die out not as a result of the relaxation of the state power, but as a result of its utmost consolidation.”⁸ Thus Khrushchev, as a Marxist, can believe in the inevitability of communism and work for its realization free of the anxiety that the “dictatorship of the proletariat” may no longer be needed in

⁸ J. Stalin, “The Results of the First Five-Year Plan” (January 7, 1933), in *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow 1940) p. 457. Stalin took this from Lenin, and Khrushchev has not repudiated this particular Stalinist view.

his lifetime. And, as will be brought out later, Khrushchev has hedged even more by taking the position that while the state will wither away, the party will remain.

II

The crucial question, however, is less whether Khrushchev believes in the inevitability of communism than why he sees the Soviet Union of today as historically ripe for its emergence. According to available evidence, the current Soviet leadership has calculated that the attainment of its ultimate goal, world communism, can be facilitated by pushing up the time table for achieving communism in the USSR—and this, too, is consistent with the Marxian concept that while man cannot change the direction of history, he can shorten or lengthen the birth pangs involved in the arrival of a new social order. But why is the effort being made at this particular time?

The underlying factor in Khrushchev's decision to take the "first step into communism" now is directly related to the carefully measured (but non-linear) economic and political "liberalization" that has characterized post-Stalinist Russia. It is my contention that Khrushchev sees in a policy of imminent transition to communism at least a partial solution to the series of complex problems posed for the Soviet regime by the shift from coercion to persuasion. For purposes of clarity it is necessary, therefore, to consider the implications of this post-Stalinist "liberalization." In using the term I am referring to such events as the abolition of Stalinist-type slave-labor camps and the freeing of political prisoners; the relaxation of labor discipline; the downgrading of the secret police; the program of two-way tourism, student exchange, and trade; the literary and artistic thaw (especially in 1956-57).⁹

⁹ An account of the specific nature of this "liberalization," or of the changing ratio of force to public control in economic, political, social, and legal spheres, is beyond the scope of this paper. The best summary of the earliest of these changes (1953-56) may be found in "Russia Since Stalin: Old Trends and New Problems," in American Academy of Political and Social Science, *Annals* (January 1956). For

A frequent and dominant explanation of such tendencies is that the Soviet Union, having passed the period of "primitive accumulation," has now reached a stage of economic development in which the earlier Stalinist instrumentalities of compulsion and negative incentives are no longer workable or effective.¹⁰ Advocates of this position hold that a highly industrialized society cannot operate efficiently with the kind of submissively frightened labor force that the political circumstances of the preceding era tended to generate. To emerge victorious in all spheres of competition with the capitalist world, the Soviet Union, it is held, must have a permissive atmosphere in which initiative, imagination, and creativity can flourish.

A broader and more realistic interpretation, in my view, rests on the fact that by the early 1950s the Soviet regime had sharply reduced its fear of capitalist encirclement, and had succeeded in significantly narrowing the gap between the pre-revolutionary values of the Russian masses and the post-revolutionary socialist institutions. In other words, the USSR had passed from Lenin's fearful admission that "we are but a hair's breadth from some invasion" to Khrushchev's confident "Who is encircling whom now?";¹¹ and the Bolshevik revolution had succeeded, as such revolutions can, in overturning in very short order almost all the existing social, economic, legal, and political institutions. What no such revolution can do, however, is to reshape the values, prejudices, and behavior patterns of the vast majority of the people in the same short span of time. Thus what Lenin and Stalin faced was the unavoidable post-revolutionary necessity of

more recent evidence see A. Ulam, "The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism," in *World Politics* (April 1960); Herbert Rito (cited above, note 4) pp. 19-29; L. Schapiro, "Has Russia Changed?" in *Foreign Affairs* (April 1960); and there are many others.

¹⁰ See Solomon Schwarz, "Why the Changes," in *Problems of Communism*, vol. 9, no. 1 (January-February 1960) pp. 10-12.

¹¹ Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 27, p. 117, as quoted by Stalin in 1926; see the latter's *Problems of Leninism* (1940) p. 156. N. Khrushchev, *For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism* (New York 1960) pp. 206-07; he asked the question in an interview given to a correspondent of *Le Figaro*, March 19, 1958.

forcing the new socialist institutions on a people not ready for them—unavoidable, that is, if the revolution was to succeed. Marxist theory is entirely consistent on this point. It makes no assumption about the readiness of the masses for socialism, especially in a semi-feudal country where the centralizing and "civilizing" forces of a mature capitalism cannot even do part of the task Marx and Engels had in mind. Lenin and Stalin knew perfectly well that the Russian masses, 90 percent of whom were peasants, had little comprehension of what the Bolshevik revolution was all about. The majority, ground into the dust by an oppressive and decadent czarist regime, wanted change. What the Bolsheviks had in mind was change on a scale undreamed of by the peasants.

The point is that once revolution occurs, it must bear the bitter fruit of a period of coercion, during which either the new takes firm root or is destroyed. This is what the Bolshevik means when he says that "you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs."

But even totalitarianism seeks legitimacy. Stalin's willingness to use terror does not, in itself, prove that he preferred tyranny as an end in itself. Ultimately every ruler or governing clique wishes to govern by the consent of the subjects rather than by permanent and exclusive reliance on brute force, and this preference is especially characteristic of Marxism and Bolshevism, because of their messianic nature. That the Bolshevik triumvirate has forced supreme sacrifices on the Soviet people for four decades is due principally to its intention to safeguard the socialist start on Russian soil as a base from which to launch a worldwide communist offensive. For the same period it has been engaged in the most massive program of "reeducation" yet witnessed by history. Under conditions of iron-curtain isolation, Soviet rulers have purged the incorrigible, intimidated the weak, cajoled the doubtful, rewarded the willing, and "educated" the newly born—all for the purpose of reducing the pre-revolutionary "vestiges" and instilling the values of communist morality.

The reduction of the gap between the socialist institutions

and the pre-revolutionary values of the people has been a gradual, almost imperceptible process, one that Stalin was too old and rigid to take into account during the last years of his life. To borrow a term from Hegel, Stalin's death was the "node"—the point at which what is continually changing becomes suddenly and dramatically visible. On coming to power, Khrushchev undoubtedly had a mixture of motives for initiating a degree of "liberalization." His ability and willingness to do so stemmed, however, from a reassessment of the risk involved. He recognized that there now existed a significant acceptance of the Soviet way of life on the part of the majority of the people.

Though it would be illusory to deny that the Soviet regime has reduced the gap between the new and the old, this does not mean that the gap is entirely closed, that deviation or dissidence has entirely disappeared. Even official Soviet pronouncements do not go that far. There is an integral relationship between the Kremlin's estimate of the extent to which the people accept the current Soviet institutions and the degree of "liberalization" it is willing to permit. I cannot, therefore, agree with those who see in the thaw a tendency toward greater real freedom or a move in the direction of democracy as we understand it. Ideally, Khrushchev seeks to loosen the reins only to the extent that there is no danger that the Soviet people will use such relaxation to question or act contrary to the Kremlin's intent.

But this is precisely the point at which a delicate problem confronts the Soviet rulers. It is difficult, if not impossible, to know exactly the ratio of acceptance to dissidence at a given moment in time. As the events of the past eight years have shown, there have been numerous occasions on which the Soviet leadership has been forced to tighten controls, because of miscalculation. Therefore, in order to reduce the risks involved in progressive liberalization, Khrushchev has seen the need for some non-coercive instrumentality as an aid to continued control. Proclaiming the emergence of communism appears to serve just such a purpose.

III

One aspect of "liberalization" has been the steady rise in the Soviet living standard. This has been occurring since 1953 despite the fact that one of the reasons given for Malenkov's demotion was his expressed desire to place more emphasis on the consumer-goods sector of the economy, as against Khrushchev who insisted on continuing the policy of concentration on the capital-goods industries. In a recent statement Khrushchev seems to have swung completely around to Malenkov's position, promising still greater emphasis on consumer-goods production.¹² This stress on material improvement has done more than meet some of the long neglected needs of the Russian people. It has excited their expectations. During a recent visit there I heard the expression *zaftra budit* (tomorrow it will be) with surprising frequency. In the many discussions I had with Russians in all walks of life, their interest in the United States centered around our material circumstances rather than our political philosophy. Some say that this was so only because the Soviet people are afraid to discuss the latter but not the former. I did not find that to be the case. It seemed to me that they were avidly interested in the material aspects of American life, and were genuinely far less concerned about our ideology.

In an atmosphere of "catching up with and surpassing America," expressions of desire, even impatience, for still greater material wellbeing have official sanction. Khrushchev, speaking to the workers of the Baltic Works in Leningrad, recently (1958) promised them an end to the housing shortage within ten or twelve years. A voice from the audience boomed out "Let's make it shorter," to which Khrushchev replied that it all depended on the workers themselves.¹³ An incident of this sort would have been unthinkable, on several counts, during the Stalinist period. The present Soviet leadership is not only taking this craving for material improvement into account; it is encouraging it and, to some ex-

¹² See Harry Schwartz in the *New York Times*, May 21, 1961, p. 26.

¹³ Khrushchev in *For Victory . . .* (cited above, note 11) pp. 709-10.

tent, catering to it. To be sure, it has given the party serious concern lest it take the form of "crass Western materialism," of which the leaders have always been so critical. Conveniently, however, Marx and Engels made economic abundance a key requisite for the realization of communism, and thus the increasing Soviet concentration on worldly goods can be seen as different from bourgeois materialism.

From the Soviet standpoint a high rate of economic growth and a continuing improvement in the living standard have, of course, a purpose quite beyond the mere satisfaction of consumer demand. Khrushchev points repeatedly to the economic progress taking place in the USSR as proof of the superiority of socialism over capitalism. He has been saying to the working class in every non-communist country what he said in July 1958 in East Germany: "There is an abundance of wealth for everyone in the world—it must simply be rationally and economically used. Marxism-Leninism teaches us that only under socialism can this wealth be most rationally used for the good of all the people. That is why we advise people who are living without a compass or with a faulty one: Throw your bad compass into the sea, equip yourself with our communist compass and take the road of building a new social system—the socialist system. You may be confident that the Marxist-Leninist compass will unerringly lead mankind to a radiant future." But, as he told two groups of Hungarian workers in April of the same year: "It is only by raising the productivity of labour that we shall beat capitalist production, demonstrate the superiority of the socialist system, and thereby create the conditions for building a communist society . . . [if only] the imperialists do not stick their pigs' snouts into our socialist garden."¹⁴

Thus an economic problem facing Khrushchev is how to increase the productivity of Soviet labor in the existing circumstances. For reasons already cited, he prefers not to rely so heavily as in the past on the negative force of coercive labor discipline. Recent

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 538-39, 325, 297.

evidence also indicates that, for a different set of reasons, he does not currently favor a further widening of income differentials or an extension of special non-monetary privileges as incentives to productivity. In fact, recent Soviet legislation has been directed toward: raising the national minimum-wage and social-security benefits; reducing the income differential between industry and agriculture; holding back any further rise in the income of the "elite" class; de-emphasizing piece-rate work that leads to sharp differences in wages in the same occupation; and even cutting back, some say, the high monetary and non-monetary earnings of those at the peak of the managerial and party hierarchy.¹⁵

The official Soviet view is of course that all this is a logical consequence of the process of transition to communism. Western analysts see it in quite a different light. Robert Feldmesser, for instance, explains these trends as part of Khrushchev's offensive to revitalize the force and insure the dominance of the party over all the other groupings in the USSR.¹⁶ Specifically, Feldmesser believes that he has become fearful of *administrirovanie*, that is, of all the "little Stalins" whom the "big Stalin" created: Khrushchev now wishes to weaken or destroy those who, in a "high-handed, arrogant" way, exercise "petty tutelage over subordinates . . . gloss over shortcomings, suppress criticism and persecute critics," all with the aim of entrenching a hereditary caste that would be safe even from the party. Recently exposed cases of petty bureaucracy, embezzlement, cheating, falsification of statistics, stealing of state property, and "familiness" (as well as the newly legislated severity of punishment for such crimes) make Feldmesser's thesis appear credible indeed.

¹⁵ See Decree of July 12, 1954, in *Sbornik Zakonov SSSR i Uzakov Presidiuma Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR* (Moscow 1959) pp. 411-13, 505-06; *Pravda*, September 9, 1956, June 21 and November 14 and 25, 1958; *Izvestia*, April 4 and June 6, 1959; *Komsomolskaiia Pravda*, March 20 and April 6, 1956; Lazar Volin, "Reform in Agriculture," in *Problems of Communism*, vol. 8, no. 1 (January-February 1959); *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, no. 2 (February 1959) pp. 80-88, 113-22, 143-49.

¹⁶ Robert A. Feldmesser, "Equality and Inequality under Khrushchev," in *Problems of Communism*, vol. 9, no. 2 (March-April 1960) pp. 31-39.

In addition, however, it seems likely that Khrushchev, having reason to avoid both negative and positive incentives in their traditional forms, has selected to rely (at least in part) on what some psychologists call the principle of the "goal gradient." In non-technical terms, this principle holds that as a person comes near the realization of a goal, his incentive to reach it grows stronger. There are known cases, for example, of prisoners who, after serving almost twenty years of a sentence, join a jail break a month before their legal release. Thus Khrushchev hopes that by bringing the long-promised but distant communist utopia almost, but not quite, within grasping distance, he will stimulate the Soviet people to greater productivity in order to make it all come true.

That "transition to communism" may serve as a non-specific incentive to productivity is given increased plausibility by the prevailing mood of optimism that exists in the USSR today. The Soviet people, in the main, do not judge their present or future economic circumstances by what exists in the Western world. Rather, they measure progress by what they have had, what they have now, and what they are told they are going to receive. And by their norms there has been welcomed improvement. (In discussions with Soviet citizens I was struck by the extent to which their knowledge about the American standard of living is distorted. It seems to go to extremes, and is often inconsistent. I have been asked such questions as "Is it true that every American has two automobiles?" and "Do Americans have enough to eat?" In one case I was asked both of these questions by the same individual. The degree of distortion increases as one goes deeper into the provinces.) Further, the Soviet regime is reenforcing the prevailing optimism by creating experimental islands of communism at the present time. The Red Proletariat Foundry in Baku, of which I have already written in this journal (note 2, above), is one important case in point. Beyond that, several communities called "agro-towns" have been erected and populated; their residents live in specially designed buildings suitable for the type

of communal living envisaged under full communism.¹⁷ The noted Soviet economist S. Strumilin has written an important piece outlining what life will be like when communism is achieved, and in fact, Soviet literature is replete these days with details about the society of the very near future.¹⁸

IV

Economic considerations are not the only ones behind the decision to move up the arrival of communism. Isolation and expansionism are mutually exclusive. During most of the Stalinist period, when the emphasis was on building and securing socialism within the USSR, contact between the Soviet masses and the rest of the world was not only unnecessary but risky from the Bolshevik point of view. Today, with the focus on Soviet imperialism, the Kremlin is forced to lift the Iron Curtain for those on both of its sides. Soviet leaders cannot expect to spread communism throughout the world without sending large numbers of their own people into the target areas. Nor can they hope to sell their socialist system by example without allowing visitors from the non-communist world. It will be recalled that it was the USSR, and not the Western nations, that initiated the idea of tourism and cultural exchange.

Given the USSR's current international objectives (especially in the context of peaceful coexistence), the Stalinist variety of iron-clad control over the Soviet people no longer appears possible or desirable. This does not mean that no control is needed, but it does mean that the circumstances of the present phase of Soviet

¹⁷ See B. Svetlichny, "Designing Beautiful Cities," in *Nauka i Zhizn* (Knowledge and Life), no. 9 (1960); A. Zhuravlyev and M. Fyodorov, "The Micro-District and New Living Conditions," *ibid.*; A. Obraztsov, "What Will our Future Cities Look Like?" in *Nedelya* (Weekly), December 25, 1960.

¹⁸ S. Strumilin, "Communism and the Workers' Daily Life," in *Novy Mir* (New World), no. 7 (1960). Three important works on transition to communism written by Soviet scholars are: A. Loginov, "Chitaia knigu o kommunizm," in *Kommunist*, no. 12 (1960) pp. 111-18; D. I. Chesnokov, *Ot gosudarstvennosti k obshchestvennomu samoupravleniiu* (Moscow 1960); S. Strumilin, *Rabochi den i kommunizm* (Moscow 1959).

development require a greater emphasis on self-control and self-discipline on the part of the population, both those at home and those sent abroad. There is no doubt that some measure of broadening is produced by the relative freedom with which, say, American tourists, students, and delegates speak with Soviet citizens (and vice versa) or bring pro-Western literature and ideas into the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders would much prefer that the Soviet citizen remain immune from such contamination as a matter of conviction and acceptance of his own system to his doing so through continued fear of the secret police. It is in this context that Khrushchev speaks of the imminent "withering away" of the various organs of the state. What he wants is a greater reliance on the people, as distinct from the external control of the state, in the matter of enforcement of communist morality. This is why there has been so much talk, and some action, about the establishment of such para-police and para-judicial public organizations as the Brigades of Communist Toil, the People's Militia, the Comradely Courts,¹⁹ and why there has been renewed interest in the role of the *aktivist*, the citizen who not only obeys the rules of communist morality but takes it on himself to see that others do the same thing.

The official explanation for the vigor with which the party is currently urging the people to "work and live like true communists" appears in the following quotation from an eminent Soviet scholar: "Despite the connection and mutual relationship between the material and moral foundations of communism, the former

¹⁹ There is by now a good deal of Soviet literature dealing with these public organizations, which are expected to replace the existing state organs. On Brigades of Communist Toil see *Pravda*, June 1, 1960; *Voprosi filosofii*, no. 10 (1959). On the People's Militia see *Pravda*, March 10, 1959; *Izvestia*, June 24, 1959; *Kommunist*, no. 10 (1960); *Komsomolskia pravda*, August 30, 1960. On the Comradely Courts see *Izvestia*, September 10 and October 24, 1959; *Pravda*, January 28, 1959. For Khrushchev's position on the significance of these public organizations see his speech to the Twenty-First Party Congress, as reported the following day in *Pravda*, January 28, 1959. For a non-communist interpretation of the meaning of these organizations (with which I do not entirely agree) see R. Schlesinger, "The Discussion of Criminal Law and Procedure," in *Soviet Studies* (January 1959).

develops more quickly than the latter. . . . We will in the near future attain the abundance and surplus of consumer goods which are necessary. . . . A much more difficult matter, which will take much more time, will be to form in every member of society the inner necessity to work and live in a communist manner.²⁰ In other words, the stage is all set for the appearance of communism, if only the people will begin to behave accordingly. This official position is derived from the Marxist materialist interpretation of history, which holds that change occurs first in the economic substructure, then, after a lag, in the superstructure of human behavior.

Soviet leaders recognize, however, that obstacles remain. One such obstacle to the fuller development of a society of New Soviet Men is the progressive disappearance of whatever revolutionary élan the Soviet masses may have had in the past. I believe that Professor Cantril puts the matter too strongly when he writes (note 20, above) that "The danger facing Soviet leadership is . . . a passive and apathetic attitude of its citizens toward it. The revolutionary élan has largely disappeared and may almost completely evaporate before long" (pp. 85-86). It is a fact, however, that the mood of the Soviet people today is one of wanting to reap the fruits of their earlier sacrifices. The forces that once provided a common goal (real or fancied danger, World War II) are greatly reduced. In a far broader sense than simply increasing labor productivity, the Soviet regime has been forced to find some new approach to revitalizing the waning revolutionary spirit. It appears to have found it in a policy of more rapid moving into communism.

Political liberalization and a rising living standard have posed a very special ideological problem as well. As noted earlier, "the inevitability of communism" and the concepts associated

²⁰ Ts. Stepanyan, "Stages and Periods," in *Oktyabr*, no. 7 (1960). The same point is made by S. Strumilin in *Novy Mir* (cited above, note 18). The best analysis of the whole role and concept of the New Soviet Man may be found in an excellent little book by Hadley Cantril, *Soviet Leaders and Mastery over Man* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1960).

with it (such as "worker control," "withering away of the state," "the leap from necessity to freedom") have never been allowed to die out as ideological slogans. In recent years, however, national communism in Yugoslavia, revisionism in Poland, revolt in Hungary, and the beginning of a faint intellectual thaw in the USSR itself have awakened the Soviet leaders to the fact that their own ritualistic phrases contain two-edged swords. Dissident Marxist elements outside the Soviet Union have been turning such promises as the withering away of the state and a classless society into weapons with which to fight Soviet totalitarianism and imperialism. That the party leaders have been annoyed, if not concerned, over this issue may be seen from the following quotation: "The problem of the withering away of the . . . socialist state is the main thesis, indeed a veritable *idée fixe*, of contemporary revisionism. No sooner does the question of the state arise than they steer it to the issue of the withering away."²¹

In turn, the Soviet people too, experiencing material improvement, have been asking pointed questions about the specific nature of the promised land. Thus *Kommunist*, the theoretical organ of the party, declares (no. 12, August 1960) that communism must not be oversimplified or turned into "harebrained plans," that "The days of utopia, of arbitrary flights of fancy, have passed, giving way to higher responsibility in analyzing reality and in foresight" (p. 113). In that same issue *Kommunist* described (p. 117) what communism will not be like: it will not be that "you rise in the morning and you begin to reflect: where shall I go to work today—to the factory as the chief engineer, or shall I gather and lead the fishing brigade? Or perhaps fly to Moscow to conduct an urgent session of the Academy of Sciences?"

Apprehensive of what such flights into fancy might lead to, the party has found it wiser and safer to take this ideological bull by its utopian horns and give it a specific and desirable content. And when Khrushchev announced the arrival of the first stage of communism to the Twenty-First Party Congress he also

²¹ *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 4 (1960) p. 14.

took pains to stress that it was not to be a "vulgar, . . . formless, unorganized, and anarchic mass of people. No, it will be a highly organized and arranged cooperation of workers . . . [with everyone] fulfilling his functions as a laborer and his social duties at a determined time and in an established order" (*Pravda*, January 28, 1959). Transition to communism has thus come to serve the purpose of keeping the expectations of the Soviet people in check and purging the heretical elements outside the party.

Deviation from the Moscow interpretation of Marxism-Leninism is far from the only problem confronting the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in its relations with other communist-bloc nations. A very practical problem is that many of the East European satellites have not been progressing along the path of socialist construction at a rate fast enough to satisfy the Kremlin. Khrushchev has found the policy of transition to communism useful in this connection as well—although I doubt that it was designed expressly for this purpose. In a concerted effort to spur socialist construction and reduce existing resentment and disaffection, Khrushchev has been saying to each of the satellites he has visited that the path the USSR has followed is the historically correct one, as proved by the fact that it is now ready to enter communism, and if the other socialist countries wish to arrive at the same destination they must pattern themselves after the Soviet model. He has been telling them:

Comrades, the victory of world communism is beyond all doubt. The task that now faces all of us is to advance toward the cherished goal under the Marxist-Leninist banner. And since we march along a single path—face one and the same task—there is and can be no antagonism, no competition between us. We must work in unity and intimacy, hand in hand, in order to build communism. Our socialist countries are, however, at different stages in their advance toward communism. Up to now the building of socialism has been completed only in the Soviet Union. But I can assure you that we have no intention of entering communism alone—of eating ham every day while the rest of you look on and lick your chops. That would be immoral and wrong.

The more developed country must help those who are less developed. The more we help each other the quicker communism will triumph everywhere. But you must do your share. You must develop your socialist economy and increase labor productivity in order to equalize and eliminate differences. Then, and only then, shall we all be able to enter communism together along a united front.²²

Khrushchev has been trying to make a somewhat similar point with the Chinese communists. After the Russian Revolution the Bolsheviks tried and discarded the commune as the basis for organizing economic life. Early experience indicated that the masses were not ready for the commune system, which requires of its participants (among other things) a degree of socialist mentality and behavior presumably possible only after living in a socialist environment for many years. Thus the conclusion was reached that to begin with communes before completing the period of socialist construction would be to begin backward. But communist China, until very recently, insisted on using the communes in agriculture, despite Moscow's persistent urging to the contrary. By claiming the successful end of socialist construction in the USSR and the beginning of the "first stage of communism," Khrushchev has, in effect, been saying to the Chinese communists: "As you can see by the fact that we have already arrived, there is only one correct way to attain true communism—our way."

These, then, are some of the practical, pragmatic reasons underlying Khrushchev's decision to move up the time table. It is reasonable to presume that after the October 1961 meeting of the Twenty-Second Party Congress, and the ratification of the first communist constitution, further advantages (as well as some disadvantages) of this policy will come to light. Thus far, on net balance, transition to communism, resting comfortably on ideolog-

²² This quotation is entirely in Khrushchev's words, but since he often repeated himself, even in identical words, I have drawn passages from various of his speeches; see his *For Victory . . .* (cited above, note 11) pp. 323-24, 327, 350-51, 506, 511, 537, 545-46, 574-75, 585, 697, and 731.

ical belief in its historic inevitability and desirability, seems to be serving some highly useful purposes for the Soviet leadership.

v

What is the likelihood of the USSR actually attaining full communism in the foreseeable future? Any attempt to provide even a reasonably full answer to that question would require an analysis and evaluation of every aspect of Soviet society, a task that is entirely beyond the scope of this paper. There is one sense, however, in which the question can be answered more easily. I venture the guess that full communism will indeed be attained in the USSR in the near future—*by definition*. The four key features of communism are: the withering away of the state; economic abundance; from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs; and the New Soviet Man. As briefly as possible I shall indicate below how each of these features is being currently interpreted or reinterpreted to enable the Soviets to declare full communism a reality within the general time limit (1970-80) that has recently been set.

One of the principal reasons why so many non-Marxists have scoffed at the Marx-Engels vision of a communist utopia has been the commonsense notion that no modern society can possibly exist without a state or some form of government and law enforcement. From the Soviet point of view, Khrushchev has resolved the problem. While advocating the gradual extinction of the state organs, he has also stated (in *Pravda*, February 16, 1958) that "The party has stronger foundations than the state organs. It arose and exists not as a result of obligations of a legal order. Its development was called for by circumstances derived from political concepts, and mankind will always be in need of moral factors." Thus the state will indeed wither away, quite as Marx, Engels, and Lenin predicted. But the party, about which Marx and Engels had nothing to say in this connection, will remain forever, being rooted, as Khrushchev now finds it, in communist morality.

The requirement of economic abundance has also been given a specific meaning that makes communism appear more likely. Taking the slight cue provided by Engels, Khrushchev has enlarged on the idea that economic abundance does not mean an economy of "free goods" in the technical sense in which bourgeois economists use the term. His position, as stated in his speech to the Twenty-First Party Congress (*Pravda*, January 28, 1959), is that "When we speak of satisfying the needs of people, we have in mind not the whims and desires for luxury but the healthy requirements of a culturally developed man." The party, which never disappears, remains of course the arbiter of what is to be regarded as a whim and what constitutes the real needs of a cultured man.

The communist dogma "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs"—which entails a break in the functional relationship between productivity and reward—is a somewhat more complicated proposition to reinterpret. By way of an official effort the current tendency is to point to the growing share of welfare expenditures in the total governmental budget.²³ Such items as medical care, education, old-age pensions, holidays are, by their very nature, more closely tied to need than to contribution. An expansion of such services, coupled with a few dramatic gestures such as free bread and free public transportation, could easily be cited by Soviet authorities as evidence of one or another stage of a communist system of distribution. (I have heard talk, in the Soviet Union, that bread may soon be placed on the free list and, after that, public transportation. This is not surprising in light of the fact that rent has been virtually free almost from the inception of the Soviet regime; the rental charge for workers has been negligible and, according to some reports, is soon to be abolished entirely.) In the meantime, however, Khrushchev is saying that the traditional system of incentives is still necessary in order to reach fully an economy of abundance.

²³ See Alec Nove, "Toward a 'Communist Welfare State?'" in *Problems of Communism*, vol. 9, no. 1 (January-February 1960) pp. 1-10.

Finally, there is the thorniest problem of all—attainment of the New Soviet Man. Anyone who is even casually acquainted with recent Soviet developments is aware of the drive to force behavior into the mold of communist morality, and the severity of the penalties for failure to comply. The Soviet view is that the publicity given to acts contrary to communist morality in no way indicates a rise in vestigial behavior. And official statistics on the secular decline in crime and juvenile delinquency are cited as proof. The current campaign is explained as the final grand effort to get rid of the remnants of bourgeois mentality and behavior in order that full communism may emerge on schedule.

Should this offensive fail or fall short of expectation, there is still, however, a possibility of maintaining the myth—a possibility coming from the Soviet people themselves. Perhaps it was best stated in a fascinating book by Joseph Novak, a recent defector from the communist world. Telling of the fact that the party regards divorce among its members as a violation of communist morality, Novak says: "But our married couples anxious to part aren't so stupid. They try to give reasons for their desire to divorce which won't harm them, which may even improve their reputations in some places. They use political, ideological, social, and labor excuses, and lie like old veterans. For instance, a case will come up . . . where . . . a husband applies for a divorce. His reason? His wife . . . refuses to 'improve her intellectual and political standards by attending an ideological course organized by the union.' The husband continues to give examples of the 'political backwardness' of his wife, quoting views allegedly uttered by her."²⁴

Over the years of Bolshevik rule, the Russian people have found many ways of adjusting and adapting their thinking and behavior to new and often sudden conditions and requirements. It may yet be that, in order to survive, they can find even more subtle means by which to make the fiction of a communist utopia appear real—at least real enough to satisfy their party leaders.

²⁴ Joseph Novak, *The Future is Ours, Comrade* (New York 1960) p. 63.

COORDINATED ENERGY POLICY IN THE COMMON MARKET: THE GUIDANCE-PRICE PLAN

BY LESLIE E. GRAYSON

IN FEBRUARY 1960 a new coordinated energy policy was suggested for the EEC (European Economic Community)—the Common Market countries of Western Europe. The main feature of this policy, which is now under consideration, is the establishment of a "guidance price" for all energy throughout the six nations of the Common Market, with the objective of bringing greater stability into their energy markets. This means, in effect, that the coal industries of the Six would be protected to some extent (the concern over the coal industry is similar to that shown to agricultural production almost everywhere). The target of such a policy would be either to assure a given level of coal production or to maintain a certain share of the energy market for coal, although neither production level nor market share would necessarily remain constant; either could be reduced over time. The long-term goal of the guidance price would be to bring the now structurally dislocated coal industry to an equilibrium level in an orderly manner.

Stabilization efforts of this kind are not uncommon. In the United States, for example, there are a number of fairly analogous situations, sugar being probably the best illustration. The United States is both a producer and an important net importer of sugar. Under the present control system, instituted in 1934, the Secretary of Agriculture annually estimates total sugar requirements and assigns marketing quotas for domestic producers. Imports, which make up the difference, are limited by import quotas.

The coal industry is important to the economies of the Common Market countries for security and social reasons as well as

for economic reasons. While the security problem is less relevant now than it was a few years ago—because of the increased diversification of the supply sources of energy—it is still a consideration. As for the social considerations,¹ the coal industry is plagued with an unemployment problem, and while other measures have been taken to alleviate its short-run seriousness (such as subsidies) it is hoped that the guidance price may provide a long-run economic measure for its solution.

I

The basic factor leading to the formulation of the guidance-price proposal is the difficult oversupply situation faced by the Common Market coal industry today, a situation that reflects an overall surplus of energy sources and leads to a keen competition among fuels. After 1957, which was the year of the Suez crisis, the coal industry in the EEC countries encountered serious difficulties. The magnitude of these difficulties can best be judged by the accumulation of coal at the mines. Since 1958, as is evident from the accompanying figures (in thousands of metric tons of hard coal at year-end),² the unsold stocks at the mines of the Common

1952	7,101	1955	7,507	1958	24,538
1953	10,460	1956	5,793	1959	31,265
1954	12,426	1957	7,261	1960	27,784

Market countries have maintained an unusually high level, representing almost two months' supply at the present rate of consumption, in spite of some improvement during 1960. Problems arising out of this situation are most serious in Belgium, France, and Germany.

The coal industry's difficulties are due partly to exogenous factors, among which the most noteworthy are the slowing down in the last two or three years of the high growth rate of the earlier

¹ See International Labour Office, *Social Aspects of European Economic Cooperation* (Geneva 1956) pp. 47-52.

² OEEC, Paris (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation), *Statistical Bulletin* (March 1961) p. 15.

postwar years, both in the economic activity and in the energy consumption of the Common Market countries; the continued relatively high level of imports of United States coal; and increased competition from fuel oil. A main problem, however, concerns the industry itself: the lack of competitiveness of coal prices. A recent OEEC study³ shows that since 1913 the comparative price of coal has steadily increased, while the price of oil has risen very little in the last forty-five years. The price of fuel oil has actually declined since 1957, with the result that the coal-oil price parity has turned considerably to the detriment of coal. Consequently the percentage share of coal in the energy use of the Common Market countries decreased from 81 in 1950 to 60 in 1960, while that of oil increased from 12 to 30.

A further difficulty arises from the increasing competition from Soviet petroleum. Before 1953 the Soviet Union did not export oil in commercial quantities to Western Europe. Since that year, however, the USSR has steadily increased its export of oil, to the point that it now holds a noteworthy share of the market. By consistently offering price discounts it has increased the "softness" of the Western European oil markets. Still more significant is the recent USSR oil export drive, and the judgment of experts that the Soviet Union could in the next few years double or triple its present exports to Western Europe.⁴ In order to preserve a dependable minimum of secure supply, the energy policymakers in the Six hope to evolve, if possible, a common attitude toward imports from the Soviet Union. Undue reliance on Soviet supplies would endanger this objective.

The most recent event in the energy-surplus situation in the Common Market is the commercial production of oil in the French Sahara. While production was still small in 1959, it is

³ OEEC, *Towards a New Energy Pattern in Europe* (Paris 1960) p. 42.

⁴ Richard J. Ward, "Soviet Competition in Western Markets," in *Journal of Industrial Economics* (March 1960) p. 146. See also Frederick G. Coqueron, *Petroleum Industry, 1959*, Chase Manhattan Bank (New York 1960) p. 3; Theodore Shabad, *Russia's Potential in Future Oil Markets*, Second Arab Petroleum Congress (Beirut 1960).

expected to increase rapidly in the next few years, as can be seen from the accompanying figures, which show (in millions of tons) the projected supply of Saharan oil and the estimated French consumption.⁵ The production of oil in the French Sahara comes at a time of growing oversupply of petroleum.

	1959	1961	1965
Total Saharan Output	1.0-1.5	19-22	44-50
Estimated French Consumption	25	over 32	over 40

Because of these various considerations, and others that are applicable to individual countries, the governments of the EEC Member States began to intervene in their energy markets. As regards the coal markets, their action took the form of cancellation of some long-term import contracts and other import regulations. More extensive intervention took place in the petroleum markets of the Six. Germany imposed a tax on fuel-oil sales, and Belgium raised its tax on petroleum products; in France the existing refinery-licensing system insured the regulation of prices, and a somewhat similar system served that purpose in Italy. The Netherlands, however, did not effectively change its energy policy. Frequently the different methods of economic intervention in the energy markets of the Six had contradictory effects; for instance, Belgian coal mines were kept in operation, while German mines, having higher productivity, were closed down. Moreover, the intensity of the actions was not proportionate to the seriousness of the energy problems that had developed.

It was against this background that in 1959 the Interexecutive Committee on Fuel and Power was set up, in order to study existing competitive conditions within the Six and to formulate alternative proposals for solving present energy problems. This Committee is composed of members of the executive bodies of the three European Communities—EEC, ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), and Euratom—and reports to the Council

⁵ London *Financial Times*, October 7, 1959; lower projections of production figures have also been suggested.

of Ministers of ECSC. In its initial report the Committee stated the impossibility of formulating coordinated short-term policy measures without knowing beforehand what the long-term policy aims of the Six should be.⁶ The Committee also raised the basic problem of Common Market energy development—and posed the question whether there should eventually be a unified fuel and power policy, or instead merely an attempt to harmonize the effects of individual national policies on fuel and power. In the latter case there would be the danger that insufficient harmonization could lead to distortion in the price levels of fuel and power, and that these distortions could be carried over into the economies of the Six. (It should be noted that the idea of having a free market in energy was not seriously considered.) Thus the Committee recommended the development of a long-run unified policy for the Common Market countries.

Such a course required prior agreement on the basic principles of this common policy, including decisions on the most economical supply of fuel and power, security of supply, maintenance of a market economy, and a minimum of corrective mechanisms. To accomplish this the Interexecutive Committee suggested a policy of flexible rules for modifying, within a set time limit, the present fuel and power structures in the Common Market countries. Specifically, it recommended a common fuel-and-power price policy. This price policy is what has been termed the guidance-price plan.

Actually, efforts to arrive at some coordination of energy policy in the Common Market can be said to have originated earlier, in a Protocol of October 1957 between the ECSC and the Council of Ministers.⁷ As the ECSC saw it at that time, the task entailed the working out of principles that would facilitate the right choice of fuel and clarify the means of effectively implementing the

⁶ Agence Internationale d'Information pour la Presse, Luxembourg, *Europe: ECSC Daily Bulletin*, No. 1929, December 4, 1959, pp. 1-2.

⁷ ECSC, The High Authority, *Sixth General Report*, vol. 1 (Luxembourg 1958) pp. 41-42.

adopted policy.⁸ This original interest in an integration of the energy economies of the Six is reflected in the Interexecutive Committee's assertion, in its revised report on the guidance price, that it wanted to provide "an opportunity to obtain gradually a declaration of the intention to realize common objectives, the most important of which being the principle of unity of the Common Market in fuel and power sources and the free movement of products within this market. The adoption of common objectives would exclude the institution of different and contradictory measures in each Member State."⁹

On the other hand, pressures against the creation of a unified energy market are formidable. In the final analysis the realization of such a coordinated policy can be brought about only if the economic pressures are strong enough. That they are indeed strong enough is not necessarily evident from an examination of the energy economies of the Six.

Let us look first at the Member States' patterns of energy use and at the comparative degrees of autarchy of their energy economies. The accompanying figures show, for 1958, the percentage weights of the different sources of power in each country's total use of energy, and also each country's net dependence on energy imports.¹⁰ It is clear that the Belgian and German economies are essentially coal-based, while Italy is relatively little dependent on coal, and that the dependence on imported energy also varies greatly from one country to another, with Italy, the Netherlands, and France importing a considerable share of their requirements, and Germany importing very little (France received a good deal of its coal from the Saar). This variation in energy autarchy and in dependence on coal causes a conflict of interests that may well be difficult to reconcile. And within each country there is of

⁸ For excellent general discussions see William Diebold, Jr., *The Schuman Plan* (New York 1959) Part IV; Louis Lister, *Europe's Coal and Steel Community* (New York 1960) Chapter 10; and Tibor Scitovszky, *Economic Theory and Western European Integration* (Stanford, Calif., 1958) pp. 136-51.

⁹ *Europe: ECSC Daily Bulletin*, No. 2015, March 25, 1960.

¹⁰ ECSC, *The High Authority, Eighth General Report* (Luxembourg 1960) p. 87.

	<i>Belgium</i>	<i>W. Germany (incl. Saar)</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>
Coal	72.7%	81.1%	60.2%	20.0%	58.1%
Oil	26.6	15.1	27.9	39.3	40.7
Water Power	0.3	3.3	11.0	28.5	0.3
Natural Gas	0.4	0.5	0.9	12.2	0.9
	—	—	—	—	—
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Net Energy Imports in % of Total Energy Use</i>	<i>35%</i>	<i>6%</i>	<i>43%</i>	<i>54%</i>	<i>49%</i>

course a conflict also between the producing and the consuming interests.

Secondly, the emergence of commercial production in the French Sahara is regarded differently by Member States of the Common Market. The interest of France is clear, as most of the Sahara production is owned directly or indirectly by the French government (whatever the outcome of the French-Algerian negotiations concerning the Sahara, it is likely that Saharan oil will continue to be closely related to the EEC through France). And for France, increased Saharan production means not only higher revenues but foreign-exchange savings as well. The benefits accruing to the other Member States are not apparent, and those countries may well be reluctant to change the existing supply patterns.

Thirdly, the problem of oil imports from the Soviet bloc is looked on with varying degrees of alarm by the Member States. Germany has a policy of not interfering with imports from the Eastern Zone; in fact, Germany may want to continue to import oil from the Soviet Union in payment for increased German exports of industrial goods to the Soviet bloc. Some other Member States (Italy, for instance) have this consideration in mind at the present time, and view the increased Soviet-bloc exports with mixed attitudes. There is now a generally growing realization, however, that further Soviet penetration would in the long run be harmful to the interests of the Six.

It was in the face of these conflicting considerations that the Interexecutive Committee put forth its proposal of establishing

a guidance price for energy in the Common Market. On balance, it is difficult to predict at this time whether the Committee will be able to succeed in establishing a coordinated energy policy. And it is virtually impossible even to speculate on how the evolution of such a policy in the Six would be affected by negotiations for the entry of additional countries. On July 31, 1961, the United Kingdom announced its intention to open negotiations for entering the Common Market, and probably some of the other members of the present EFTA (European Free Trade Association) will also seek membership in the EEC. Of the present EFTA members, the United Kingdom is the only significant energy producer. It is not highly dependent on imports, and its energy situation is dominated by coal.

II

The guidance price is basically a reference price thought to be essential to the principle of energy coordination (in my belief, "reference price" would be a better term, but for the sake of uniformity it seems desirable to continue to use in this paper the terminology of the Interexecutive Committee). It is conceived of as a theoretical price of all energy, around which actual prices of the different types of energy would fluctuate. It is not thought of as a fixed price set by governments and superseding the market price, or as a maximum or minimum price. At any one time a discrepancy between the guidance price and the market price would indicate a discrepancy between the existing market conditions and those thought "desirable" by the energy coordinators. Presumably such a price discrepancy would indicate to the energy coordinators the nature and intensity of the desired corrective measures. For instance, if energy prices remained below the guidance price for a certain period, this would call for an intervention in favor of domestic producers. Intervention would be thought necessary whenever the difference between the guidance price and the actual price became greater than a given spread fixed in advance.

Establishment of the guidance price would provide, at the beginning, a survey of national energy policies in the Six, because the Member States' different spreads between guidance price and market price would reflect the energy policies of each country. Such a survey, it is hoped, would uncover discrepancies in the energy policies of the Member States. The Interexecutive Committee would then comment on these national policies, thereby making a start at energy coordination. It should be emphasized, however, that as the plan is presently envisaged, the means of aligning the market price for energy with the guidance price would remain the responsibility of each Member State. Thus it can be expected that the nature of the measures taken will vary from country to country. It seems to be the conviction of the members of the Interexecutive Committee that in energy coordination, price is the guiding instrument—in other words, that any intervention in the market economy implicitly or explicitly involves price.

On what objective criteria would a guidance price for energy be developed? It is being suggested by the Interexecutive Committee that the c.i.f. price of United States coal in Western Europe should be taken as the guidance price.¹¹ The reason for this selection seems to be twofold: first, United States coal represents the marginal energy imports required in the Common Market; and second, United States coal prices are expected to be relatively stable in the next few years, and thus to give a reasonable base for pricing.

The following calculation illustrates how the guidance price, if adopted, would be computed (steam coal is used for the illustration, as this type of coal, which has mainly industrial uses, is the main United States coal export to the Common Market):¹² \$8.50 steam coal per ton f.o.b. Hampton Roads + \$5.50 sea-freight rate

¹¹ *Europe: ECSC Daily Bulletin*, No. 1968, January 29, 1960, p. 1.

¹² For coal prices see U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*; for sea-freight rates see *Saward's Journal*, New York; and for coefficients to convert coal into fuel-oil equivalent see United Nations, *World Energy Supplies, 1956-1959*.

Hampton Roads to Rotterdam = \$14 steam coal per ton c.i.f. Rotterdam (equivalent to \$21 per ton of fuel oil). Also under consideration is the use of a multiple basing-point system for computation of the guidance price. Alternative basing points may be Strasbourg, an inland city, and Naples or Genoa, the two large coal ports on the west coast of Italy. In arriving at the guidance price the selection of the "basing point" is a difficult one.

If the guidance price is to be representative of world energy prices it is necessary to have the broadest possible base for its calculation. On the other hand, even if all supply points were to be taken into consideration, a difficult enough proposition in itself, the problem of weights in calculating the weighted average of a guidance price would still exist. As was mentioned, the reason for selecting American coal as a basis for the guidance price seems to be partly that United States coal imports into the Common Market represent marginal energy imports. But the import of United States coal into the Common Market is not necessarily a permanent phenomenon, and indeed it is likely that this source of supply will diminish. Moreover, the use of this rather than some other criterion, say the price of Middle Eastern fuel oil, has the effect of keeping the guidance price higher, as Middle Eastern fuel oil is presently available in Western Europe below the proposed guidance price. The Interexecutive Committee has given no indication of other possible criteria. Alternative bases for the guidance price would depend, of course, on policy goals. Thus Middle Eastern fuel-oil prices could be used if inexpensive energy supply were the goal; the price of indigenous coal could be chosen if the purpose was to balance demand with the desired level of domestic supply. It may be worth noting that on the United States east coast, coal has to be competitive with fuel oil and natural gas, and that therefore the adoption of American coal prices as the basis for energy pricing in the Common Market would inevitably tend to "harmonize" the energy economies on the two sides of the Atlantic, and move them toward a common base.

Two further alternative economic objectives of the guidance price are under consideration.¹³ One is to reduce the adverse effects of business cycles on individual domestic energy sources while keeping Common Market energy prices generally consistent with world energy prices. This is essentially a short-term objective that would be operative when cyclical conditions require action. It would also include an initial protective adjustment of indigenous energy to world prices. And the second is to assure a desired level of energy production from domestic sources. In this connection, security considerations are now being cited. This is a long-term objective and would have as its primary aim the orderly readjustment of the coal industry, with the guidance price serving to protect indigenous energy supplies. Pressure to adopt this second course is considerable. Under it, Common Market energy prices might be higher than world prices.

The guidance price, if adopted, may have far-reaching implications affecting the six Member States' economies as well as the pattern of future energy supplies in the Common Market.¹⁴ For one thing, it may well set energy prices higher than they would be under competition. This would clearly be the case under the objective of protecting domestic energy production, and would probably be the result also under the objective of lessening cyclical fluctuations in the energy industries—even though the avowed purpose were only to even out price fluctuations. If energy prices were thus raised beyond their competitive level, a consequence might be increased costs for Common Market industries; those that have a large energy component in cost—such as iron and steel, aluminum, and some chemicals—would be particularly affected. This aspect is especially noteworthy because under the theory of comparative trade advantage it would be in the interest of the Six to keep the costs of their energy inputs low, to export

¹³ See the discussion in *Europe: ECSC Daily Bulletin*, Nos. 2012 and 2013, March 22 and 23, 1960.

¹⁴ See M. V. Leemans, *Rapport sur les problèmes de la coordination dans le domaine de la politique énergétique*, Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, Document 42, Luxembourg, June 1960, pp. 5-9.

competitive manufactured goods, and to import energy—a product in which the Six do not have a relative advantage.

Another probable consequence would be the effect on the structure of energy industries themselves. It would be awkward to set the guidance price for any period of time, since the supply-and-demand situation shifts constantly. On the other hand, every change in the price would be cumbersome, as it would involve conflicts between the interests of the different producers and also between the interests of the producers and the consumers. Thus there would be a tendency to change the price as infrequently as possible, a course that would encourage rigidity.

From the point of view of the world economy it is significant to note that there has traditionally been considerable trade in both coal and oil between the Six and the rest of the world. Thus isolation of the EEC from the world energy markets would be difficult, and to the extent that it could be accomplished it would increase the already existing surpluses elsewhere.

The question still remains, of course, how the guidance price would be used as a policy instrument. So great a range of policy instruments for enforcing the guidance price is available that it is hazardous to speculate. Two possibilities may be mentioned, however. For one, it is possible that the only purpose of the guidance price would be to admonish the energy suppliers to observe voluntarily the desired price of energy. Historical experience with voluntary compliance on matters like this is not encouraging. More probable, therefore, are measures to enforce the guidance price through government regulations, by quotas, tariffs, or excise taxes, of the profitability of crude imports, refinery operations, and marketing.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the proposal of a guidance price arose because the traditional market mechanism seemed to have failed to provide a stable equilibrium in the energy markets of the Six. Their coal industries are in a difficult position, and the guidance price is intended to provide an "umbrella" until production is rationalized. Because of the state of the energy

markets the individual governments of the six Member States are already intervening in these markets. Thus the choice is not between a "free" and an "administered" market, but rather whether to have six administered markets or just one. The goal of the Common Market is integration of the economies of the six Member States. It is unlikely that the energy industries can stay outside the overall trend. Moreover, one goal of the guidance price is to rationalize investment in the energy sector. As the economies of the Six become progressively integrated in accordance with the Common Market Treaty, investment funds can be rationalized better on a Community-wide basis than on different national bases. The guidance price would not only affect domestic production but also influence the planning of the long-run investment programs of the energy industries. This is significant because most of these investment programs are of an economically irreversible character.

III

The pricing of energy resources in the Common Market represents at present a mixture of administered and market pricing.¹⁵ Coal companies are forced by the ECSC Treaty to publish their price lists and to charge the same price to all customers. The pricing of petroleum products is a reflection of prices in the Persian Gulf, plus tanker rates from the Middle East to European destinations. Theoretically, as I have indicated, the proposed guidance price is similar to the "target" price concept, its purpose being to stabilize the energy markets of the Common Market countries and assure a "fair" share of that market for coal. The economic pressures for the adoption of the guidance price, though not unanimous, are nevertheless strong, and the new proposals

¹⁵ See I. M. D. Little, *The Price of Fuel* (Oxford 1953). On administered or target prices see A. D. H. Kaplan, Joel B. Dirlam, Robert F. Lanzillotti, *Pricing in Big Business* (Washington 1958); R. F. Lanzillotti, "Pricing Objectives in Large Companies," in *American Economic Review* (December 1958); J. R. Hicks, *Value and Capital*, 2d ed. (Oxford 1953); Frank H. Knight in *The Determination of Just Wages in Twentieth Century Economic Thought*, ed. by Glenn Hoover (New York 1950).

are being given serious consideration by the responsible officials of the Common Market.

It should be recognized, however, that experience shows stabilization efforts of this kind to have a restrictionist tendency. In times of oversupply, restrictions would be applied; if the market price rose above the guidance price, the only thing that could be done would be to eliminate the protection. The question can also be asked whether the raising of the price of a surplus commodity (coal) would cure the chronic overproduction situation. Past experience indicates that the answer must be in the negative: ¹⁸ original intentions notwithstanding, the raising or fixing of the price of a surplus commodity at best preserves the high-cost producers and, at worst, slows down the development of more economical sources of output.

The economic consequences of the guidance price, if adopted, would depend on the nature of the enforcement. It is safe to conclude, however, that this price policy would be likely to raise the cost of energy above world-market levels, and thus to slow down the rate of expansion in energy demand and, to a limited extent, the rate of economic expansion. These would be the likely long-term consequences. Short-term economic policies are usually directed at alleviating immediate embarrassments arising out of surpluses and price weaknesses. It is true that during 1960 the coal output of the Six remained steady and stocks declined slightly. But the Interexecutive Committee believes that this was achieved only because 1960 was a boom year, and that if a recession were to occur, coal would bear the burden of it. As a matter of fact, the Interexecutive Committee hopes that an agreement of limited duration—three to five years—will be concluded while the situation is relatively favorable, rather than waiting until a crisis develops, when the intervention might come too late. This explains the present concern over the establishment of a coordinated energy policy in the Common Market.

¹⁸ See Edward S. Mason, *Controlling World Trade* (New York 1946), especially Chapter 5.

MODERNITY AND TRADITION IN BRITAIN

BY STANLEY ROTHMAN

The Englishman is tempted to believe that no-one outside his happy island is altogether worthy to play cricket or the parliamentary game.

Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*

WITH the increasing study of non-Western societies it is becoming ever more apparent that the countries of the West, whatever differences may exist among them, form part of a common European civilization. It seems, therefore, that a fruitful approach to analysis of the social and political systems of any Western country is to seek a dynamic understanding of the particular combination of Western elements that have characterized them—and thus to develop a common set of categories for comparisons both among Western nations and between Western and non-Western nations. In this essay such an approach is applied to Britain. My thesis is that the structure and dynamics of British social and political life are to be understood in terms of the traditional society out of which modern Britain emerged, and the particular manner in which the transition to modernity developed. More specifically, it is argued that a crucial key to understanding British social and political life is the fact that Britain entered upon modernity as a *Gemeinschaft*, to use a term coined by Tönnies, that is, a collectivity whose members are bound together by *affective* ties to the collectivity itself, and to each other as members of the collectivity.¹

¹ Ferdinand Tönnies, *Fundamental Concepts of Sociology*, tr. by Charles P. Loomis (New York 1940). Actually, of course, I am following Weber's use of the term; see Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, tr. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York 1947) pp. 156-58.

I do not, of course, maintain that the development of British social and political life is to be explained solely in terms of *Gemeinschaft*. Certainly a complex combination of variables operating over time determined the pattern that emerged; in the nineteenth century, for example, important influences were such factors as Britain's economic supremacy, the role of empire as safety valve, the role of Methodism. My point is that a particular pattern of social relations did develop, and that as such it played an autonomous causal role. In effect this pattern represented the nationalization of the class structure and attitudes that had been characteristic of the mediaeval manor. And as a result, British political and social life has been characterized, at least until recently, by a unique synthesis of traditional elements and the forces that transformed them. For example, the emergence of democratic conceptions of authority in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was associated, as Bagehot and later commentators have noted, with the maintenance of a deferential society and a governing class characterized by strong feelings of *noblesse oblige*.

In what follows I shall attempt to demonstrate that these propositions systematize features of British social and political life that have heretofore been explained by ad hoc propositions or not explained at all, and that they enable us to make meaningful and systematic comparisons between the British social and political systems and those of other Western countries. For such comparisons I shall refer primarily to France and the United States. And my analysis will focus primarily on political life.

I

The British introduced Europe, and we may say the whole world, to "modernity." It was in Britain that the practical, that is, industrial, use of modern science had its beginnings, and it was there that the Calvinist sects sprang up which provided the psychological basis for capitalist entrepreneurship. It was in Britain, too, that the multiplicity of sects springing from Calvinism itself (and from the destruction of a central religious authority which was a con-

comitant of the break with Rome) prepared the way for the erosion of a psychologically compelling religious view of the universe, and hence for the emergence of the secular world view. Thus the modern outlook sprang naturally, as it were, from British soil. This may go a long way to explain why the rifts that developed in other countries, where the new was introduced from the outside, and where "modern" men had to struggle with far "stickier" societies, never reached full proportions in Britain. It also explains why many traditional social patterns retained their viability in the face of dramatic change. They could more easily be accommodated to the social-economic and ideological revolution to which they had given birth than was the case with other nations.

One of the key variables here is that England had developed many of the characteristics of a modern nation before the economic and social revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—indeed, much earlier. Henry VIII could consummate the break with Rome with relative ease, in part because he no longer had to compete with a powerful quasi-independent aristocracy, and because Britons, bound together by a common law and a set of national institutions, thought of the Roman church as a foreign church.² Thus England escaped the religious upheavals that rent the continent. And, even more important, the liberal economists and political theorists of a later period felt far less need to completely transform traditional patterns than did reformers in other countries. Among the aims of all continental reformers was the development of an integrated national state under a common law. Traditional English society was characterized by both.

But the fact that England had developed national institutions before the reformers' attack on traditional modes of thought and action meant that these institutions and the modes of thought associated with them retained important traditional elements. Eighteenth-century England, in practice as well as theory, was more than a mere aggregation of atoms bound together by law or force. The "estates" of the realm were functionally related to

² D. L. Keir, *The Constitutional History of Modern Britain* (London 1955) p. 57.

one another by traditionally defined rights, duties, and attitudes. It was as if the state were the mediaeval manor writ large—as if the sense of mutual responsibilities which had theoretically characterized the manor had been transferred to the national level. Thus the state played a continuing role in regulating conditions of work, and secular authorities took over from the Church the care of the indigent and poor through a system of outdoor relief that reached its culmination in the Speenhamland system of 1795.³ And we find here a governing class willing, despite some grumbles, to support "poor rates" that were quite high. Comparison with France is instructive. As Trevelyan notes: "The worst horrors of failure, of unemployment or of unprovided old age were not suffered by the poor in England to the same extent as in the continental countries of the ancient regime. The regiments of beggars, such as continued to swarm in the streets of Italy, and of France under Louis XIV, were no longer over here . . . That is one reason . . . why through all our political, religious and social feuds from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Centuries the quiet and orderly habits of the people, even in times of distress, continued upon the whole as a national characteristic."⁴ I certainly do not want to suggest that English social life at this point was idyllic, but for present purposes it is the comparison that is important.

Modernity, the rapid industrialization that transformed traditional societies, came to the Western world in the form of liberal capitalism, of which the intellectual grandfather was John Locke and the most systematic British exponents were the philosophic radicals.⁵ The premises of liberalism stood in direct antithesis to the assumptions of the society it sought to transform. For natural inequality it substituted natural equality, each man counting as one. For a view of secular history as a series of events it substituted

³ See Karl Polyani, *The Great Transformation* (New York 1944).

⁴ George Trevelyan, *Illustrated English Social History*, vol. 2 (New York 1942) p. 88.

⁵ See Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago 1953) pp. 202-51; also Elie Halévy, *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism*, tr. by Mary Morris (London 1928).

a conception of history as the development toward a future in which men would become happier and more moral as they achieved increasing control over nature. For reliance on the traditional ways of doing things it substituted the method of reason and the standard of utility. It accepted and even welcomed changing patterns of social life. In economic thought it idealized the free market, and attacked all limitations on the natural play of economic laws, whether these resulted from tariffs, guilds, the regulation of wages, or poor rates. It equated the good life with the life of economic wellbeing, and subordinated other values to those of economic expansion. It expected continued technological and economic progress. The philosophic reaction to liberal capitalism came in the form of the rationalization of tradition, that is, conservative thought, and the clash between the advocates of the new and the defenders of the old took a variety of forms.

In the United States, with its general lack of traditional social patterns, no substantial conservative orientation emerged. The premises of liberal thought were regarded as natural, and were accepted almost immediately, with an interpretation that was democratic, egalitarian, and atomistic. As Hartz points out,⁶ the United States thus skipped the traditional stage of European society and began life essentially as a modern nation. As a result, American society was never characterized by the sharp ideological conflicts that developed in European nations. Ideological conflict involves basic disagreements on the nature of legitimate political authority and the goals of political action. And sharp as labor-capital conflicts became in this country, the fact is that both groups were committed to essentially a liberal-capitalist outlook, and hence the situation cannot be described in terms of ideological conflict. Compared to developments in almost every other nation in the world since the early nineteenth century, the changes experienced by the United States have been relatively marginal.

The development in France is illustrative. While Americans drew the most radical theoretical implications from Locke, these

⁶ Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York 1955).

did not produce radicalism on the practical level, for they described substantially what existed. In France too the premises of liberalism yielded radical consequences almost immediately, but there the same theoretical conclusions, and the attempt to carry them out, could only mean violent social upheaval and further radicalization. (This helps explain the ambivalence with which Americans like Jefferson regarded the French Revolution: they could not help but agree with the ideas of the revolutionaries, but they recoiled from the results of those ideas and from the kind of men whom really radical social changes generally bring to power.) In France the "stickiness" of preexisting social patterns resulted in Jacobinism, the emergence of an intransigent conservatism, and the development of a persistent fault in French society that finds its violent echoes down to the present.⁷

British development exhibits still another pattern. Whig historians have written of the triumph of liberalism, and socialists of the triumph of the middle class and of capitalism. Actually neither of these interpretations is completely satisfactory, for the actual course of events involved an intermingling of liberal and traditional views of society. As with Calvinism itself, liberalism was transformed even as it transformed the traditional community out of which it emerged. The result was that while Britain became more and more liberal as the nineteenth century proceeded, so liberalism took on increasing traditional content. In this process the fact that Britain was already a national community played an important role: it muted the inherently radical premises of conflicting ideologies, thus permitting the pragmatic handling of issues arising from violent social changes; and in some areas it even inhibited the very conception of thought patterns that might tend to shatter the stability of the community. Thus the logical consequences of liberal premises were muted on the levels of both thought and action. The liberal attack on the Establishment was never a total attack, and conservatives never held on to the point

⁷ See George H. Sabine, "The Two Democratic Traditions," in *Philosophical Review*, vol. 61 (October 1952) pp. 451-75.

of no return. Later, when the area of conflict shifted and a socialist movement developed, the pattern repeated itself.

The consequences of the liberal idea were many: the gradual extension of the suffrage through the great reform bills; the establishment of free trade, culminating in the repeal of the Corn Laws; the new Poor Law of 1834; and so on. Politically the result was a society that was becoming more and more democratic, with consequent shifts in the distribution of power. Economically the result was the creation of a society that for a short time approached the model of *laissez faire*—but only for a short time and never completely, for at the same time that a new “economic” Poor Law was being introduced, so were factory acts. And the pace of social reform of this type increased as the century wore on, to culminate in the National Insurance Act of 1911, providing for universal unemployment insurance, old-age protection, and a very extensive system of free medical care.

Again it should be emphasized that the history of social and economic change cannot be associated solely with either a party or a social class. Conservatives in Britain accepted significant portions of the new economics and the new politics, and the Whigs (liberals) accepted the idea of community responsibility, despite the heavy weight they attached to the arguments of the liberal economists.⁸ Classic liberalism assigned very little role to the state aside from the maintenance of law and order (and American liberals, until the New Deal period, were committed to this point of view). But British liberals, almost from the beginning, implicitly considered the state to have a creative role in transforming the will of the community into action, if only to eliminate feudal abuses.

A notable area in which liberal theory was quickly eroded in action was its acceptance of the legitimacy of trade-union organization. In the classic liberal view, labor was a commodity to be bought as cheaply as possible, and any limitation on free contract, in the form of associations of men, was thought to be a positive

⁸ See E. L. Woodward, *The Age of Reform, 1815-1870* (London 1938) p. 142.

evil. Here again, however, a large number of Britons, while accepting the views of the "economists" in theory, felt that workers had as much right to protect their interests as the masters—a reflection of the traditional view of society as made up of organized estates. This comes out quite clearly in the debates on the Combination Acts of 1824 and 1825, especially the latter. At neither time did the point of view that labor had no right to organize command substantial support. The only question really raised dealt with the limitations to be placed on trade-union activity.⁹ Again the capstone was the insurance act of 1911, which, by providing that benefits be paid through friendly societies, almost compelled individuals to join unions and fostered their ever more rapid growth. In contrast to the United States, where the organization of "interests" has always been regarded as somewhat sinister, all British governments have discussed proposed legislation with the interests affected, and have even encouraged the amalgamation of different organizations representing the same interest, so that consultations might be more readily completed.¹⁰

Traditional histories of the working-class movement tend to emphasize the workers' "struggle" for the recognition of "rights." Without denying the fact of opposition and even sharp conflict, one is struck by the relative rapidity with which working-class organization was accepted in Britain as compared with either France or the United States. Trade unions were not legalized in France until 1884, and until 1890 the French worker had to carry a *livret* or be accounted a vagabond; he handed it to his employer when he took a job and could not take another unless his employer signed and returned the book to him, thus indicating that all obligations had been met. While legal prohibitions were not nearly so severe in the United States, there too the individualistic orientation of both employers and workers seriously inhibited

⁹ Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates* (second series): xi (1824) 409, 911; xii (1825) 1288, 1351.

¹⁰ See Gilbert Walker, *Economic Planning by Programme and Control in Great Britain* (London 1957) pp. 135-36.

the formation of trade unions. In Britain, moreover, the amount of violence attending conflicts between labor and capital was relatively small. Workers preferred letters to the *Times* and an appeal to the general will of the community to mounting the barricades. And capitalists were willing to yield under pressure rather than maintain a completely intransigent position. The willingness to compromise built on itself. British employers, in contrast to the French, did not think of trade-union leaders as irresponsible revolutionaries, and trade-union leaders came to expect the possibility of gains based on peaceful action. I am aware, of course, that this picture flies in the face of conventional discussions of the nineteenth century, but so far as I can determine, the evidence for it, if one takes a comparative view, is overwhelming.

Before turning to the development of British political life, I wish to add a word on the emergence of modern socialism. This is not simply, in my opinion, a concomitant of industrialization or of liberal capitalism. If it were, a socialist party of substantial size should have developed in the United States. It seems more reasonable to search for the origins of Western socialism in the particular relationships that characterized European society. More specifically, following Hartz and Ulam,¹¹ I would argue that a key factor was the emergence of liberal capitalism, that is, bourgeois society, out of a preexisting feudal society. According to this view, the class consciousness of European workers and their reaction to the imperatives of industrialism and the atomism of liberalism are related to two main factors: the tension between the continuing class consciousness of the European bourgeoisie and the promise of liberalism; and the tension between the imperatives of a liberal-capitalist society and an awareness of what had been before. Certainly socialism's intellectual attack on liberalism combines the insights of the conservative reaction to liberal society with the liberal promise of equality and affluence.

But if the class consciousness of the worker explains the ulti-

¹¹ Hartz (cited above, note 6) and Adam B. Ulam, "The Historical Role of Marxism and the Soviet System," in *World Politics*, vol. 8 (October 1955) pp. 20-45.

mate attraction of a working-class party, what explains the relative moderation of British socialism as a movement? Is not part of the answer to be found in the relative muting, in Britain, of the implications of liberal thought, from which socialism took its promise, and in the social content that almost immediately infused British liberalism?

In Britain the intellectuals who embraced socialism were, by and large, far from being in total rebellion against the society they wished to change. The fact that the state constantly intervened to ameliorate economic evils took the edge off social protest. And the success of trade unions, first of the skilled and then of the unskilled, gave workers a stake in the system. Not only did it provide a career open to talents for the most dynamic of the workers, but it gave them a sense of belonging to an estate whose interests were represented. Here the history of the first and second generations of the leaders of the unskilled is instructive. The pattern is typified by the career of Ernest Bevin: beginning as a member of the Social Democratic Federation, he gradually sloughed off his radicalism as he achieved power at the head of a highly successful trade union. This was not, of course, a question of betrayal or of the "aristocratic embrace," but rather an acceptance of the legitimacy of a system of which he had become part.¹²

British radicals, even while preaching moderate socialism, refused to attack the basic communal values of the society. Contrast, for example, Clement Attlee and Léon Blum.¹³ By 1920 Blum was certainly no longer a *political* revolutionary. Yet throughout his life he mounted a fundamental attack on all of what he con-

¹² On Bevin see Trevor Evans, *Bevin of Britain* (London 1946); Francis Williams, *Bevin* (London 1946); J. T. Murphy, *Labour's Big Three* (London 1948); and Alan Bullock, *The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin*, vol. 1 (London 1960). On other trade-union leaders see J. M. Clynes, *Memoirs* (London 1938); Will Thorne, *My Life's Battles* (London 1925); Ben Tillett, *Memoirs and Reflections* (London 1931).

¹³ On Blum see Louise Dalby, "The Ideas of Léon Blum," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Radcliffe College (1956). On Attlee see Hugh Jenkins, *Mr. Attlee* (London 1948); or read Attlee's *The Labour Party in Perspective—and Twelve Years Later* (London 1949) and *As it Happened* (London 1954).

sidered the "bourgeois" premises of French society, including conceptions of love and the family. Attlee, on the other hand, accepted all of these values; indeed he could not conceive of questioning them. Thus when Blum outlines the future that socialism will bring, his words induce the intellectual excitement of a radical and total attack, but Attlee on this subject is merely dull. In Britain fundamental criticisms of the basic values of the community are left to literati, who are always marginal politically; there, in contrast to France, literary and political criticism hardly ever meet. Radicals from other countries who find haven in England are almost always highly critical of what seems to them the insularity and stuffiness of their English comrades.

II

British politics is characterized by a disciplined two-party system. The fact of two parties it shares with the United States; the fact of disciplined parties it shares, at least in some measure, with the European continent. The combination is almost unique, and can be fully understood only in terms of the previous discussion.

It has frequently been asserted that the existence of a two-party system in Britain is primarily the result of its system of single-member electoral districts, for this system discriminates sharply against minor parties.¹⁴ But this essentially mechanical answer is not satisfactory in and of itself, even though it may represent a factor of significance. The electoral system did not prevent the continued existence of a party that represented a geographically segregated ethnic minority, the Irish: those who continued to support the nationalist cause felt that neither of the major British parties had anything of importance to offer them. And even if a minority were not isolated geographically, but felt strongly enough about certain kinds of issues, it might continue to support the party of its choice despite the discrimination of the electoral

¹⁴ The classic American exposition is provided by E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York 1942); see also Maurice Duverger, *Les partis politiques* (Paris 1951).

system. This was the experience of the Labour Party itself for a number of years, and also of the French Communist Party during 1924-36, when it was heavily discriminated against by the electoral system. In fact it can be argued that discrimination of this kind against powerful minority sentiments may have the result of turning them to violence. Thus while single-member districts may create a tendency toward two parties, the ultimate result may be the replacement of a party system by civil war. Apropos of this, it can be argued that the political polarization that occurred in the United States between 1852 and 1860 was not unrelated to the existence of an electoral system characterized by single-member districts and a popularly elected president.

In other words, if single-member electoral districts are to produce a successful (in the sense of working peacefully over time) two-party system, a precondition is necessary: the society in which the system operates must not be characterized by sharp conflicts.¹⁵ Only under this condition can the major parties absorb the adherents of the minor. If single-member electoral districts have served, in both Britain and the United States, to produce a successful two-party system, they have done so because in some measure the politics of the two countries is pragmatic, founded on basic social consensus.

How then do we explain the differences between the British and American systems, specifically the difference between a disciplined two-party system and one that is not disciplined? Without attempting a total explanation of this complex problem, I would emphasize that one necessary condition for the development of party discipline is that the party be more than a party: it must be a "cause," representing a particular *Weltanschauung*. It is notable that party discipline in Britain reached its maximum only after the emergence of the Labour Party;¹⁶ and what has

¹⁵ See the typology developed by D. A. Rustow, "Some Observations on Proportional Representation," in *Journal of Politics*, vol. 12 (February 1950) pp. 107-28.

¹⁶ James B. Christoph, "The Study of Voting Behavior in the British House of Commons," in *Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 11 (June 1958) pp. 319-40. See also Leon D. Epstein, "British Mass Parties in Comparison with American Parties,"

held the Labour Party together has been the self-imposed discipline not only of the party but also of an electorate to whom party meant everything and the quality of individual leadership meant practically nothing. This has been partly true also of the communists in France and of the socialists and Catholics in Germany, but in the multi-party environments of the continent, where the significance of party "mission" becomes blurred by the fine shadings of political differences, even "radical" parties, or those representing a given religious or ethnic group, have found it more difficult to maintain discipline than has the Labour Party. The discipline that has characterized the British Conservative Party in recent years has been not so much the result of a positive sense of mission as a reflex to the discipline of those who have opposed it within the framework of a two-party system. And in the United States, where a radical party has not developed, for reasons already outlined, this essential ideological basis for party discipline has not existed.

But if we grant the importance of this factor we are faced with what, on the surface, appears to be something of a paradox. Among the necessary conditions of a successful two-party system is the existence of pragmatic politics, but among the necessary conditions of disciplined parties is that, in some sense, they be more than parties—that they represent *Weltanschauungen*, divergent ideologies. How can it be held that both of these seemingly contradictory conditions have obtained in Britain? The answer lies again in the fact that ideological and class conflict has always taken place in Britain within the framework of a more inclusive attachment to the community as such. I suggest that British politics cannot be understood unless these interrelations are recognized.

It has often been argued that the key to a disciplined party

in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 80 (March 1956) pp. 97-125; W. J. M. MacKenzie et al., "Partis politiques et classes sociales en Angleterre" (mimeographed, n.d.); Leslie Lipson, "The Two Party Tradition in British Politics," in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 67 (June 1953) pp. 337-59.

system in Britain lies in the continued authority of the Crown, which devolved upon the prime minister—including, and this is what is generally emphasized, the power of dissolution. The effective institutionalization of the power of dissolution in the hands of the prime minister has also been cited—especially by Frenchmen who have seen absence of this power as one of the prime sources of the weakness of the French executive—to explain why British government has effectively become cabinet government while France, at least until the Fifth Republic, remained a parliamentary regime. Undoubtedly the power of dissolution played a role, but the answer is far more complex than this, and in fact the institutionalization of the dissolution power has itself to be explained. Why did the dissolution powers of the French monarchy not devolve upon the prime minister?

Again I would suggest that the development of the dissolution power in Britain, and indeed the whole system of cabinet government, can best be understood in terms of our previous discussion. More specifically, it was *possible* for cabinet government to emerge there because Britain's transition from traditional to modern society was associated not only with the development of class and ideological conflict and hence with the emergence of a disciplined two-party system, but also with the fact that party leaders, convinced of the necessity of effective governance, continued, despite their differences, to assign a creative role to the state as the executive arm of the community. These points can be clarified by comparing British developments with those of France and the United States.

The first precondition of the emergence of cabinet government was the development of a parliamentary regime in which legislative and executive authority was derived from the same body. This occurred in all European countries as the traditional balance among king, aristocracy, and commons tipped toward the commons, and authority came to reside in the institution responsible to the people.

In the United States, however, the political separation and

balance of power created by the founding fathers maintained itself. It could do so for a number of reasons. First of all it was not, as in Britain, a social balance. Thus the president, unlike the English monarch, could combine democracy with authority. But even given this, and the constitutional fetishism that quite early came to characterize American public life, the pattern still might have been different. Had the country been sharply divided into numerous splinters, as was France, we might have slipped into Caesarism. Or had sharp class divisions yielded two disciplined parties, and had Americans felt a strong need for a state capable of carrying out a relatively integrated and active public policy, it is certainly possible that some greater integration between the president and the legislature would have developed. In other words, both the structure and the dynamics of our political system are a result of our having been born a modern nation, that is, a liberal society.¹⁷

In France, as in England, dissolution was originally part of the prerogative of the monarch. Under the constitution of the Third Republic the power was assigned to the president. It was not used by him after MacMahon and *seize mai*, but there is no logical reason that the power could not have devolved upon a prime minister who was immediately responsible to a parliamentary majority. The reasons it failed to do so are not difficult to uncover. Part of the answer lies in the feeling of the "republicans" that such authority would bring with it the dangers of "reactionary" plebiscitarianism, but of great importance as well was the emergence of a multi-party system from a fragmented political culture.

Such was the nature of this system that in order to become prime minister one needed the support of the Assembly as against the support of one's party. Therefore if one wished to obtain office one did not force deputies to fight another election, in which

¹⁷ On the relationship between our being a totally liberal society and our constitutional fetishism see Hartz (cited above, note 6). The word fetishism is not used here in a pejorative sense.

the issues would, in any event, be unclear and nothing would be resolved. And, in general, those who obtained office were men with a sense of "balance" who, despite differences of ideological nuance, liked and were liked by a reasonably substantial number of deputies. These were men who were, by and large, more oriented to office than to policy. Even during the Fourth Republic, then, when the dissolution power was specifically given to the prime minister, it was used only once. In fact, many potential ministers were forced to promise that they would not make use of this power unless the Assembly supported them. Thus, given the existence of a multiplicity of ideological parties that found it impossible to achieve their ends, individual deputies (with the exception of the communists or the very extreme right) were always tempted to seek the satisfaction of their constituents' immediate demands through mutual backscratching and the power that comes from office. As a result, the political system was such, paradoxically enough, as to transform ideological into pragmatic politics.¹⁸

In Britain, finally, it was widely agreed that, whatever the balance of political forces, effective government was required. But given the acceptance of popular sovereignty, the emergence of two disciplined parties implied that an effective government could be formed only by the party that possessed a majority, rather than, as had been the case in the middle of the nineteenth century, by intra-parliamentary negotiation. If the leader of that party lost his compact majority his only course, save in exceptional circumstances, was to dissolve the parliament, since the breakdown of agreement within a party precluded effective government. And since the electoral fate of his party became bound up with the image of the government and the prime minister, his

¹⁸ For discussions of the Third and Fourth Republics see H. Luethy, *France Against Herself* (New York 1955); David Thomson, *Democracy in France* (London 1946); R. de Jouvenal, *La république des comrades* (Paris 1914); Nathan Leites, *On the Game of Politics in France* (Stanford 1959); and P. Williams' very perceptive article, "Compromise and Crisis in French Politics," in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 62 (September 1957) pp. 321-39.

authority was bound to increase, especially since, except in the most rare circumstances, one preferred one's own party in office, whatever one's disagreements with official policy.¹⁹

This relationship between government and parliament, which emerged with the modern party system in Britain, is what structured the present organization of the Commons. In France and the United States legislators have, for different reasons, been primarily members of the legislature rather than members of a government or an opposition, and thus legislative policy there has been largely determined by a mutual give-and-take among legislators who are anxious both to pass what they consider to be good legislation and to satisfy the interests they represent. But if the legislation that is introduced does not come from a government of trusted colleagues who have at their disposal the bureaucratic apparatus necessary for drawing up a program, the legislature is thrown back on itself. Thus a complex system of subject-matter committees has developed, and the committees, since they acquire the authority and prestige that come from expertise and power over time tables, have drawn to themselves the most dynamic members of the legislature. This, of course, serves to further weaken executive authority. It is no accident that in Britain the subject-matter committees that existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries gradually disappeared, and that all governments today exhibit an unwillingness to restore them, even in very limited areas.²⁰

If the system operates effectively in its peculiarly British manner, it is only because, tied in with all of this, are those informal agreements and attitudes that assume Parliament to be a body searching to discover and implement the general will of the community. A majority does not, as it could, ride rough-shod over a

¹⁹ On developments in Britain see Kenneth McKenzie, *The English Parliament* (London 1950); K. B. Smellie, *A Hundred Years of English Government* (New York 1951); C. S. Emden, *The People and the Constitution* (London 1933).

²⁰ Note the reaction of the present government to the suggestion of a Select Committee that Parliament experiment with specialized committees: *Economist*, July 25, 1959.

minority, but, through informal channels, tries to arrange time tables acceptable to all; and all governments, whatever the size of their majority, remain sensitive to minority desires. The symbol of this attitude is that continued cherishing of traditional procedures ("the dignified part of government," to use Bagehot's delightful formulation) which never fails to delight American visitors and has always angered rising young radicals.²¹

The importance of the view that the state is a creative instrument whose function it is to serve the general will of the community, and that public servants have a duty to carry out this will, is exemplified in the British bureaucracy. In the 1930s, when the Marxist view of history was popular, it was widely argued that the emergence of an efficient disciplined bureaucracy was tied in with the rise of the middle classes, and that if, in Britain, the bureaucracy had served several masters equally well, this was only because the masters were equally bourgeois parties.²² At that time it was feared that the coming to power of a Labour government would entail a serious bureaucratic crisis. The fears did not, of course, materialize; the bureaucracy continued to serve different sets of masters with equal diligence.²³ Actually, the Marxist view was invalid in other respects as well. For example, the German bureaucracy, on which the British reforms of the mid-nineteenth century were based, was developed not by the bourgeoisie but by an aristocratic state. And in the United States the rise of middle-class democracy was associated initially with a complete loss of interest in the ideal of a bureaucratic apparatus consisting of competent men.

But pointing to the errors of the Marxist analysis does not tell us why the British so naturally developed a bureaucracy that

²¹ And of course the young radicals, if reelected often enough, generally come to cherish the tradition themselves, and are accused by a new generation of young radicals of having succumbed to the "aristocratic embrace." See, for example, David Kirkwood, *My Life of Revolt* (London 1935).

²² For a fairly typical statement of this view see J. D. Kingsley, *Representative Bureaucracy* (Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1944).

²³ See C. R. Attlee, "Civil Servants, Ministers, Parliament and the Public," in *Political Quarterly*, vol. 25 (1954) pp. 308-15.

combined effectiveness with objectivity. After all, in both France and Germany ideological differences did lead bureaucrats to subvert the governments with whose views they violently disagreed. Again, one cannot argue that it has been *simply* a matter of basic ideological consensus, for in the United States bureaucrats have found themselves in frequent conflict with administrations or Congressional edicts they did not like, and administrations still feel it necessary to replace top-level officials by members of their own party. Here too the difference between the United States and Britain is partly a consequence of divergent patterns of legislative-executive relationships. However, if middle-class reformers in Britain were, from the beginning, concerned with the development of an effective bureaucracy, it was, as we have seen, because British liberals always felt the necessity for effective state action. And if they accepted the ideal of the "gentleman" as the model of the bureaucrat, it was because they had, in part, internalized the values of the society they were changing. Finally, if in fact the British public has come to assume that civil servants will carry out political mandates with which they disagree, and if civil servants have accepted this image of themselves, it has been because of a general agreement underlying sharp political differences—an agreement that bureaucrats are the servants of a community interest transcending political conflict, and that their job is to translate the "general will" of the community into effective action.²⁴

To complete this discussion we can examine the symbols that serve as shorthand expressions of national unity. The symbols of American consensus, the founts at which we renew our faith, are the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, documents that enshrine a set of abstract ideas—the "liberal" view

²⁴ See F. M. Marx, *The Administrative State* (Chicago 1957) p. 86. In Germany and France the members of the bureaucratic elite were also "gentlemen" serving a "creative" state; but they identified the "real" state with their own preconceptions in communities that had been shattered by social and ideological upheavals (Germany under Weimar, and France throughout the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century).

of the world. In Britain, on the other hand, the symbol of unity remains the monarchy and all the traditional paraphernalia that go with it. One may attack the monarchy because it fosters a class society, or because, as Keir Hardy and other early Labour Party militants contended, it is a "stupid" archaic institution.²⁵ Or one may defend it because of its utility as a symbol or because it serves certain psychological needs. But its possible usefulness as a "symbol" does not explain why it is a symbol, and the psychological needs it is sometimes said to fulfill (such as pageantry in a drab world) do not enable us to explain why Americans, who have similar needs, fulfill them in different ways. When all is said and done, neither defense nor attack explains the monarchy's continued attraction for the British people as a symbol of their nationality. It has no real ideological continuity with the past. At one time it was part of a certain kind of society in which it played an integral role, combining dignity with power. Today, like the smile on the Cheshire cat, only the dignity remains. Everyone knows that the prerogative of the monarchy is no more.

If the monarchy does not, like our Constitution, stand for a set of political ideas handed down from the past, what does it stand for? To raise the question in this way is to answer it. It represents the British community *qua* community, not only at the present moment but in its total development. Thus the attachment to monarchy is a traditional attachment, in the Weberian sense. To be sure, the monarchy could not have survived had it not relinquished political power gracefully, that is, had it not been lifted out of the realm of politics; thus the actual fact of its survival may be, in part, the result of historical accident. However, the accident could not have occurred were it not for the cultural role the monarchy played and has continued to play.

III

Thus the development of British social and political life has involved a uniquely British synthesis of traditional patterns and the

²⁵ See Kingsley Martin, *The Magic of Monarchy* (New York 1937).

forces that transformed them. The synthesis was possible not only because traditional British society was less "sticky" than its counterparts elsewhere, but because its patterns had taken on a national form before their transformation began. The result has been an organic community with its own peculiar political institutions. No wonder, then, as Aron points out in the quotation at the beginning of this essay, the British tend to regard their institutions as peculiarly their own, while both Americans and Frenchmen identify themselves with universal ideas applicable to all peoples.

But what of the future of society and politics in Britain? It is quite apparent that some of the traditional patterns we have been discussing are rapidly eroding, for while traditional British society was able to transform and, in some sense, incorporate modern values and social patterns, there exists a kind of dialectical tension between modernity and tradition. Thus the continuing changes in educational patterns and in income distribution, which were accelerated by the Labour government of 1945, have broken down the barriers between social strata. Just as important has been the increasing rapidity with which Britain and other Western societies have emerged into the era of mass consumption. This breakthrough stems in part, of course, from the belief that the purpose of society is to satisfy the material wants of individuals as consumers, but it is also related to the implications of industrialization and the advance of scientific technology itself. Mass production of cars and clothing masks differences in wealth and status. The advent of radio and television contributes to an ever increasing erosion of class and regional speech patterns, as does the increased geographic mobility associated with the mass production of the automobile and the building of more and more roads.²⁶

All these fortify, and partially result from, a society that finds traditional patterns of deference and social responsibility increas-

²⁶ See T. R. Fyel, "The British Age of Participation," in *The Anchor Review*, ed. by Melvin J. Lasky (New York 1955) pp. 129-40; A. Crosland, *The Future of Socialism* (New York 1957); A. M. Carr-Saunders, D. Caradog Jones, and C. A. Moser, *Social Conditions in England and Wales* (Oxford 1958).

ingly archaic—one that participates in a more homogeneous "mass" culture, in which relationships are increasingly impersonal.²⁷ The desire for increased consumption, and the expectations of possible advance, erode working-class loyalties; traditional upper-class patterns of behavior are eroded by the loss of real prestige, of real roots, and of the sense of the legitimacy of *noblesse oblige* and a certain style of life.²⁸ And the advance of science itself, as well as the felt need for increasing technical competence in the interest of increasing production, erodes traditional concepts of education and culture.²⁹ These social results, which have been accelerating ever more rapidly since the war, are what both Conservative and "left-wing" Labour Party critics have pointed to when they bewail the "Americanization" of British life. Actually, whatever their merits or evils, they are essentially the outcome of a revolution in economic and social patterns which was European and more specifically British in origin.

These emerging social patterns have already had a considerable effect on political life. The Labour Party has now lost three elections by increasing majorities, and partially as a result its socialism is gradually being watered down. The connection between this development and the social changes in Britain was pointed out several years ago by G. D. H. Cole: "To one who can look back over more than sixty years, it is remarkable how conditions in Great Britain have changed. Nowadays . . . it is often impossible to tell by looking at a man—or woman—and by hearing them talk, to what class they belong. In these circumstances the struggle between classes . . . necessarily changes its human character. It becomes more and more a contest, not between unlikes, but of like with like."³⁰

²⁷ See A. H. Birch, *Small Town Politics* (London 1959); Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy* (London 1957).

²⁸ See T. Brennan, E. W. Cooney, and H. Pollins, *Social Change in South-West Wales* (London 1954); Peregrine Worsthorne, "Class and Conflict in British Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 37 (April 1960) pp. 419-32.

²⁹ B. V. Bowden, "Case for University Reform," *The Guardian*, December 8, 1959.

³⁰ G. D. H. Cole, *The Post-War Condition of Britain* (New York 1957) pp. 43-44.

Paradoxically, the recent resurgence of the "left" within the Labour Party seems to stem, in part, from the very forces that have resulted in Labour's declining electoral fortunes. During the 1930s and earlier the great mass of constituency party and trade-union activists were highly class-conscious working men and women, driven by a desire to obtain greater benefits for their class. They voted for a class party because in a Britain that maintained traditional class distinctions they identified themselves as members of a class; as indicated earlier, their outlook involved an implicit acceptance of much of the traditional pattern of British society. On the whole, however, these men and women have now left or are leaving the party (or becoming relatively inactive), and they are not being replaced in equivalent numbers. Those who remain most active politically tend, therefore, to be "true believers." Their activism stems not from "interest" but from conviction. The Labour Party has always had its quota of this type, but the present situation is qualitatively different, in that their relative number has increased since the party attained the status of a national movement.

The changes have affected the Conservatives too. The Conservative Party, which has won these three victories, is no longer the party even of the interwar years. It has accepted the welfare state as a permanent part of the British scene, and within that framework is willing to compete with Labour in extending social services. Just as importantly, it is no longer—though traces of this remain and can be deceptive—a party whose appeal to the electorate is couched in terms of the natural superiority for leadership of the "better" elements in society. Rather, it is now a political organization whose professed aim is to give the voters what they want and to provide an open, not a class, society, in which individuals have equal opportunity to rise to their "natural" level.³¹

Thus as traditional elements in British life have declined they have been replaced by an "idea" consensus associated with social patterns that are more and more "modern." And it is quite likely,

³¹ See the Conservative Party's 1959 Election Manifesto, *The Next Five Years*.

assuming no great depression or other catastrophe, that the political parties will move ever closer together in the nature of their appeals, and that, like American political parties, or British parties in the mid-nineteenth century, they will come to represent coalitions of "interests" (with interests also operating across party lines). In fact, there is every evidence that tendencies in this direction are gaining momentum.³²

But if this is so, what will happen to party discipline, and to a parliamentary structure that is based, according to this analysis, on vanishing social and political patterns? One certainly cannot answer this question with any assurance. If some of the factors that helped determine the shape of British political institutions are disappearing, this does not mean that the institutions themselves will go. Certainly it can be plausibly argued that institutional arrangements of a certain kind can develop an autonomy and maintain themselves, at least unless powerful forces develop which they cannot contain. Thus the bureaucratic organization of the parties, and also the position that the cabinet has attained, may tend to perpetuate present arrangements. It is also possible, however, that these patterns will be gradually replaced by a situation in which Parliament, developing subject-matter committees, begins once again to assert its prerogative, in a system not too unlike that of Sweden, for example. In this case a whole generation of American political scientists will have to radically revise its thinking.

³² See S. H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Great Britain," in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 50 (March 1956) pp. 1-23.

CURRENT INFLATION THEORY: CONSIDERATIONS ON METHODOLOGY*

BY GEORGE MACESICH

ALTHOUGH observers do not all agree as to its magnitude, most of them concur that the United States economy and the world's economies in general have experienced various shades of inflation since World War II. Much has been written in recent years on its causes and control. Few believe that any one cause has been dominant, or that any one method of control would be effective. By and large, however, in economic literature and in testimony before Congressional committees, the proponents of the principal views on the causes and control of inflation fall into two major groups: the "demand-pullers" and the "cost-pushers," the first emphasizing the "pull" of monetary and fiscal factors, and the second emphasizing the "push" of industrial and union "market power."¹

* AUTHOR'S NOTE—I am indebted to Webster C. Cash, Marshall R. Colberg, Sherman Krupp, and Richard H. Timberlake for helpful comments and suggestions.

¹ See, for example, United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *The Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth, Compendium*, March 1958 (hereafter referred to as *Compendium*), and *Staff Report on Employment, Growth, and Price Levels*, December 24, 1959; Albert Rees, "Do Unions Cause Inflation?" in *Journal of Law and Economics*, vol. 2 (October 1959) pp. 84-94; Milton Friedman, "Current Critical Issues in Wage Theory and Practice," in Industrial Research Association, *Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting*, Chicago, 1959; Walter Morton, "Trade Unions, Full Employment and Inflation," in *American Economic Review*, vol. 40 (March 1950) pp. 13-40, plus comments on this paper by Martin Bronfenbrenner and D. T. Lapkin, *ibid.* (September 1950) pp. 622-27; Walter Morton, "Wage-Push Inflation," speech before the American Economic Association and Industrial Relations Research Association, December 1958; Yossef Attiyeh, "Wage-Price Spiral Versus Demand Inflation: United States, 1949-1957," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, December 1959; Richard T. Selden, "Cost-Push Versus Demand-Pull Inflation, 1955-1957," in *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 67 (February 1959) pp. 1-20; James R. Schlesinger, "Market Structure,

These differences in point of view reflect two basic methodological issues. One is the importance attached to assumptions in the testing of economic theory. The other is the attention given to compensating changes—the issue of partial versus general analysis in providing economically meaningful conclusions. These issues have been discussed at length by Friedman and, following him, by Bailey and Buchanan.² My purpose here is to examine these two methodological issues as they are mirrored in the demand-pull and cost-push views of inflation. I am not at present concerned with the substance of the controversy over these two views.

The first methodological difference dividing demand-pullers and cost-pushers provides an example of the different roles assumptions play in testing the validity of hypotheses. Cost-pushers often choose to defend themselves by reference to the realism of their basic assumptions, whereas demand-pullers argue that a theory's assumptions are never realistically descriptive, for if they were realistically descriptive of one phenomenon they would probably be undescriptive of others; an analytical framework, this group contends, must be abstract if it is to be useful in dealing with a large class of phenomena.

According to demand-pullers the implications of neoclassical economic theory are sufficiently consistent with reality to war-

Union Power and Inflation," in *Southern Economic Journal*, vol. 24 (January 1958) pp. 296-312; William G. Bowen, "Cost Inflation Versus Demand Inflation: A Useful Distinction?" in *Southern Economic Journal*, vol. 26 (January 1960) pp. 199-206; Economic Research Department, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, *The Mechanics of Inflation* (Washington 1950); John K. Galbraith, "Market Structure and Stabilization Policy," in *Review of Economics and Statistics* (May 1957); A. J. Brown, *The Great Inflation, 1939-1951* (New York 1955). The literature on inflation has become voluminous, and the above list of contributors is by no means complete.

² For a development of these points in other contexts see Milton Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago 1953) pp. 3-43; Martin J. Bailey, "The Marshallian Demand Curve," in *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 62 (June 1954) pp. 255-61, and "Saving and the Rate of Interest," *ibid.*, vol. 65 (August 1957) pp. 279-305; James M. Buchanan, "Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology," in *Southern Economic Journal*, vol. 24 (January 1958) pp. 259-70. See also Leland B. Yeager, "Methodenstreit Over Demand Curves," in *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 68 (February 1960) pp. 53-64.

rant its use irrespective of the realism of its assumptions. The theory, they hold, explains much by little, emphasizing analytical rigor rather than descriptions of reality; if it is consistent and a useful tool for prediction, the "realism" of its assumptions needs no proof. Thus they predict that inflation occurs whenever the general level of demand for goods and services exceeds available supply at existing prices. Emphasis is placed on changes in the general *level* of demand rather than on changes in the *composition*. An increase in the general level of demand *must* raise the general level of prices, under conditions of full employment. But when demand changes in composition and not in level, the prices of goods and services that benefit from an increase in demand will rise, while the prices of goods and services that suffer from a decline in demand will fall, and hence on balance there will tend to be no change in the general level of prices. The burden of proof is on the cost-pushers to show that compensating changes have not occurred—or so the demand-pullers argue.

The cost-pushers, however, eschew this abstract approach and argue that the concrete realism of their assumptions betokens the validity of their hypothesis. Indeed, the very names assigned to various versions of the "market-power" theory of inflation suggest the tests to which the assumptions are subjected: "wage-price-spiral inflation," "administered-price inflation," and "oligopoly-union inflation," to mention only the more popular. The apparent goal is to attain analytical validity through realistic description. These three versions have important implications for public policy, and in the remainder of this paper I shall regard them as representative of the market-power theory.

Let us consider first the version embodied in the thesis of wage-price-spiral inflation. This version argues that unions are responsible for inflation because, possessing market power, they obtain wage increases that push wages above the value of the marginal product of the existing labor force. One conclusion derived from this version is that a gap occurs between union and non-union wages that is to the advantage of the former. The methodo-

logical contention that the realism of the assumptions provides a test of the hypothesis is evident in the assertion, explicit or implicit, that the economic environment has changed with the advent of unions and collective bargaining. If theory is to be useful, it is held, changes in economic environment must be incorporated into assumptions. Since this version does incorporate an observed change into its assumptions, it is deemed more useful than versions that do not do so.

Similar assertions are made by the sponsors of the administered-price version of inflation. In this version prices are set in one way in those sectors of the economy that are composed of many firms, and they are set in another way in oligopolistic industries, where there are only a few major producers. A conclusion derived from this version is that prices set by oligopolistic industries are "administered" in such a fashion that these industries are excellent conductors of inflationary pressure. The prices are presumably flexible upward, but not downward. Here the appeal to the realism of underlying assumptions as providing a test for the hypothesis is the same as above, except that oligopolies are substituted in the place of unions and collective bargaining. The choice between the two depends apparently on one's view of the primary direction of change in the economic environment.

The third version of the market-power theory unites the other two versions, concluding that both unions and oligopolies are responsible for inflation. According to this version, as set forth for example by Schlesinger (cited above, note 1), unions lodge themselves in oligopolistic industries and share in the "spoils" derived from the product side, taking advantage of the inelastic or expanding demand conditions on the product market to obtain higher wages without fear that entry of new firms will reduce wage gains. One conclusion derived from this version is that, the product market permitting, the oligopolist grants a higher wage rate than producers in a competitive market, in order to avoid a more costly strike, and then passes on the results of such bar-

gaining to consumers, in the form of higher prices. As in the two other versions, the test for this hypothesis is provided by the realism of its assumptions, which take into account the "changed" economic environment.

In reply to such theories of inflation the demand-pullers express skepticism that the basic structure of the economy has changed, and even if they agree that it has, they do not feel impelled to incorporate "descriptive realistic assumptions" into their analysis—for the reasons already outlined. Clearly a theory that uses realistic assumptions in contrast to one that uses abstract concepts (such as the price level) will have more popular understanding and support. The "common man" likes to think that he "understands" economics; he gave up on physics long ago. But be that as it may, the division between demand-pullers and cost-pushers on the role of assumptions in providing a test for an hypothesis will not be easily resolved. And the reason is that the division is firmly lodged in methodology.

We turn now to the other major methodological distinction between the two groups of inflation theorists: the consideration given to compensating changes. The analysis of real problems requires simplification. Thus the behavior of any particular variable in a system—say A—is observed by holding other variables constant. But if the economist is to go beyond arithmetic and reach economically meaningful conclusions, he must, argue the demand-pullers, consider the full rather than the partial effects of A's variation.³ As Buchanan puts it (pp. 261–62), if the problem is that of deriving a demand curve for cheese, the price of cheese is allowed to change, but something else must be allowed to change in compensating fashion. The compensating changes may take place anywhere in the system—for example, in the price of popcorn. To ignore these changes—which is equivalent to applying *ceteris paribus* literally—is justified if cheese demanders constitute a different group from popcorn demanders, or if

³ See Friedman, *Essays*, especially pp. 100–13, and Buchanan, p. 262 (both cited above, note 2).

we are content to analyze the behavior of one individual or of a group of individuals smaller than the total. But when the whole economy is subject to analysis, as it is in the study of inflation, economically meaningful conclusions are not yielded when *ceteris paribus* is used literally and conclusions reached in partial-equilibrium analysis are extended to problems of general equilibrium.

By and large, however, the cost-pushers do not agree. Thus the wage-price-spiral version, at least in its so-called naive formulation, is characterized by a complete neglect of these compensating changes. This version contends that inflation has its origin in wage gains for a given labor force beyond the rise in the value of the marginal product. The essence of the argument is that these wage gains push up costs, which are then passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Presumably only unions have sufficient market power, which they exercise, to push wages beyond the value of the marginal product, and hence they are the causal elements of inflation.

Although demand-pullers would admit that this conclusion might be conceptually valid in a partial-equilibrium case, it is, they argue, inconsistent with the general-equilibrium world. Where does the means to finance the higher level of prices come from? From an increase in the quantity of money or from an increase in velocity, or from both? Whatever the answer, wage rises can be followed by inflation and continued full employment, but it is not possible to determine at what level prices will reach equilibrium. The forces that caused the change in the demand for money call forth corresponding changes in the supply of money: a change sending prices above the equilibrium level, as determined by the initial quantity of money, will bring forth the additional quantity of money necessary to maintain the higher level.⁴ There is no mechanism whereby the original price level is restored. And if the compensating changes do not manifest themselves in the supply of money, they will do so elsewhere in the system. They make take the form of a one-time increase in

⁴ See Attiyeh (cited above, note 1) Chapter 2.

the general level of wages, together with increased unemployment, or else wages and prices elsewhere will be relatively lower and employment higher. Indeed, these compensating or offsetting changes "elsewhere" may manifest themselves in other countries as well.

A number of attempts have been made to reformulate this version of market-power inflation theory in order to take into account the demand-pullers' objections regarding compensations. One of the more familiar of these reformulations couples the wage-price-spiral version with the so-called spill-over effects. This reformulation argues that the demands of unions "spill over" into the non-unionized sectors, causing wages and prices to rise there too. In rebuttal, demand-pullers argue that this version, regardless of its validity in determining the price level, would require a utility function for consumers and a production function for producers wherein all goods and factors are complements. Actually, however, as Hicks has shown, substitution, not complementarity, is dominant in the system as a whole.⁵

The one version of the market-power theme of inflation that demand-pullers agree is theoretically complete and entails proper usage of *ceteris paribus* is the so-called sophisticated wage-price-spiral model. This assumes the existence of strong unions and industrial monopolies and a full-employment policy of the government, operating in the framework of the classical pricing mechanism.⁶ Thus unions ask for wages that are higher than the marginal product of those employed. They obtain higher nominal wages, and as a consequence prices rise. At the same time unemployment increases. In order to fulfill its obligations under a full-em-

⁵ J. R. Hicks, *Value and Capital*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1953) pp. 311-12.

⁶ Even here, however, there is disagreement, albeit not methodological, for a necessary though not sufficient condition to set off a wage-price-spiral inflation is increasingly strong unions, and not simply strong unions. As Friedman states in his "Current Critical Issues" (cited above, note 1), the failure to recognize this distinction "is an example of one of the most prevalent fallacies in theorizing about economic events; a fallacy that arises in many other contexts in which 'high' is confused with 'rising' and 'low' with 'falling.' A 'high' price will generally have a very different effect than a 'rising' price" (p. 219).

ployment policy the government intervenes and increases the quantity of money. Real wages decline and unemployment decreases. This completes one round of wage and price rises. The model is indeed theoretically complete, and it may also be empirically valid if unions and the government respond in the assumed manner. Demand-pullers (see for example Rees, note 1 above) express skepticism, however, that unions and the government will in fact respond in the assumed manner.

Let us turn to the cost-pushers' theory of administered-price inflation, which, as we have seen, draws on oligopoly theory for support. What has been said in discussing the "naive" wage-price-spiral version with regard to the price level and the velocity and quantity of money is equally applicable to this version of the market-power theory. According to demand-pullers, the administered-price theorists assert in effect that the forces affecting the demand for money also affect the supply of money. Both versions treat the price level as an agglomeration of loosely related items, and regard a rise in any one price as inflationary. Neither version takes into account compensating changes in other prices.

The administered-price theorists' contention is that in those sectors of the economy dominated by a few large firms, prices in the short run will not be set in such a way as to maximize profits. Oligopoly prices are flexible upward, so the argument goes, because universal cost increases permit price rises without triggering off retaliatory price wars by competitors. They are inflexible downward because a large seller hesitates to cut his prices for fear that his action will bring retaliation in the form of price cuts from other sellers. The implications are that in the absence of a universal cost increase no seller will raise his prices; in the absence of a substantial decline in demand no seller will cut his prices.

One question this version fails to answer is how prices for these products were determined in the first place. If we take the theory seriously, argue the demand-pullers, each seller is primarily concerned with keeping his prices at the established level, however that level may have been established. Another diffi-

culty is that in inflationary periods prices are always below equilibrium because, as demand increases, appropriate adjustments are not made unless cost justification can be shown—and this is simply another way of saying that "administered prices" mirror inflation rather than cause it.⁷ Lag in adjustment is probably more dominant than cost justification. As Stigler, among others, has shown, it takes time to recognize the need for price changes and to implement these changes.⁸

Moreover, demand-pullers ask, how is it that raising prices to their equilibrium levels contributes to inflation? Compensating changes or offsets must be taken into consideration when firms practice private price control, because in doing so they are in effect removing upward pressure on their prices by redirecting the pressure onto prices elsewhere in the economy: when firms practicing private price control raise prices to equilibrium levels, the demand for other goods declines and the prices of those goods tend to fall.

As was mentioned, the administered-price model also implies that, in the absence of a substantial decline in demand, no seller will cut his price. But this implication cannot be upheld unless each seller is confident that other sellers will not cut their prices. Here too, demand-pullers argue, the administered-price version of inflation theory breaks down. Confidence among sellers on the price issue is more apparent than real, as is indicated by the fact that failure of collusive agreements is the rule rather than the exception.⁹ Whenever the cost of producing a commodity is substantially below its sales price, a compensating change or

⁷ See Selden (cited above, note 1) p. 11; Martin J. Bailey, "Administered Prices in the American Economy," and William J. Baumol, "Price Behavior, Stability and Growth," both in *Compendium* (cited above, note 1).

⁸ George J. Stigler, "The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices," in *Journal of Political Economy* (1947), reprinted in *Readings in Price Theory*, ed. by George J. Stigler and Kenneth K. Boulding (Homewood, Ill., 1952) pp. 410-39.

⁹ See for example Martin J. Bailey, "Administered Price Inflation," in *Compendium* (cited above, note 1). M. R. Colberg, W. C. Bradford, and R. M. Alt, in *Business Economics, Principles and Cases* (Homewood, Ill., 1957) pp. 226-31, list 144 different ways to cut prices.

offset in the form of hidden price cutting is likely to occur. But even if oligopolists are able to prevent compensating changes in this form, the changes will manifest themselves in other ways. They may take the form, for instance, of competition from other products that fulfill the same or similar requirements; thus the replacement of coal by oil has tempered the demands of those engaged in the coal industry.¹⁰ Since the administered-price version of the market-power theory of inflation does not take such compensating changes into account, it fails to meet the demand-pullers' test of consistency with the general-equilibrium world.

As for the third version of market-power theory considered in this paper, that of oligopoly-union inflation, it represents a combination of the other two, and is equally subject to what has already been said. In all three versions, according to the demand-pullers, the cost-pushers either completely fail to consider compensating changes or conveniently release from the *ceteris paribus* enclosure only complements that buttress their conclusions. As a result, say the critics, either the conclusions are not economically meaningful or the determination of the price level is not explained.

My polarization of inflation theorists does not mean, of course, that all of them fall into either one group or the other. Indeed, some cost-pushers would argue that most inflations in history have been of the demand-pull type, and some demand-pullers would argue that cost-push inflation, as seen in a "sophisticated" wage-price-spiral model, is conceivable, even if not historically important so far. And certainly it has not been my intention to pass judgment on "right" versus "wrong" approaches. The sole purpose of this paper has been to point out two basic methodological differences between the two major camps of inflation theorists, in the hope that increased awareness regarding methodological framework will contribute in some measure toward a resolution of substantive differences.

¹⁰ Economic Research Department, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, *Disemployment Forces and Reemployment Prospects* (Washington 1959) p. 6.

ON THE USE OF METAPHOR IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS

BY MARTIN LANDAU

SUCH phrases as "living constitution" and "balanced governments" are daily encounters in political discussion. We speak and we write in metaphors, and we could scarcely get along without them. But the consequence may be more than felicity of phrase, for though figurative language can provide powerful analytic tools, it can also be the source of distortion and misrepresentation. Analysis is a function of the language we employ, and frequently "our thoughts do not select the words we use; instead, words determine the thoughts we have."¹ When this happens, language may impose on entities properties they do not in fact possess, or relationships that do not in fact exist; language, which is intended to clarify and illuminate, may then have just the opposite effect. In any case, the consequences of metaphoric expression, both substantively and methodologically, should not be minimized.

My purpose here is to examine the methodological implications of metaphoric usage in political analysis, with primary emphasis on the organizing power that has been demonstrated, in American political thinking, by the concepts of mechanism and evolutionism (though space limitations prevent an extended discussion of the latter). Each has served to impose a distinctive pattern of analysis on the field. Mechanism underwrote a rigidly structured formalism that made possible an almost wholly deductive study of politics. Evolutionism stimulated the "pragmatic revolt" that overthrew formalism and transformed political science into an empirical discipline. The contemporary revival of a theoretical politics derives much from prevailing models of "system," few of

¹ Weller Embler, "Metaphor and Social Belief," in S. I. Hayakawa, ed., *Language, Meaning and Maturity* (New York 1954) p. 125.

which are mechanical (closed), most of which are biological (open).²

I

A typical textbook provides many examples of the metaphors to which political scientists have grown accustomed.³ Constitutions and governments, the student reads (pp. 33, 83), "are growing and *evolving* organisms" (italics in original), which must be "adapted to changing conditions." If government is to be "functional" for a society in change, it must itself change, following the laws of evolution as it "adapts" to new conditions. In this process all sorts of "disorders" arise to threaten "integration," and these may result in "stasis" (p. 564). One is presented with a "diagnosis of the main ills," with "proposals for cure," with clinical prescriptions designed to maintain or restore "health." We have here the image of an *organism*, and it is fully consistent with this image to employ a set of biological concepts to order analysis and discussion. But in the same volume, and sometimes in the same chapter if not on the same page, our student will find a language particularly appropriate to the image of a *machine*. He is told of the "operations of governmental machinery," of the "friction" between president and Congress, of the means whereby an effective "balance" might be engineered. He finds references to the "political pendulum," to "political leverage," to "inertia" in bureaucracy, to obsolescence ("out of date party machinery"), and to "efficiency" in the "running of the machine." In this context it is not too difficult to set the president at the center of government with the control box before him and "his fingers on countless levers that shape the making of public and private policies" (p. 432).

² See R. L. Schanck, *The Permanent Revolution in Science* (New York 1954); P. Meadows, "Models, System, and Science," in *American Sociological Review*, vol. 22 (1957) pp. 3-9; L. von Bertalanffy, *Problems of Life* (London 1952); D. Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," in *World Politics*, vol. 9 (1957) pp. 383-400; M. A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957).

³ J. M. Burns and J. W. Peltason, *Government by the People* (New York 1957).

If our student is perceptive he will wonder about the effects of such metaphors, about the identities that are thereby established. But if this escapes him he will no doubt observe that two "dominant metaphors" are indiscriminately mixed, and this, as his English instructor must have taught him, can serve only to obscure imagery and confuse meaning—indeed, to involve one in essentially contradictory statements. Thus if "American federalism has not been a static affair" and "has been molded by our dynamic society" (p. 84), then federalism cannot be a "mechanical arrangement" (p. 140). If it is "self-evident" that such social alterations as urbanization and industrialization have a "powerful impact on the government" (p. 105), if "forms" and "patterns" so intermesh (p. 889) that "alterations in procedures . . . have an impact upon . . . structure" (p. 902), and if "the pattern of federalism is being altered" (p. 121) in such a way that "the original system has been adapted to meet the problems of a nation going through vast . . . changes" (p. 32), then it cannot follow that "the structure of our federalism is little changed" though "its actual operation has been drastically altered" (p. 101). It is only when we confuse organic and mechanical models that we can hold to this conclusion and yet maintain that there are "few aspects" of the economy not national in scope (pp. 102-07) and that "the national government today . . . has sufficient constitutional power to dispose of virtually any problem of national extent" (pp. 137-38).

As Bronowski has written, "the action of putting things which are not identical into a group or class is so familiar that we forget how sweeping it is. The action depends on recognizing a set of things to be alike when they are not identical . . . Habit makes us think the likeness obvious;" but "This ability to order things into likes and unlikes is . . . a human ability; we trace and to some extent inject the likeness, which is by no means planted there by nature for all to see."⁴ Nevertheless, to seek likeness between things that are apparently unlike—to search for analogies—is a

⁴ J. Bronowski, *The Common Sense of Science* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953) pp. 21-22.

fundamental goal of scientific inquiry. Its great value is to enable us to see a single "logical form" in things that appear to be quite different—as when Newton perceived the likeness "between the fall of an apple and the swing of the moon in its orbit," a likeness expressed by the concept of gravitational attraction. In science "we take from the world around us a few models of structure and process and when we research into nature, we try to fit her with these models."⁵ By rendering different things as in certain respects equivalent, a class or category, a generalization, is established. Through such a process the empirical complexity of an environment is reduced. So ordered and simplified, it need no longer be responded to in terms of the unique.

Thus when we come across something new we liken it to something familiar to us. We treat the new entity "as if" it were like the known entity, which, because known, has a name and is a part of our language. A language is a classification system. Each of its basic terms, its nouns and verbs, is a category defined in terms of a set of characteristics. To liken the new to the old (the known) is to suggest that the new possesses some of the characteristics of the known, that the two are somehow analogous.⁶ And this is the way inquiry must proceed, for "how can we apprehend new relations except by viewing them under old categories . . . In trying to visualize the unknown, the imagination must clothe it with attributes analogous to the known."⁷ For this reason metaphorical expression may be considered the "omnipresent principle of language." By using the more familiar as a representational base for the less familiar, we acquire a hypothesis

⁵ J. Bronowski, "Science as Foresight," in J. R. Newman, ed., *What is Science?* (New York 1955) p. 428.

⁶ See W. H. Werkmeister, *The Basis and Structure of Knowledge* (New York 1948) pp. 34-39. Charles Morris, in *Sign Language and Behavior* (New York 1946) pp. 136-37, defines a metaphorical "sign" as one that "is used to denote an object which it does not literally denote in virtue of its signification but which has some of the properties which its genuine denotata have."

⁷ Morris A. Cohen, *A Preface to Logic* (New York 1944) pp. 83-84, also Chapter 5. See J. S. Bruner, J. J. Goodnow, and G. A. Austin, *A Study of Thinking* (New York 1956); E. Cassirer, *Language and Myth* (New York 1946) Chapter 6.

to be tested. As Cohen puts it, metaphors express vague and confused but primal perceptions of identity, which through analysis and research may be transformed into a clear statement of the common properties possessed by two different objects.

There is another way in which metaphor serves as a useful organizing device. We frequently engage in a "conscious identification of avowedly diverse objects" both of which are quite familiar to us. This action, by transferring the actual referent to a new context, stimulates a reorganization of thought that may be quite productive. It prompts us to revise our former conceptions of the object, and it gives rise to new hypotheses that may yield a significant increment. To call a government a machine (when we know that it is not literally a machine) directs us to the task of determining in what sense government is like (or unlike) a machine.

Thus metaphorical transfer—the substitution of analogy for actuality—may serve to "reveal new attributes or disclose old ones in a new light," thereby adding to the corpus of our knowledge. But while thus serving as a basic instrument of scientific analysis it must be attended by an awareness of the tentative character of the proposed analogy (in this essay I do not consider its emotional function, but only its use as an analytic tool). If, through research, the analogy is verified, well and good; we have learned something. If the transfer is revealed to be false—if no analogous properties can be demonstrated—we have also learned something. Difficulty arises, however, when we allow a metaphor to congeal, to harden into a rigid set—when we take it literally. What we then do is to allow a presumed analogy to become an identity, an assertion of fact that may be, and usually is, entirely erroneous. To take a metaphor literally is to create a myth, and the more conventional myths become, the more difficult they are to dislodge.

In political science, as in social science generally, this danger is further aggravated by the fact that those metaphors in longest use have not been the product of explicit formulation or conscious transference. They have been, for the most part, rather implicit,

and more often than not they have been taken as quite literal expressions precisely because of their familiarity and conventionality. And where the transfer is not explicitly formulated (as it is in the scientific use of a model), we work without a clear conception of the steps that led from the original to the metaphorical meaning, we fail to realize the hypothetical character of our statements, and we remain unaware that our thoughts and our observations are being shaped and directed by a particular image. Therefore if the analytic power of metaphors is to be properly exploited, metaphorical representation must be a matter of deliberate conceptualization. Only then can we proceed with that "full recognition of its limitations" which makes for "hygiene" in metaphorical usage.⁸

II

Historians often suggest that an era is best known by the metaphors it keeps. It should not surprise us that for the last four centuries these have been drawn primarily from the domain of the natural sciences. Because of the spectacular successes of modern science, those models of structure and process that science itself accepts as most warranted have been readily transferred to the domain of social inquiry, to become what Nagel calls the "set of necessary principles for ordering, acquiring and interpreting all knowledge."⁹ Or, in Oppenheimer's phrase, the findings of physical science have been prone to such extensive generalization as to profoundly affect the "common understanding" of a time. One central unifying image seems to distinguish the way men think. In the eighteenth century it was the machine that provided this image, and it was the Newtonian system that was taken as the model on which all rational inquiry was to be based.¹⁰ So strong

⁸ A. Rapoport, *Operational Philosophy* (New York 1953); see Chapter 17.

⁹ E. Nagel, *Sovereign Reason* (Glencoe, Ill., 1954) p. 122.

¹⁰ J. R. Oppenheimer, *Science and the Common Understanding* (New York 1954) pp. 4-6, 15-16, and Chapter 4. See also Nagel (cited above, note 9); E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Boston 1951); Isaiah Berlin, ed., *The Age of Enlightenment* (New York 1952) editor's introduction; Crane Brinton, *The Shaping of the Modern Mind* (New York 1953); Bronowski (cited above, note 4).

were these influences that numerous scholars of the Enlightenment have regarded the form of the American constitution as a direct product of mechanism, and have held that as a result of the profound effect of the constitution on political analysis, mechanism has been the dominant influence on American political science.

There are many uses to which the term mechanism is put, but since we are dealing with metaphorical transfer it is necessary to indicate only its literal meaning. In physics a system is called mechanical, as with Newton, "if and only if its basic entities are particles that move in orbit." That is, it must be a closed system consisting of discrete bodies, each possessing a specific set of properties (such as mass and position) that act over space and time in accordance with fixed law. The motion of a body is unequivocally determined by the action of external forces, and these forces arise from the action of other bodies in the system. Changes in position are always and solely a function of the masses of the system members and the distances between them. In such a system there is only lawful behavior: from a definite configuration of particles there will always follow the same results; there are no alternatives, and there is nothing any part of the system can do about it. It is possible, therefore, to build a completely predictable structure. Since the state of the system at any one time determines its state at another, one may predict the future if one knows the present. Hence the method of analysis is to reduce any process to its irreducible elements or parts, and to treat process as the resultant of these separate parts acting externally on one another.¹¹

This model, the most powerful in the history of scientific enterprise until very recently, was formulated by Newton "sudden and entire." From a puzzle of loose observations, from the empirical generalizations of his predecessors, this great physicist produced a

¹¹ Nagel (cited above, note 9) p. 23. See also E. Nagel, "The Causal Character of Modern Physical Theory," in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, eds., *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (New York 1953) pp. 420-27. For an extensive analysis of the properties of a mechanical system see G. Bergmann, *Philosophy of Science* (Madison, Wis., 1957) Chapter 2.

system of such utter simplicity, of such "sweep and finality," that nature seemed indeed to have given him "her profoundest secret." To the eighteenth century the Newtonian system constituted a cosmological formula so powerful that "Newton became not so much the name of a man as of an infallible world outlook."¹²

Accordingly, society came to be thought of in terms of mechanics. Social processes were seen as determined processes, directed into given paths by the action of impersonal external forces. The motion (behavior) of bodies (human beings) was preset and controlled according to the laws of nature. Natural man, whose properties included natural rights, was directed by natural forces to form societies. A society was no more than the sum of its constituents, a state no more than the sum of its discrete parts, its elemental bodies. Social and political processes resulted from the action of the separate parts on one another. And the perfect working of a state, as of any machine, depended only on the perfection of adjustment of the pushes and pulls of its constituent elements.

It is this transfer that explains the "moral Newtonianism" of the Enlightenment, later to give rise to utilitarianism.¹³ The hypothesis became the norm, and the image the goal. To achieve the harmony and balance of the physical universe it was necessary only to discover nature's way. And nature, in Thomas Paine's phrase, was "the law by which the universe was governed." Once this law, the natural order of human affairs, was discovered and applied, society would achieve the symmetry of the great machine.

In turning now specifically to the influence of mechanics on the American Founding Fathers, we need not be concerned with the origins of their ideas about a "mixed constitution" or a "balanced government." There is no doubt that these ideas predate the Newtonian era.¹⁴ What is to the point is the sense of

¹² J. W. N. Sullivan, *Isaac Newton* (New York 1938) p. 259.

¹³ See Élie Halévy, *The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism* (Boston 1955) Chapter 1.

¹⁴ J. A. Robinson, "Newtonianism and the Constitution," in *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, vol. 1 (1957) pp. 253-66, makes much of this fact in rejecting the

certainty that was attached to the concept of balance, and the fact that this assurance reflected the triumph of mechanism. With but few exceptions the constitution-makers thought that the government they were constructing was in accord with nature's design: in establishing the separation and balancing of power they were following nature's way. This was the ideal that was struck in Philadelphia—a government of law, not of men, one that, by its natural properties, minimized the risks of human passion. The true principle of government, said Hamilton, is this (my italics): "Make the system *complete* in its structure; give a *perfect proportion* and *balance* to its *parts*, and the power you give it will never affect your security."¹⁵ We may not find footnotes to Newton's *Principia*, but the master model emerges so clearly that one may ask, with Lippmann, "is there in all the world a more plain-spoken attempt to contrive an automatic governor—a machine which would preserve its balance without the need of taking human nature into account?"¹⁶

And it could scarcely have been otherwise. The Founders were no more able to throw off the fundamental typifications and conceptualizations of their day than we of ours. That they had differences in interest, attitude, and opinion is without doubt. But they possessed a certain "habit of mind," a way of perceiving problems, which inevitably affected their projected solutions. Thus Lippmann, in the same work, could remark (pp. 14-15) that

influence of Newtonian mechanics on American constitutional philosophy. But I submit that his observations (which are completely impressionistic) are quite irrelevant to his conclusions. He sampled the writings of the Founders (using as guide the indexes of various editions of their papers) and failed to find any "significant acknowledgment of intellectual debts to Newton"; on the contrary, they "referred more frequently to 17th century and classical figures than to the Newtonians." Robinson has thus transformed the problem from that of the influence of mechanics on the Founders to whether or not they "acknowledged" Newton—thereby failing to understand the nature of a dominant metaphor. Metaphors may be so implicit that a lack of acknowledgment means only a lack of awareness that a transfer is in process.

¹⁵ Quoted in Richard B. Morris, *Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of the Nation* (New York 1957) p. 238.

¹⁶ Walter Lippmann, *A Preface to Politics* (New York 1913) pp. 14-15.

had the Founders "written the Constitution in the fire of their youth, they might have made it more democratic—I doubt whether they would have made it less mechanical." However hardheaded they were, however practical in adapting their prior constitutional experience, they still bathed willy-nilly in eighteenth-century thought: "Arguments for balance were all about them, in pamphlet and treatise, in legal commentary, in reports of parliamentary debates, in encyclopedias, in classical works, in books on education, on morality, on philosophy, as well as in John Adams's book—the whole of it a learned defense of balance—which they were all reading in the spring of 1787, and in Madison's doctrinaire pronouncements on the convention floor."¹⁷ This "stream of thought" is what is commonly referred to as the American Enlightenment and, like its European counterpart, it was set firmly on the mechanistic hypothesis. Adams' *Defence* is most interesting in this context, for, in his words, it "was written to lay before the public a specimen of that kind of reading and reasoning which produced the American constitutions." On its title page one finds this line from Pope: "All Nature's difference keeps all Nature's peace." And this was the defense of the United States.

Its people exhibited "the first example of governments erected on the simple principles of nature." Compelled by their circumstances to erect new governments, they held this to be a problem of the same order as "arts and sciences, only more important." Faced with a rational problem, they turned to rational inquiry. They examined history, consulted theorists, studied past governments, compared the theories to the governments—all "to inquire how far both the theories and the models were founded in nature." And nature's principle (so happily verified by Newton) was action and reaction, thrust and

¹⁷ Stanley Pargellis, "The Theory of Balanced Government," in Conyers Read, ed., *The Constitution Reconsidered* (New York 1938) pp. 38-39. Adams' work is *A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America*, 3 vols. (London 1787-88).

counterthrust, check and balance. There are, said Adams in his *Defence*, three branches of power in any government, and "they have an unalterable foundation in nature"; to constitute a single body with all power, without any counterpoise, balance or equilibrium," is to violate the laws of nature, but "to hold power in balance is a self-evident truth," which stands as the basis of "decency, honesty, and order in society."¹⁸

Is this not what the *Federalist* papers attempted to demonstrate? Set squarely on the foundations of mechanism, they had to be written "in the most precise Newtonian language."¹⁹ The image was the "perfectly proportioned complete structure"—Jonathan Swift's scale—always to be held in poise by equal weights on each side of the beam. In the celebrated No. 10, it will be recalled, Madison based stability and order on a balance of rival interests, on the neutralization of counterforces. Faction was to be checked by faction, class by class, one part of government by another—all to achieve the equilibrium of nature. A "natural" government was such that "its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places." A "natural" government, after all, was a transcript of nature, and nature was but a machine.

Look at this world, Hume wrote; "You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, sub-divided into an infinite number of lesser machines . . . adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them." Look at these United States, Jefferson might have paraphrased, that great federation of lesser units—states, towns, and wards—all "adjusted to each other with an accuracy. . . ." "In time," he ventured, "all these as well as their central government, like the planets revolving around their common sun, acting and acted upon according to their respective weights and

¹⁸ G. A. Peek, Jr., ed., *The Political Writings of John Adams* (New York 1954); see pp. 115-18, 142, 188-92.

¹⁹ See R. Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York 1958) Chapter 1. H. S. Commager, *The American Mind* (New Haven 1950) pp. 312-13, speaks of a "vocabulary . . . eloquent of mechanistic concepts."

distances, will produce that beautiful equilibrium on which our Constitution is founded, and which I believe it will exhibit to the world in a degree of perfection, unexampled but in the planetary system itself. The enlightened statesman, therefore, will endeavor to preserve the weight and influence of every part, as too much given to any member of it would destroy the general equilibrium.²⁰ So, too, Hamilton cautioned that the "public burthens" must be so distributed that they do not fall too heavily on parts of the community, lest disorder ensue; "a shock given to any part of the political machine vibrates through the whole."²¹

It is possible to extend this parade at great length, but it would only weary. In one form or another, in greater or lesser degree, the Founders' thought rested on the image of the world machine. Even man was a machine, not only for La Mettrie but for Benjamin Rush, to whom life itself was the purely mechanical effect of material causes. It is beyond the scope of this essay to consider the psychology of the time, but its essential environmentalism, or elemental behaviorism, was a function of mechanism. Eighteenth-century psychology began with Hobbes' sensationalism—all that exists is body, all that occurs is motion, and the fundamental element of life is body (matter) in motion. It extended to Locke, for whom an external nature wrote its images on a *tabula rasa* (an interesting metaphor), and for whom the laws of retention and association became the equivalent of the force of gravitational attraction. And it reached into the American Enlightenment to underwrite, beyond Rush's psychology, the doctrines of individualism, equality, and perfectibility. Man was a discrete body, rationally contrived, governed by the play of natural forces. It was to order the interaction of these discrete particles in accordance with the laws of nature that Adams would check passion with passion, G. Morris set vice against vice, and Madison ambition against am-

²⁰ Quoted in H. W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy* (New York 1946) pp. 46-47. See C. E. Merriam, *American Political Theories* (New York 1903) pp. 159-60, and J. L. Blau's discussion of Jefferson and Paine in his *Men and Movements in American Philosophy* (New York 1952).

²¹ R. B. Morris (cited above, note 15) pp. 84-85; and see *Federalist*, No. 17.

bition. Small wonder that, as Pargellis tells us (note 17, above), "few voices were raised in the convention, as too few in the eighteenth century, to offset the clear-cut, beautiful, unreal symbolism of government as an equipoise of equal powers" (p. 49). The set of this time, the prevailing habit of mind, made it axiomatic that government constituted a problem in mechanics, and its solution a matter of balance. The Constitution of the United States may well be taken as "a deliberate monument" to the image of the machine.

III

The dominance of the mechanical metaphor in eighteenth-century political thought may be regarded as inevitable, given the historical circumstances. But it is the appropriateness of the metaphor and its consequences for political science that is our central problem. In considering these questions it is instructive to refer to Woodrow Wilson and J. Robert Oppenheimer, who have on occasion been quoted in opposition to each other. Wilson regarded the constitution as built on a theory "which Newton might readily have recognized as suggestive of the mechanism of the heavens," but Oppenheimer, it has been suggested by Robinson (note 14, above), is hard put to find any appreciable influence of Newtonian mechanics on eighteenth-century political thought. When we place their positions in context, however, they make the point of this essay.

At the time Wilson began to write, the influence of developments in the biological sciences was such that a new metaphor had begun to take hold. Darwin had appeared. And the rise of a new dominant metaphor has important methodological consequences. The transfer of meaning from one context to another serves to introduce new modes of thought, new systems of analysis, which profoundly affect the "received axioms" of the past. A change in image is a change in method.

To those who have studied Wilson he appears as a "realist," one of the first American political scientists to break with nine-

teenth-century tradition. Chafing under the "literary theory," the "paper pictures" of the constitution, the young Wilson pressed as much for a reform of political science as of government. As early as *Cabinet Government* (1879) and certainly by his doctoral dissertation *Congressional Government* (1885) he appeared as an advocate of Walter Bagehot's "fresh and original method," which, "if applied to the exposition of our federal constitution, would result in . . . a revelation"; even the most acute constitutional students, he held, had been dominated by the images of the *Federalist Papers*, and these images, "with a strange, persistent longevity of power, shape the constitutional criticism of the present day." As a result, one who looks at the living reality of government would wonder at the contrast to the paper description: he would see in life much that was not in the books, and in the rough practice of government he would not find the many refinements of the literary theory. If one wished to write practically and critically of government, he must "escape from theories and attach himself to facts . . . striving to catch its present phases and to photograph the delicate organism . . . exactly as it is today."²²

Here then is the shift in metaphor. The organism is to replace the machine. There is no mention of Darwin, but the evolutionary model that structures Wilson's analysis is evident throughout the work. Where once the language of physics was applied to government, it is now the language of biology that is relevant. The constitution has become "a living and fecund system," and the terms Wilson used to describe it are growth, development, change, adaptation, and alteration. This was the approach that would provide an escape from a political science that "thinks, argues, and dogmatizes only about the *constitution*; about the nature of the state, . . . of sovereignty." Two decades later, still concerned with transforming political science into a descriptive, empirical discipline, Wilson issued his ringing protest: "government is not

²² Wilson, *Congressional Government*, Meridian edition, with introduction by Walter Lippmann (New York 1956) pp. 11, 30. See also Wilson's "The Study of Administration," in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 56 (1941) pp. 481-506, reprinted from vol. 2 (1887); and D. Easton, *The Political System* (New York 1953) Chapter 6.

a machine, it is a living thing. It falls not under the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. It is modified by its environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its functions by the sheer pressure of life."²³ And a few years thereafter, on the eve of World War I, Walter Lippmann wrote a preface to a new political science cut in this image. The times, he stated (note 16, above), require a different order of thinking: we cannot expect to meet our problems with a few inherited ideas, uncriticized assumptions, a foggy vocabulary, and a machine philosophy. "Feeble,—that is what our politics is. It is literally eccentric: it has been centered mechanically instead of vitally. *We have, it seems, been seduced by a fictitious analogy*" (p. 23; italics mine).

To both Wilson and Lippmann, then, the historic assumption of an analogy between a political system and a mechanical system was false. There was, in fact, no correspondence between the properties of a machine and those of a government; the "symbolism" was unreal. The proper analogy was to evolution; the appropriate image was the biological organism. And it was indeed the Darwinian metaphor that served as the foundation of the practical, "realistic" political science which was to emerge.

Now Oppenheimer enters this discussion, because of the following statement from his 1954 work on science (note 10, above): "What there is of direct borrowing from Newtonian physics for . . . politics is mostly crude and sterile. What there is in eighteenth-century political and economic theory that derives from Newtonian methodology is hard for even an earnest reader to find. The absence of experiment and the inapplicability of Newtonian methods of mathematical analysis make that inevitable" (pp. 15-16). This statement is particularly significant because his book has to do in large measure with metaphorical transfer, and with the use of the physical sciences as a model both for other sciences and for the "common understanding." While Oppenheimer considers physical science a source of fruitful analogies, he reminds

²³ Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York 1908) p. 56.

us of the dangers involved in uncritical transfer—especially when scientific findings are so generalized as to affect “the way men think about things which are not themselves part of science.” The limiting terms and conditions, “the special circumstances of the discovery of scientific truth,” act “as a protecting sheath against their unlimited and universal acceptance,” but this holds only when these circumstances are understood. When they are not, we are faced with “mis-applications of findings,” which can result only in misrepresentation and confusion.

Fix now on the quotation above. If it is read carefully, Oppenheimer is seen not to be in conflict with Wilson; on the contrary. He does not say that the Newtonian model was not applied: he says that it was misapplied, that the application was crude and sterile, that the transfer was quite uncritical. And this misapplication was precisely what underlay the criticisms of Wilson and those who came after him. What passed as Newtonian methodology in eighteenth-century, and most of nineteenth-century, American political theory did indeed bear very little visible relation to Newton's system. Perhaps the reason was, as Oppenheimer says, the inapplicability of Newtonian mathematical analysis. But examination suggests that a deeper reason for the misapplication of the mechanistic metaphor in the eighteenth century, and for its “strange, persistent longevity of power” over nineteenth-century political and social inquiry, was the distortion of the role of mathematics. What made it inevitable that Newton's name would be taken in vain was that the scholarship of these eras was not born of Newton's “rules of reasoning.”

The world that Newton dealt with, from which he had banished all notions of *a priori* certainty, was a world of sensible phenomena, and was limited to the “phenomena of motions.” While some aspects of nature, in his view, possessed mathematical characteristics, he was not at all certain that we could “derive the rest of the phenomena of nature by the same kind of reasoning from mathematical principles.” As Burtt paraphrased him, “the world is what it is; so far as exact mathematical laws can be dis-

covered in it, well and good; so far as not, we must seek to expand our mathematics or resign ourselves to some other less certain method" (Newton's invention of the calculus was such an expansion, although his *Principia* used the language of geometry). Unlike Descartes and Galileo, Newton distinguished mathematical and empirical truth, insisting that the process of mathematical deduction must culminate in the process of experimental verification. Thus all propositions, all hypotheses, were to be empirical in character. Metaphysical assertions, unverifiable hypotheses, a priori speculation in general, were to be cast out of science: if such hypotheses are to be "the test of truth and reality of things," stated Newton, "I see not how certainty can be obtained in any science." The union of mathematics (logic) and experimentation (experience), set firmly on the rule of observation, was the essence of Newton's methodology.²⁴

But this was not the methodology that characterized the Age of Reason. Its measure of knowledge, though taken under the authority of Newton, derived less from him than from the great rationalists who preceded him. It is ironic that the "universal geometry" of Descartes expresses more of the character of "reason" than does the mathematical-experimental method of Newton. Geometry, as Nagel tells us (*Sovereign Reason*, pp. 122-23), was taken as the method of nature, indeed as the prototype of reason. The only familiar system of deductive mathematics, it was assumed to mark off the inherent boundaries of human reason. The lack of alternative systems was construed as evidence of their impossibility; thus geometry and mechanics were riveted in the final structure of reason and nature. "The true system of the world," D'Alembert could therefore write, "has been recognized, developed, and perfected."²⁵ Hence the overwhelming emphasis on "self-evident principles," on "axioms of right" and "primary truths." Things became knowable in advance of experience, re-

²⁴ E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*, Anchor edition (New York 1954); for an extensive discussion of Newton's methodology see Chapter 7. See also A. R. Hall, *The Scientific Revolution* (New York 1954).

²⁵ Cited in Cassirer (note 10, above) p. 5.

quiring no more verification than intuitive self-evidence (compare Hamilton's "rules" in *Federalist*, No. 31). In the common currency of the time, sovereign reason moved on a priori knowledge. From "first principles," through a network of deductions, results were arrived at, and if logical they were deemed incontrovertible.

This summary provides, without too much danger of error, a statement of the general methodology of academic thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the sphere of American social inquiry. The curriculum researches of Anna Haddow sustain the observation that the nineteenth century inherited and preserved a political thinking that was a priori in method, mechanistic in form, and moral in character.²⁶ During this time the study of politics was the study of moral philosophy. Ethics was the overwhelming concern of instruction, and the logical elaboration of primary truths was the subject of countless disputations. Empirical research was frequently minimized as "beneath the dignity . . . beside the purpose of philosophical institutions." Philosophy, after all, was "inquiry by reason," and if it had laid aside revelation, neither was it linked to experience. The first empirical study of Congress was not made until Wilson published his dissertation (1885), and the first empirical study of parties came only with Lord Bryce's *American Commonwealth* (1888). Until Bryce the "conspiracy of silence" on the political party was virtually unbroken.²⁷ Francis Lieber, our first "political scientist," could write two volumes *On Civil Liberty and Self-Government* (1853) and devote a page and a half to the party; in 1890 John W. Burgess, the founder of the Columbia School of Political Science, could ignore parties even as he tried to describe presidential elections.²⁸

²⁶ Anna Haddow, *Political Science in American Colleges and Universities* (New York 1939). And see T. I. Cook, "The Methods of Political Science," in *Contemporary Political Science*, UNESCO Publication No. 426 (Paris 1950).

²⁷ See E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York 1942) pp. 4-5; also Easton (cited above, note 22) Chapters 3, 6.

²⁸ For an excellent analysis of Lieber and Burgess see B. Brown, *American Conservatives* (New York 1950).

And so it went with respect to almost every sphere of governmental activity. It seems strange now, but the activities or operations of government did not become the subject matter of political science until the last decade of the century. Before that the preoccupation of political research, such as it was, was law: the law of the constitution. What was not provided for in law, or in acceptable philosophies of law, was either of no concern or downright dangerous. Thus, to Lieber, the movement for an eight-hour work day was a "dangerous tampering with immutable law." Even administrative law was suspect until the pragmatic Frank Goodnow made it respectable—but this did not occur until the new metaphor had taken hold. Indeed, it took a veritable social revolution to dislodge the eternal and immutable law that had been so fortified by mechanism, and to prove that there existed other systems of analysis. To those to whom self-evident principles were the starting points of a geometric deductivism, the life of the law was not experience; it was logic.

There was another aspect of this period which made the "certain systems" of the eighteenth century even more rigid. Those scholars who dominated the emerging discipline of political science were heavily influenced by German idealism: the line ran from Kant to Hegel. With Lieber and Burgess, and the returning Herren Doktoren, political science drew its first principles from a "higher kind of truth" and built grand deductive systems that were carefully protected from the eroding force of experience. They spoke science, but they were speculative scholars who relied on intuition and frequently resorted to an active Providence to validate their propositions. Even their concept of change, a type of organicism that had emerged as a reaction to the dissolving individualism of the closed and static world of the "Newtonian," was confined within its own predestined system, bounded on all sides by the high walls of morality.²⁹ They

²⁹ See M. G. White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism* (New York 1950) Chapter 2; R. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Boston 1955); also Haddow and Cook (both cited above, note 26).

may have opened this world to break through the "social contract," but they closed it right back again with a moral absolutism.

Nor is their kind of organicism to be confused with the evolutionary political science that was soon to take root under the promptings of pragmatism. To be sure, they treated the state as a biological organism, but the state was to be distinguished from government—and with respect to government their treatment remained typically mechanical. Beard, in recalling his schooling under Burgess, reminds us of a time when the constitution was the thing, when a judge was presented as a master mechanic, when the "weighing, measuring and logistical method of 'learning' constitutional law was a way of life," and when the analysis of a case was "an adventure in deductions drawn from a major premise grounded in the ineluctable nature of things."³⁰

The Darwinian metaphor overthrew all of this. The story is a long one, but its substance is that the epistemological implications of evolution exerted a mighty influence on those who laid the foundations of pragmatism.³¹ Discarding old-world forms of rationalism and empiricism, the group of scholars who came together in their "Metaphysical" club (Charles Peirce, William James, Oliver W. Holmes, and Chauncey Wright, among others) searched for a new "rule of method" to clarify ideas and to test claims to truth. Out of the welter of their thought came a new empirical temper. The pragmatist, wrote James, "turns away from abstraction . . . from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems and pretended absolutes. . . . He turns toward concreteness and adequacy, toward facts, toward action, toward power."

And this was the hallmark of the political science of Wilson and Frank Goodnow, of Henry Jones Ford and J. Allen Smith—

³⁰ Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, *The American Spirit* (New York 1942) pp. 347-54.

³¹ See P. Wiener, *Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1949).

pragmatic, evolutionary, and empirical. Politics became a descriptive science, abandoning the isolation of first causes for a functional analysis of how things worked. The old language yielded to the new as fixed and final notions gave way to a vocabulary whose essential terms were function, process, development, and change. System building and theorizing were minimized, and the "thin abstraction" fell before the "thick particular fact." The study of politics, Wilson urged, must proceed "unclouded by theory," while Goodnow insisted that a policy of "opportunism" is most likely to achieve desirable results: adherence to fixed general theories is productive of harm, not good, and the postulation of universal principles is "mere useless opprobrious theory."³² The fact became the thing; to get it sure, "to polish it until it sparkled"—this was the goal of the new pragmatist and of the generation that followed. Observation was to come first, the fact stood inviolate, and the secondary, even dangerous character of theory was stressed, a stress that led to a fragmentary political science that we are only now beginning to question. This was the result of the new metaphor.

IV

The implications of metaphors are such, then, as to call for the clearest understanding of their uses and limitations. It is neither possible nor necessary that exacting care be taken with every metaphorical expression; many of them have been made so synonymous with what is to be represented that we are unaware of their metaphorical character; many of them are not important. But where a metaphor is dominant, it is a very powerful instrument. It structures inquiry, establishes relevance, and provides an interpretive system. Hence it must be used with full awareness, and must be made fully explicit. The use of a dominant metaphor always involves us in a basic form of comparative analysis. We compare B to A in order to pursue a more or less systematic analysis of B. A is our representational base, our model. If

³² F. J. Goodnow, *Social Reform and the Constitution* (New York 1911) pp. 3-4.

very little is known about A, the likelihood of any significant yield is minimal; if we do not understand A's characteristics, the comparison is pointless. It is only when we understand the structural form, the concepts involved, and the properties and features of the model that we can make an "educated guess" as to the validity of the analogy.³³

Thus to reject mechanism for evolutionism does not mean that the latter is necessarily more appropriate. A mechanical model, properly employed, may yield considerable increment. Improperly employed, we know, it quickly "hardens into a rigid prison of system" and will serve only to retard the development of the field. It may be that social institutions are more analogous to biological organisms than they are to machines, but this is only a guess that must be tested out. Whether social institutions in fact possess properties and features that are similar to those of biological organisms becomes, under this metaphor, the empirical problem. To attack this problem requires that the concepts involved be clarified.

There are any number of concepts that have been transferred from biology to the sphere of social science. But just what does it mean to apply these terms to social institutions? To what in political life do these concepts refer? What is being placed in correspondence with what? What does the concept "evolution" itself mean in political science? (It is interesting that Wilson and Lippmann tried to clarify what it was in mechanism that they rejected; their attack rested on the fact that mechanism assumes a closed system while that of social life is open.) The proper employment of the Darwinian metaphor, no matter on what level of generality, requires that these questions be dealt with before we can proceed to a determination of whether the properties of the organism and the government are in fact analogous. Fail-

³³ See May Brodbeck, "Models, Meaning and Theories," in L. Gross, ed., *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (Evanston, Ill., 1959); also A. Rapoport's essay on "Uses and Limitations of Mathematical Models in Social Science," in the same volume.

ure to make such clarification provides us with a proposal (hypothesis) that is so vague, so ambiguous, as to be of little usefulness in the organization of our efforts.

The long history of metaphorical transfer in political science may well be pondered by those who fret over the increasing use of models today—be the models mathematical, biological, electronic, or other. It may justifiably be said that some of this is more a product of fashion than a scientific tool relevantly employed.³⁴ But fashion is by no means the whole story. Just as mechanism once ordered the domain of politics, and evolutionism proposed to reorder it, the new models are now employed to provide some system in a field that remains, after some seventy-five years of hyperfactualism, without any substantial theory. Some of these models, as applied to politics, may be quite inadequate, the methodology they engender quite inappropriate, but in the minds of sophisticated workers their "as if" quality remains clear, their proposals are recognized as hypothetical, their limitations are understood. It is therefore possible to evaluate them with ease and economy. This is to be contrasted with the use of concealed metaphors, which invariably begins with an "as if" proposition and ends with an "it is" statement without in any way demonstrating correspondence.

Political science has always resorted to metaphors, to the device of proceeding from the known to the unknown. Those who criticize the use of "models" need to understand that they too must use them. Accordingly, much of the conflict over the use of models is spurious. The choice is not between models and no models, but between a critical consciousness of their use and an uncritical acceptance. An open and "hygienic" use of models may or may not aid us in developing empirically sound political theory, but it would enable us to run far less risk than we take with the hidden, implicit, and rigidified metaphors that one frequently finds in the textbooks of political science.

³⁴ See H. Goldhamer, "Fashion in Social Science," in *World Politics*, vol. 6 (1954) pp. 394-404.

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FORUM

*Economic Imperialism Again **

IN RECENT years, with the United States allied with the NATO colonial powers, and with most colonies moving rapidly to independence, Americans have tended to think of imperialism as considerably more meritorious than we used to believe. According to this view, imperialism was not really so bad for the colonies after all, nor was it so beneficial to the mother countries. Such an interpretation, as I have pointed out elsewhere,¹ could have a profound effect on our attitudes toward the recent colonies, particularly in Africa. If colonialism has been, on the whole, at least as benign as malignant, then Africa's vociferous, emotional antagonism regarding anything that smacks of colonialism could be interpreted as ill natured and demagogic or irrational, and thus could lead to a feeling of annoyance with these nations, or at best an attitude of patronizing tolerance. Hans Neisser's stimulating article, "Economic Imperialism Reconsidered," contributes, though perhaps unintentionally, to the growth of this more cordial feeling toward colonialism. This implication, in addition to purely economic considerations, provides good reason for commenting on his paper.

Professor Neisser was concerned primarily with the theory that imperialism helped the metropolitan powers to overcome problems of general overproduction (stagnation) and periodic overproduction (the business cycle). He finds this theory fallacious. Briefly, his position is that if western income during 1815-1914 had been as high without investment outlets in the less developed economies as it actually was with the existence of those outlets, then the theorists of imperialism, like Hobson, would have been correct and "western and especially British capitalism . . . would have encountered investment difficulties from time to time, hence an overproduction of commodities (at least potentially), and might never have recovered from the ensuing depression" (p. 73). Neisser argues, however, that the theory of imperialism breaks down because without the abundant and varied flow of cheap primary products engendered by European investment, western real-income capabilities would *not* have been nearly so high as they were.

* Comment on Hans Neisser, "Economic Imperialism Reconsidered," in *Social Research*, vol. 27 (Spring 1960) pp. 63-82.

¹ Sayre P. Schatz, "A British View of African Colonialism," in *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (April 1961).

Consequently, saving would have been much lower, and there would have been no need for a high level of investment to counterbalance the saving. An absence of investment outlets in the economically backward regions would therefore not have caused general overproduction in the West, because the need for investment outlets would have been more or less correspondingly reduced. Rejecting also the periodic overproduction argument, for reasons that are not here of concern, Neisser concludes: "At times . . . a rise of investment opportunities abroad, or a better utilization of existing opportunities abroad, assisted in ending a depression. This is all that appears to be left of the theory of economic imperialism" (p. 82; the "theory of economic imperialism," it should be realized, refers here only to the overproduction thesis).

Accepting everything that Professor Neisser has said, except one inference, which I believe does not hold up, one may arrive at a radically different conclusion. Even if one should agree with his finding that one cannot deduce imperialism from oversaving—that is, that oversaving did not arise first and cause a search for investment outlets—his analysis leaves standing a great deal more of the "theory of economic imperialism" than he indicates. Since he states that, given the actually attained income and saving levels in the West, foreign investment outlets may well have been necessary to prevent stagnation, it follows that in his analysis foreign investment played a dual role. On the one hand, it had a supply effect: it made the technically or physically *possible* real-income path much higher than it otherwise would have been. On the other hand, it had a demand effect: it provided the investment outlay necessary to achieve prosperity, that is, to *realize* the higher real income that was technically possible. The demand-creating aspect of foreign investment is therefore seen as a necessary element. Hobson would not have felt completely crushed if he were left only with this; the spending aspect of foreign investment, with which he was concerned, still plays a crucial role.

However, Hobson need settle for this limited thesis only if one assumes that foreign investment in any given period causes increased productive capacity, hence higher (potential) income and saving, *in that period*. Then one might say, with Neisser, that if the foreign investment did not occur during some period, (potential) saving, as well as investment, would have been lower during that period; therefore the investment would not have been necessary in order to avoid overproduction. If one assumes, however, a several-year lag between foreign-investment expenditure and the consequent increase in supply of primary products, with its income-enhancing effects in the West, and

if one again accepts Neisser's position that the foreign-investment outlays were needed to match saving, given the income levels actually attained, then one has a quite different model.

This lag assumption seems justifiable. Investments in plantations, mines, and the like have a long gestation period, and then yield their benefits over a long time. Furthermore, a large proportion of foreign investment was devoted to overhead capital, which usually has an especially long gestation period, and is very durable. Given this lag, foreign investment in any given year has a demand effect but not a supply effect. Hence a cessation of such foreign investment for a few years would reduce investment demand during that time, but *not* productive capacity and potential real income and saving. It would therefore cause general overproduction. In other words, if foreign investment is necessary to match current saving, while such investment does not create additional income and saving until some subsequent period, reduction of the investment would *not* be offset by any decrease in current (*ex ante*) saving, and overproduction would result. If the lag assumption is valid, then Hobson's thesis about the necessity of foreign investment as a means of avoiding overproduction seems to be restored.

Aside from this, one might also point out that if at some point the less developed countries undertook to carry out the investment in their own primary products, Hobson's thesis could again be sustained. If the flow of primary products to the advanced economies, and therefore their potential real-income and saving path, was not greatly disturbed, the absence of the foreign investment outlets would have caused oversaving in the western economies.

Finally, though Professor Neisser's article does not deal with the effect of western economic penetration on the less developed areas, the few words he does devote to this topic prompt me to add a brief supplementary (rather than conflicting) point. His view is that while the western capitalist countries may have obtained "the lion's share" of the benefits, the other areas did not suffer economically, and in fact received some stimulus to ultimate economic development. I would add that in appraising the effects of the colonial relationship, we need not confine ourselves to comparing the results of western penetration as it actually developed to the probable results of a complete absence of contact. Another possibility, more realistic than the latter, is contact that is sympathetic and mutually helpful, or, if that is too rose-colored, at least non-dominating. The West's contact with Japan was of the latter nature, and its development illustrates the possibility. In

assessing this experience, one is inclined to agree with Barbara Ward about Japan: "the speed of the transformation achieved by the only Asian country to exclude outside Western economic influence throws the clearest possible light on the degree to which economic imperialism is in general a faulty route by which to reach a fully modernized economy."²

SAYRE P. SCHATZ

Hofstra College

Rejoinder

DR. SCHATZ states a proposition that I have not denied, and that is not identical with the Luxemburg-Sternberg-Hobson argument. Let me reformulate my contention in this way: because of the economic development of large parts of the globe by capitalistic activities, the saving potential of the "capitalist" countries reached a level that was not at all times matched by their internal investment opportunities, and when that equivalence did not exist, the export of capital prevented or mitigated serious depression and unemployment (of the "deflationary" not the "technological" nature) in the "capitalist" countries. I stress the qualification "not at all times": thus during 1895-1905 the saving potential of the western countries exceeded the investment opportunities there only to a small extent if at all, as is evident for example by the rise in the interest rate. But Luxemburg-Sternberg-Hobson go much further: they assert that capitalism would have succumbed from oversaving except for the possibility of exporting surplus goods to the "non-capitalist" countries—or, as I would rather say, except for the investment opportunities in the latter. It is this blanket contention that I take issue with, and my doubts are not removed by Dr. Schatz's analysis. In particular, his time-lag argument implies, if I understand it correctly, a constant rate of growth in the capital exports of the western countries. The available empirical evidence does not support this assumption.

HANS NEISER

Graduate Faculty of the New School

² Barbara Ward, "Economic Imperialism and its Aftermath," in Chatham College, *The Legacy of Imperialism* (Pittsburgh 1960) p. 13.

ON METROPOLITAN GROWTH: A REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE

THE new frontiers are in the large metropolitan centers. It is there that the population squeeze dramatized by Higbee and by Vogt makes itself felt.¹ Since the turn of the century the metropolitan areas of the United States have been its fastest growing sector, eight of them now accounting for over 20 percent of total non-farm population and for almost 25 percent of the nation's non-agricultural jobs. Moreover, the development is global rather than national, emergent and growing rather than finite and historical. Projections of available data assure the creation of a new Chicago every month, and, whatever one may think of Chicago, a new one every month, month after month and year after year, makes a dizzying prospect. Dizziness becomes vertigo when it is realized that Chicago's—or for that matter any other major city's—current social and economic problems are as yet incompletely identified and far from solved. All that is clearly known is that the basic social and economic forces of our times are creating larger and larger cities, with complex social organizations begetting problems that urgently demand the attention of social scientists and policymakers. The important contribution of Higbee's and Vogt's very readable books is that they persuasively put this situation before the general public.

In the newly developing countries population pressure is easily explainable by the falling death rates and the longer life expectancy attendant on rising standards of health. In the industrialized world, and particularly in the United States, the recent upsurge in population, and with it the growth of metropolitan centers, requires a more complicated explanation and calls for more careful projections. Much is being done to help with this problem by a longitudinal study of fertility attitudes and fertility performance that is currently under way at the Office of Population Research in Princeton.

The first phase of this study is reported on by Westoff and others² in a book that samples over 1000 couples of seven metropolitan regions, at the time of the birth of their second child, and analyzes in depth how birth-control attitudes are related to social-economic status, mo-

¹ Edward Higbee, *The Squeeze: Cities Without Space* (New York: Morrow, 1960) 348 pp., \$5.95. William Vogt, *People* (New York: Sloane, 1960) 257 pp., \$4.50.

² Charles F. Westoff, Robert G. Potter, Jr., Philip C. Sagi, Elliot G. Mishler, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) xxii & 433 pp., \$10.

bility aspirations, religion, education, marital adjustment, and feeling of personal adequacy. So far—the book deals primarily with attitudes, as a re-interview three years hence will test actual behavior—religion is found of preeminent importance in determining the couples' attitudes toward family planning; once again income is found to have little influence as an independent variable. This work, which is structured with great care and is precise in its statistical techniques, deals with an exclusively white universe and makes no speculative comparisons with the traits of rural populations or the non-white part of our metropolitan areas, and is thus limited in precise population projections. Nevertheless it is significant that despite the widespread knowledge and selective use of effective contraceptive techniques by the metropolitan population, there is no indication that the level of birth rates sustained since World War II will slack off in the future.

Even though the isolation of residence and migration as a variable does not substantially simplify the study of fertility behavior, it does throw light on the reasons for different demographic distributions within the regions studied in this book. The pattern of population increase during 1950-58 in the New York region, showing an increase of about 1 percent for the city and of 25 percent for the remainder of the area, is found to be generally characteristic, with "the urbanized areas of each size [showing] fertility ratios consistently and sharply lower for 'the central cities' than for the surrounding 'urban fringe' areas." These intra-regional differences appear to be associated with certain preferences regarding "desirable" versus "undesirable" neighborhoods, single versus multiple-family houses, and houses versus apartments.

As the city grows and its nature changes, new approaches to public policy are required. Emerging conflicts between the city and the suburb, the welfare problems of larger and larger groups, the problem of metropolitan government, and, not least, the nature of the relationship between metropolitan economic wellbeing and national economic requirements call for a reformation of policy attitudes and actions. In this area the Area Development Committee of the Committee for Economic Development has become active, tackling the problem of the metropolis along with that of regional development.³

³ Committee for Economic Development, New York: *Guiding Metropolitan Growth* (1960) 56 pp., \$2 paperbound; Raymond Vernon, *The Changing Economic Function of the Central City* (1959) 92 pp., \$1 paperbound; Robert C. Wood, *Metropolis Against Itself* (1959) 56 pp., \$1 paperbound.

CED's policy statement, *Guiding Metropolitan Growth*, makes four simple points: it recommends careful "economic base studies" as a prerequisite for efficient planning and allocation of private and public resources; it calls for the casting of urban renewal programs in a metropolitan framework; it points to the need for governmental reorganization to achieve unified action; and it calls for local business leadership and participation. Such recommendations are unobjectionable. Their blandness is all that can be held against them. The second and third are buttressed by two CED staff papers that enlarge and supplement the policy statement.

One of these papers, by Raymond Vernon, notes the absolute and relative decline of the central city in relation to the suburbs, but whereas earlier studies—particularly those ecological in approach—predicted only blight for the narrowing core of the center, Vernon sees the possibility of vitality and regeneration. Around the core, it is true, a gap of obsolescence develops as jobs and people skip over it to go to the less densely populated areas of the outer suburban circle; in the areas of high obsolescence space costs are high, transportation difficult, water in short supply, and consequently their recapture for factory sites is most improbable. Vernon argues, however, that they can be redeemed by subsidized governmental intervention, "much larger than any which heretofore has been contemplated."

The problem of redeeming the "gray areas" is complicated by the multiplicity of independent local governments that, by hanging on to their "autonomy," discharge their functions by providing only minimal services. In the second CED staff paper Robert C. Wood writes, in general terms, about the conflict between the big changes that occur and the little governments that are supposed to cope with them. Federated metropolitan governments, regional authorities, and—where feasible—strengthened county governments are viewed as the way out. Administrative solutions are, in Wood's judgment (with which I agree), less than a half-way house, because of the excess of doctrine and ideological content in housing and renewal programs and because of the strong political reaction that renewal programs engender in the areas' residents. Nor do old saws like "there is no Republican or Democratic way to pave the street" or fixation on direct and universal participation in municipal-type government help with the problem of the gray areas in the metropolis. The solution calls for governments larger and stronger than those of many nation-states. Wood is on the whole pessimistic, finding that "competitive governments effectively

foreclose the chance for policy-making on a regional basis." A "thin red line of leadership" is potentially available, however, in voluntary organizations and private persons of good will. Metropolitan Councils, Planning Groups, Civic Associations, and the like, bringing together politicians, educators, businessmen, and labor leaders—all of whom have a "gilt (or guilt) edge in the future metropolis"—form groups on which the making of policy falls by default. Without them, regional policy would be bottled into the existing councils of state.

The Wood and Vernon papers are as well written as they are typographically elegant. Cogent and forceful in their exposition, they deserve ample broadcast, even though neither contributes new facts or new ideas. Like the policy statement, which is both their filiation and their *raison d'être*, they are essentially modest. The contribution of these slim volumes must not be lost sight of for their modesty. Indeed, in calling attention to the need for broad-scale planning of metropolitan growth the CED is serving the community well, providing precisely that thin line of leadership perceived by Wood as available.

That enlightened leadership is necessary in dealing with the social problems focused in large cities has long been known. The field of "urban sociology" and related concerns with urban planning and renewal—urbanistics in its broadest sense—are in fact an outgrowth of this realization. As the city grows into a metropolis the problems multiply and change, in kind as well as in degree. Macroscopic approaches and techniques are called for where microscopic ones were thought to suffice. Even new studies and new disciplines are allegedly needed. In response, regional economists, economic geographers, and location theorists grow in number and establish new professional societies. Their work draws new support from universities, foundations, and governments. It is unclear, however, whether ideas and analytical tools—assuming that new ones are needed—have grown apace with concern. Inroads into the study of metropolitan economics have been in the making since the publication, in 1894, of Cooley's paper on transportation, which sets the classical principles of urban location. Improvements on the idea that the city arises where transportation "breaks" take place were the contribution of Lösch and other contemporaries, who attempted to establish "urban hierarchies," linked the city with the region, and worked on the integration of locational with general equilibrium analysis. Gains were made in the development of new and more precise definitions—the concept of "standard metropolitan region" being one—and in the according of

closer scrutiny to the problems attendant on growth of the metropolis and the region.

In *Metropolis and Region*⁴ an attempt is made to bring together such earlier work and move to new ground. Explicitly ecological and eclectic in their approach, its authors argue that the rich variety of tools within the reach of the "metropolologist" have fruitful ramifications and interconnections in spite of the different sources of the ideas. In their introduction they enter a disclaimer: "We cannot pretend to have achieved a thoroughgoing articulation of these concepts or the perhaps drastic reformulation that the present profusion of ideas invites. But we may tentatively claim to provide a more comprehensive summary of pertinent theoretical insights than is readily available elsewhere." As this reviewer understands it, the central contribution of the work is its building of a city's "industry profile." Such a profile shows that the city is not related directly to the surrounding hinterland. A city's industrial profile relates it to various regions—of physical factor inputs, markets, labor resources, flows of funds—none of which need be geographically adjacent. But the reviewer wonders about the value of the authors' contributions as providing an index of the progress in the field; he is sure that whatever gains may potentially exist in the ideas presented, they are badly marred by prolix writing and the abuse of jargon.

New York City is the metropolis par excellence. As far as it is concerned, the CED's call for an economic-base study has been answered, an industry profile built. A study of the New York Metropolitan Region was begun in 1956 by Harvard's Graduate School of Public Administration, and its findings have been published in a series of volumes presenting current conditions and key employment and demographic projections for 1965, 1975, and 1985.⁵ Overall results

⁴ Otis Dudley Duncan, W. Richard Scott, Stanley Lieberson, Beverly Duncan, Hal H. Winsborough, *Metropolis and Region* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960) xviii & 557 pp., \$8.50.

⁵ New York Metropolitan Region Study, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press: Raymond Vernon, *Metropolis 1985: An Interpretation of the Findings of the New York Metropolitan Region Study* (1960) xvi & 252 pp., \$5; Max Hall, ed., *Made in New York: Case Studies in Metropolitan Manufacturing*, by Roy B. Helfgott, W. Eric Gustafson, James M. Hund (1959) xviii & 388 pp., \$6.75; Sidney M. Robbins and Nestor E. Terleckyj, with the collaboration of Ira O. Scott, Jr., *Money Metropolis: A Locational Study of Financial Activities in the New York Region* (1960) xx & 294 pp., \$5; Robert M. Lichtenberg, *One-Tenth of a Nation: National Forces in the Economic Growth of the New York Region* (1960) xvii & 326 pp., \$6.75; Martin Segal, *Wages in the Metropolis: Their Influence on the Location of Industries*

are reported and discussed in the Director's *Metropolis 1985*; the other volumes tackle specific parts of the problem, and can with profit be read separately even though they present an integrated whole.

The study's major conclusions can be summarized as follows. In 1985 the New York region will be more like what it is now than different. Its population will be about double, almost 24 million, but this increase will actually reflect a proportional decrease, as the region's share of the total United States population is expected to shrink from the present 9.2 percent to a scarce 8.3 percent. Projected employment for 1985 is about 9.5 million jobs, again representing a small shrinkage in the region's proportion of total national employment. The components of the job mix are viewed as varying more than the totals. Manufacturing activities will continue to be a source of the region's employment strength, even though considerable changes will take place inside the group. The presence of many non-manufacturing activities will help the New York region generate higher non-manufacturing growth rates than the rest of the nation, with particular increases in the business service group and in government employment. The relative stability of the forecast overall employment and population rests on the expectation of numerous structural changes and on the expectation of continued in-migration in the first period, population stability to 1975, and a small net out-migration toward the end of the period under analysis.

The New York Metropolitan Region Study was not based on a well defined and specific overall "model." It reflects none of the elaborate methodology of the regional specialist. Instead it relies on the elaboration of the economist's known analytical devices and on a good deal of measured judgment. Expected political and economic responses to expected change are thus based, more often than not, on the hope of reasonably successful "muddling through," or on the simple assumption that growing forces will continue to grow while those on the decline will continue to decline. Such an approach is limited yet reasonable, and if the authors occasionally move on thin ice they are aware of what they are doing. To the present reviewer this seems preferable to moving on the still thinner, albeit more elegant, ice of the theoretical constructs that the complex economy

in the New York Region (1960) xii & 211 pp., \$4.75; Benjamin Chinitz, *Freight and the Metropolis: The Impact of America's Transport Revolutions on the New York Region* (1960) xv & 211 pp., \$4.50; Robert C. Wood, with Vladimir V. Almendinger, *1400 Governments: The Political Economy of the New York Metropolitan Region* (1961) xviii & 267 pp., \$5.75.

of New York might have brought forth from more high-powered theorists, as well as wiser from the point of view of the influence the study can be expected to have on the general public.

Various approaches to analysis help unify the volumes. The concept of "region" as an entity is one of them. It is used primarily in its commonsense meaning, which does not necessarily imply a single focus at the center. As the concept of metropolitan region is treated here, it is free of the criticism that it obscures changes in internal location. On the contrary, these volumes, particularly *Made in New York* and *Money Metropolis*, discuss at length locational changes within the metropolitan region. Another useful approach is the distinction between "national-market oriented" and "sectional-market oriented" industries, and the distinction of industries sensitive to transport costs, to labor costs, and to external economies. Industries in whose location external economies are important are further divided into a "wage-oriented sector" (unskilled and semi-skilled) and a "skill-oriented sector." Throughout, comparisons are made between the national growth of given industries and projections of "expected growth" for these same industries in the New York region. The consequent "expected growth" of New York is then compared with New York's actual growth, and the differences between the two are analyzed, in order to arrive at the "actual currents underlying the growth of the Region." The approach is then repeated for projections into the future, the growth rates expected on the basis of the economic mix being adjusted to make up the "actual projected growth rates," which take cognizance of assumed future changes in the economic mix.

Central in the whole study are the notion of "external economies" and the concept of the "dominant locational factor." External economies are the familiar well accepted Marshallian idea. In these volumes, however, emphasis is placed not only on the advantages provided by the interdependence of the competitors (sharing various specialized services in production, labor supply, marketing, and transportation) but also on the importance of what the region itself provides through the institutionalization of banking, advertising, publishing, and educational services ("face-to-face" contacts and the pooling of ideas, research, and information). External economies are viewed as determining the growth and development of new industries within the region as well as holding industries to their original location. In regarding external economies as the crucial determinant of the future growth of New York, these studies make growth in the region dependent on the entry of new firms, and pin employment

projections on the existence of a fairly high rate of national economic growth. Implicitly the growth of New York is thus dependent on the maintenance of some form of effective competition.

The notion of the "dominant locational factor" is developed in terms of differences in costs at alternative locations. These are viewed as more important than the level of a given type of cost or its proportion in the cost structure. Thus even in an industry in which labor, for example, accounts for a high proportion of all costs, labor is not viewed as the dominant locational factor unless wages for that industry are significantly different in other parts of the country. The concept of the dominant locational factor needs qualification for its built-in fuzziness in application, as precision is hampered by classificational difficulties and by the fact that certain alternative costs cannot be determined until the shift has taken place. Nevertheless the concept is useful, and is here used effectively. Among its other values it illustrates the uselessness of asking such broad and loose questions as whether a city is or is not a high labor-cost center.

The dominant locational factor is used in *One-Tenth of a Nation* to classify manufacturing employment in the New York region and in the rest of the nation. Of New York's total manufacturing employment, 39 percent is found to be in industries whose dominant locational factor is external economies, while for the nation the corresponding figure is 15 percent. From this it appears that almost 40 percent of the industries located in the New York region are there because of a combination of factors peculiarly characteristic of that metropolis.

The importance of external economies as the crucial locational determinant is bolstered by Segal's study of labor as a locational determinant. He concludes that "*at any point of time*, it is hard to find many jobs under serious wage pressures within the region." This is due to the advantage that the very size of New York's labor pool provides for industries in the skill-oriented sector, and to the offsetting effect of external economies on the higher labor costs of small firms in the wage-sensitive sector. The only groups sensitive to labor-cost pressures turn out to be firms with large runs, standardized products, and sales in a very competitive market. Segal's labor-cost analysis thus represents almost—but not quite—the other side of the external-economies coin. Not quite, because his analysis of locational determinants is enriched by consideration of how market structures affect location. He thereby suggests the need for further empirical research to the locational theorist who has traditionally related location to market structures only for situations of small-number

competition, and who may with advantage relate locational decisions also to the broader gamut of market structures.

Transport costs as a locational determinant are treated by Chinitz, who reveals that industries concerned with the minimization of transportation costs, although underrepresented in New York in comparison with the nation, have shown a relatively good rate of employment growth.⁸ He finds also that other locational determinants—availability of space, water, the level of taxes—while they “might be important in other contexts,” can be “counted as trivial in analyzing the Region’s economic strength or weaknesses”; land and space rent, however, may not be so considered.

Finally, in *1400 Governments*, Wood elaborates for the New York region the situation he broadly sketched in his CED study. Dealing with the public sector and discussing the political economy of the region, he too goes about his work without the pretense of elaborate models: factor analysis is applied to municipal finance, with careful judgment and attention to detail. The response to metropolitan needs on the part of the many conflicting and overlapping jurisdictions—it is their number that gives this volume its title—is described as a set of strategies of adjustment. What comes out is a mosaic of ineffectuality, each response limited by the momentary perception of a given problem and by the constituencies’ determination to “thwart the natural pressure of expansion.” Municipal “beggar my neighbor policies,” historically determined land-use-control attitudes, and the conflicts between economics and ideology provide no important limits to the activity of the private sector. At the same time, continual local-government agitation about economic affairs impedes the development of a region-wide public policy, and thus “the management of the political economy goes forward in ways localized, limited and largely negative in character.”

The region’s population and economic activities are actually determined, in Wood’s view, by forces generated outside the region and by the quasi-governmental enterprises, which turn out to be the real metropolitan giants. The fact that outside financial assistance is second only to the property tax as a source of revenue for the New York region explains why the city—with an assist from its own historical tradition and from Robert Moses—is leading the nation in housing renewal activities, and also why the region’s local governments have only a temporary veto power on state or federal ventures in the hous-

⁸ See also a short review of this work in *Social Research*, vol. 27, no. 4 (Winter 1960) pp. 502-03.

ing area. Because of the growing significance of outside financing, "the appeal upstairs" becomes the strategy of adjustment with the greatest future, and the link with Washington becomes ever closer.

As Wood sees it, the development of roads, bridges, piers, and airports, the availability of water, and the rate of urban renewal are the factors that affect the location of industries and set the level of economic activity. The Port of New York Authority, the Transit Authority, and the other regional enterprises are thus the real actors in the public sector. They are the giants that operate through a special kind of political process relying on publicity and press rather than on votes and land values. With them, "the determination of public needs is not made in the marketplace, nor in the voting booth. Instead, the public needs are what the Regional organizations say they are, subject to the organizations' capacity to find financing and subject to the presence and strength of other interests in the field. As for financing, the amount of real property in the Region is not directly relevant, nor is the Regional income. What counts is the ability to persuade officials above the municipal level to approve budgets or get financing independently of normal revenue sources."

What about the future of the New York region in such a jungle of governments? Wood's final assessment, after a disturbingly precise analysis of "one of the greatest un-natural wonders of the world," is thoughtful, bland, and possibly more optimistic than his CED paper. "Muddling through" triumphs again; municipal bankruptcy is a paper tiger; public needs are more or less satisfied; the quality of services is improving. Splintered jurisdictions do not create an aroused citizenry clamoring for metropolitan government. Indeed, has there ever been a time "when a revolution (even administrative) took place when the existing system was solidly established and its citizens, as they understood the goals of their domestic society, content"?

The New York studies are most welcome. They are, on the whole, well done, a good example of how to go about making necessary economic-base studies. Works of this type throw into a cocked hat certain a priori definitional discussions, such as Sombart's distinction between "city founders," or industries that establish cities, and "city fillers," those that develop because a city is already there. And they go far beyond the familiar broad generalizations that, however valid and important, do not seem to help with policy. But what do studies such as these, and the others reviewed here, leave us with? Three observations may be ventured.

First, the need for broad methodological reconstructions or for complex interdisciplinary frameworks, from which to derive policy guidance, is yet to be demonstrated. The problem does not rest with the identification of the appropriate variables and analysis of their interaction. While refinements in analysis and techniques are always useful and welcome, the crucial bottleneck is not here. And second, detailed studies that precisely identify current conditions and trace the workings of specific political-economic forces active in the region are still a necessary prerequisite of policymaking, however conducted. The search for pertinent social facts is still a noble pursuit, for the metropolitan specialist as for all social scientists. True, the accumulation of data about metropolitan areas is proceeding apace, as these works testify, and the New York studies and others have contributed much. But even for the New York region there is still, to cite only one example, no available inventory of the outflow and inflow of firms.

The greatest need, however, is for a theory of public expenditures. It is here that the major breakthrough is called for. The nation's attitude toward public works, transportation facilities, and public services in general will have to change in such a way as to permit them to be allotted a much higher proportion of income—regional but primarily national. Public concern is after all the most powerful tool available for redeeming the gray areas, helping private development, and guiding growth. Thus policy discussion of the economics of metropolitan growth merges with the broader debate about the level of public and private needs. Enlightened leadership is obviously required, and technical expertise as well. But, as Wood has shown so well, albeit without facing up to the problem, the determination of public needs cannot be left to the experts in public services. All they can do is put dollar signs on extrapolations based on the quality of public services today; however great their skill, we cannot "turn the preferences of the experts into the preferences of the public." What is most needed in metropolitan analysis is a theory of public expenditures that makes the citizen sovereign where neither the current political organizations nor the market provides for his needs.

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BOOK REVIEWS

LENSKI, GERHARD. *The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics, Economics, and Family Life.* Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday. 1961. xvi & 381 pp. \$5.95.

This volume presents a wealth of findings, nearly all of them interesting and some downright startling. Gerhard Lenski (a sociologist on the faculty of the University of Michigan) here reports and discusses certain findings on religion coming out of the Detroit Area Study of 1958. The Study, an ongoing project of the University of Michigan, begun in 1951, uses sample surveys of the population in the Detroit metropolitan area to investigate a broad variety of sociological and economic problems. The focus of the 1958 survey, of which Lenski was in charge, was on the effects of religion on politics, economic behavior, and family life. The data are based on the responses of 656 persons to whom a standardized schedule was administered.

Naturally, only a few highlights of the book can be commented on here. Probably the most important consequence of the work is a provocative new perspective on the religious pluralism of our society. An important distinction is made between associational and communal adherence to religious groups, the first defined in terms of church attendance, the second in terms of primary-type relationships within the group. Lenski finds that not only is there a very limited relationship between these two kinds of religious involvement, but sometimes they have a contradictory effect on the individual. He distinguishes four socio-religious communities—the white Protestant, the white Catholic, the Negro Protestant, and the Jewish—and finds consistent differences among them in political, economic, and family patterns. These differences cannot be explained in terms of class, for which appropriate controls are introduced. Even more provocative is the finding that the differences tend to increase rather than decrease with the individuals' Americanization and urbanization. Particularly suggestive is the indication that community endogamy is hardening, contrary to what many sociologists have hitherto suspected.

Lenski discusses in detail Will Herberg's theory that religious affiliation has become a substitute for older social identifications in terms of ethnicity and class. While the Detroit data do not support Herberg's notion of the dialectic between first-, second-, and third-generation Americans, they strongly support his basic insight: that the socio-religious communities constitute new foci of identification cutting

across ethnic and class lines. Lenski's use of the term "status group" (as an equivalent for Weber's concept of *Stand*) to describe this phenomenon is debatable. However, whatever terminology is used, there are far-reaching implications here for an understanding of stratification in American society, bearing out the view of Dahrendorf and others that the traditional concepts will have to be modified. Lenski believes that religious pluralism of American society is approaching the pattern that has been called *verzuiling* ("columnization") by Dutch sociologists—that is, increasingly rigid divisions of society in vertical groupings that are religiously identified.

A second area of Lenski's findings worth singling out for comment is that of economic attitudes. In this area he begins with a discussion of Weber's classic theory of the relationship between Protestantism and economics. While he would not like to apply the term "Protestant ethic," in its Weberian sense, to the contemporary American scene, he finds that important elements of this ethic are still much stronger among Protestants than among Catholics—once more a finding that will be startling to sociologists. Protestant attitudes toward work and economic achievement differ consistently (and in the direction indicated by Weber's theory) from those of Catholics. Even more interesting, these attitudes appear to give a distinct advantage to Protestants in terms of upward social mobility. To mention but some of the intriguing relationships in this area, Lenski has found that Catholic middle-class parents are less successful than Protestant parents in protecting their children against downward mobility, that working-class Protestants tend to hold middle-class economic values (for instance in matters concerning labor unions), that church involvement among Protestants is associated with a weak sense of kinship ties (which is conducive to social mobility) while among Catholics it goes well with a strong emphasis on kinship (which appears to be a handicap for mobility). Again, these findings are controlled by class, and thus cannot be explained by the two groups' obvious class differences.

One other area that ought to be at least mentioned is the bearing of Lenski's data on the theory of urbanism. Urban sociologists have tended to assume that associationalism in all its forms thrives in the city at the expense of *Gemeinschaft* ties. Lenski's work bears out the first assumption, but not the second. Church membership and church attendance are going up in American cities, as the discussions of the so-called "religious revival" have brought to everybody's attention. However, this increase in religious associationalism has not occurred at the expense of what Lenski calls communal ties. On the contrary,

his description of the socio-religious communities gives us a vivid picture of the vigorous existence of *Gemeinschaft*-type sociation in the metropolitan milieu. One might even speculate that this religious communalism may be of profounder significance in the future than the present boom in religious associational involvements, a boom that may already be waning.

In a work of such magnitude there are inevitably details to quarrel with. Space considerations forbid this reviewer to indulge in such dissent, except to say that serious questions could be raised about Lenski's measurements designed to denote "orthodoxy" and "devotionalism" (two concepts used in some of the Protestant and Catholic analyses). It seems to me that "orthodoxy" is a pretty meaningless term in the bulk of American Protestantism, while "devotionalism," as defined by Lenski, may actually be a measure of "Protestantization" when applied to Catholics. A more serious criticism is that Lenski's approach makes it difficult to gauge the degree of secularization present in *all* the religious groups, whatever the differences among them. The sense in which both associational and communal involvement is "religious," in the usual meaning of this word, bears further investigation. Lenski concedes the "culture religion" character of much of Detroit Protestantism, but the work of, for example, Joseph Fichter on American Catholics and Marshall Sklare on American Jews makes one believe that these other communities too are more secular than Lenski's interpretation would indicate. In other words, while accepting Lenski's data on the differences among the communities, one could argue that the label "religious" may be somewhat a term of courtesy.

The book's style of presentation is rather heavy and may not be easy for one not accustomed to contemporary sociological writing. However, the non-sociologist will be well rewarded if he overcomes this difficulty, and for the sociologist the volume is a mine of data and insights to be pondered for a long time to come. This reviewer feels, without reservations, that Lenski's volume presents us with one of the most important sociological studies of American religion in recent years.

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GURVITCH, GEORGES, ed. *Traité de sociologie*. [Bibliothèque de Sociologie Contemporaine, vol. 2.] Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1960. 466 pp. n.f. 20.

This second volume of a French symposium on sociology contains contributions ranging widely in quality as well as in the theoretical

perspectives of the authors. Those by Duverger on political sociology, Le Bras on sociology of religion, Piaget on the social psychology of childhood, and Gurvitch on the sociology of law, of morals, and of knowledge will be of particular interest to the American reader who wishes to have a concise presentation of the work and position of these well known social scientists.

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STOLPER, WOLFGANG F., with the assistance of Karl W. Roskamp. *The Structure of the East German Economy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1960. xxv & 478 pp. \$10.

One does not *read* statistics, one *uses* them. Hence the only way to review such a book as this is to ask it specific questions.

The reviewer's first question was what percentage of East Germany's GNP went into reparations to Russia before they were canceled late in 1953. To this the book contains no reply, since the author refuses to calculate the national income by the expenditure method, that is, by use. Following Marx, the East Germans think of the national income as essentially product, and calculate it not by use but by origin. The bulk of this book is an evaluation of the official statistics, industry by industry, followed by an independent reckoning of the value added by non-material production, omitted from the official statistics on the usual Marxist grounds. Thus we know how many chemicals or machines were produced, but not how many were taken in reparations. A reparations figure, not indeed for chemicals but overall, would emerge only from a calculation of such items as consumption, investment, and foreign trade—the national income by use, not origin. But the author never proceeds in such a breakdown beyond "individual consumption," "gross investment" (public and private, fixed and circulating) and "other" (p. 436). "Other" includes a great deal of "private but collective" consumption (the social services), defense, police, justice, and the export surplus in normal trade. It is suspiciously large, no doubt because of reparations. I find it difficult to believe that it would have been impossible to break down "other." If Professor Bergson can set a fairly firm figure for Soviet security-police expenditures under Stalin, surely Professor Stolper can have a stab at this no more sensitive magnitude? It is particularly disappointing that he has not used the budget at all. Surely reparations, for one thing, were actually financed by the budget?

Happily a brilliant calculation of the amount of reparations is avail-

able, which came out too late, however, for Stöper's use during the period his book was in preparation: in E. Klinkmüller's *Die gegenwärtige Außenhandelsverflechtung der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands* (Berlin 1958) pp. 99, 176-79. Here we find that the West German reckoning, by amounts of individual products delivered, corresponds very well to the scanty official admissions of the DDR and the USSR as to the total sum. In the years 1946-50, 1951, 1952, and 1953, according to that reckoning, the DDR's net national income (Western concept) was respectively c. 90.0, 43.8, 49.5, and 52.5 billion (American definition) East German marks, omitting indirect taxes, and of these figures reparations amounted to, respectively, 23, 6, 5, and 4 percent. Lack of space prohibits an exact defense of these figures here, but it should be noted that I had great difficulty in extracting from Stöper's book so simple a figure as the national income in current East German marks. It can be inferred from his Table 164, once one has detected a serious misprint: the national income is there given on the East, not the West, German definition (that is, it is the Marxist concept). To this one adds about 12 percent, in accordance with Table 163, for the non-material production included in the Western concept. In any event, the estimated 23 percent of the national income is a very big figure indeed. It is also a considerable understatement, since it omits the occupation costs of the Red Army. It entailed, while it lasted, a serious restriction on investment as well as on consumption, and it surely explains well enough why the absolute level of consumption (though no longer of investment—see Stöper, p. 440) is still only about three-quarters of that obtaining in West Germany.

If consumption levels are our second question, the author does not answer it too well. At all points he compares *individual* consumption in the East with *private* consumption in the West. This is forced on him, as I have indicated, by the alleged absence of data on social services and the like. Thus when we learn (p. 440) that in the East individual consumption per head is still only 59 percent of private consumption in the West, we must jump to no conclusion before adding in the missing bit. Assuming it to be a quarter of individual consumption, the comparative figure rises to 74 percent. This becomes fairly creditable to the DDR when we bear in mind that in 1936 private consumption in that area of Germany was only 89 percent of the level in Western Germany (pp. 435, 439). It is an especially unfortunate error that in the table on p. 440 this 89 percent, labeled incorrectly *individual consumption*, is included alongside postwar

comparisons of the order of 59 percent, which really were for individual consumption.

The reviewer's third question to the book was what economic effect was produced by the continual loss of working population through emigration to West Germany. To this question the book stands up very well, with rich materials bearing directly on the topic. In 1949-55, inclusive, the DDR lost 1.63 million net by migration, or over 3 times its natural population increase. It is not obvious, however, that this was a loss in terms of per capita growth. In so far as an economy is experiencing diminishing returns, or its emigrants are retired or about to retire, emigration is an economic gain. If there are increasing returns, or the emigrants are young skilled workers, it is a loss. The economic balance is quite unclear in the case of a baby, with all the costs of education and upkeep still to come, or in the case of a young parent, whose skill will be outweighed in crude economic terms by his fertility. Actually most of the East German emigrants were young and ablebodied, and many very skilled; the bad effect of this loss of skill has often been admitted by the East German government. Moreover, most of them were male (a point clearly brought out by Mr. Stolper), and thus their loss has unbalanced the sex ratio. The resultant reduction in the number of babies may or may not be an economic loss, but there can be no doubt that available labor has been increased by the release of potential East German wives. Let us accept the common but unproved view that the emigration is indeed a loss in terms of per capita growth. Certainly it is an unanswerable condemnation of two other things: the absolute level of the standard of living today; and political conditions.

My final question was how the DDR has performed beneath the twin burdens of emigration and reparations. Comparison of West and East German rates of growth is precisely the main topic of the book, and here too it must get full marks for its answer. The rate of growth (real GNP per head of population of working age per annum) has been 7 percent in both parts of the country. From this it follows that the DDR, since it has all the handicaps, shows the better performance, though one searches the text in vain for this conclusion.

An admirable description of communist statistical methods, and an indispensable quarry for those interested in the population and production figures of the DDR, this work is nevertheless not quite the "DDR's Bergson." It is not adventurous enough; it has almost nothing on fiscal matters and foreign trade; it fails to analyze income adequately by use rather than origin. But as a comparison of West

and East German growth it is—apart from the error noted (national income in Table 164)—surely definitive. And this is a very vital subject. Though the author is anxious to play it down, he is too honest to conceal the figures that reveal one of the least successful communist countries doing as well as one of the most successful capitalist ones.

P. J. D. WILES

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BRY, GERHARD, assisted by Charlotte Boschan. *Wages in Germany, 1871-1945*. [National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 68, General Series.] Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1960. xxvi & 486 pp. \$10.

This important study records the behavior of German wages during the rise and fall of the German Reich. As is desirable for an analysis of economic relationships, it organizes its rich material not by historical periods but by topics, and in his conclusion the author compares his findings on Germany with the developments in Great Britain and the United States during the same period.

In 1871-1945 wage rates in Germany showed material losses only twice: in the severe and prolonged depression following the *Gründerjahre* boom in the early 70s, and again in the Great Depression. During the other business contractions before 1914, there was only a deceleration of wage increases. It is notable that wage rates tended to lag substantially behind turns in general business conditions, in striking similarity to their behavior in Britain and the United States. Over these years hourly wages increased about threefold in Germany and Britain, and real wages doubled, but in the United States the respective increases were sixfold and fivefold. In all three countries the wage structure tightened during that period—in other words, wage differentials became smaller. Of particular interest is the finding that from 1890 to 1900, when real wages rose steeply, the unions in Germany were rather weak and limited in their activities, whereas from 1900 to 1914, when the unions were enlarging their membership and the number and range of their collective agreements were considerably increasing, consumer prices were also rising and real wages became stagnant—though the unions did succeed in reducing hours.

The book is a major contribution to our understanding of wage behavior. In addition to its statistical analyses the investigation offers a wealth of qualitative material dealing with such matters as the process of wage setting, trade-union activity, employers' organizations,

apprenticeship. It is a valuable source for future studies concerned with the behavior of wages, and also for studies of how wages are affected by institutional factors, such as labor unions.

HEDWIG WACHENHEIM

New York City

LEVIN, JONATHAN V. *The Export Economies: Their Pattern of Development in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1960. xiv & 347 pp. \$6.75.

This interesting book, using case studies of Peru in the "Guano Age" and Burma's rice-marketing board, develops the thesis that the majority of underdeveloped countries have been "export economies" in a special sense, integrated into the economies of industrial nations but in the past benefiting little from this integration. Not only capital and entrepreneurial ability, but also in many cases labor, have been moved into an underdeveloped country whose factors of production were too immobile to exploit its own natural resources or climatic possibilities. Kidnapping, fraud, and slavery have been all too frequently associated with the movement of large bodies of foreign workers to supply labor for an export economy.

In the past, Dr. Levin argues, foreign capital, foreign managers, and even foreign labor remitted much of their income to their home countries. He calls businessmen living in the export economy "luxury importers," who used part of their remittances home for buying foreign consumer goods, thus offering no market for the growth of new industries in the underdeveloped country. The remitting of most of the export earnings of the underdeveloped country to the industrial country caused the former to benefit little from its foreign trade, remaining in general a subsistence economy. But while it profited little from exports, it was hardly affected by declines in foreign earnings. It was isolated, yet also insulated, from fluctuations in world trade. Today, underdeveloped countries are trying to abolish foreign factors of production. This means that more benefits will accrue to them from their exports. It also means that the effects of changes in export earnings will be reflected backward into the economy. Both the insulation and the isolation are disappearing.

This is a sound conclusion, but like many theoretical arguments it does not fit the facts perfectly. The foreign trade of underdeveloped countries has always had some effect on the rest of their economies; service industries, food production, transport, real estate, and sometimes internal trade and domestic banking have been stimulated by

foreign economic penetration. The luxury importers have as often been members of the indigenous upper classes as foreign businessmen. And declines in export earnings have hurt the economy as a whole, if for no other reason than that government financing has frequently been dependent on them. Nevertheless there is a marked difference between the past and the present. Today underdeveloped countries are much more sensitive to external changes, and they will become increasingly so as they are integrated more completely with the international market economy and the internal subsistence economy dwindle. Though the author presses his argument a little too far, he has handled a significant problem with great skill. This is a valuable contribution to the literature on underdeveloped economies.

FELICIA J. DEYRUP

Graduate Faculty of the New School

GOWDA, K. VENKATAGIRI. *Appreciation of the Indian Rupee: A Study of International Monetary Mechanism*. Allahabad, India: Chaitanya. 1961. xii & 269 pp. \$4.

Hardly more than a year after the Indian rupee and other sterling-area currencies were devalued in 1949, agitation was started in India for an appreciation of the rupee in order to combat internal inflation. In this book Dr. Gowda makes a vigorous, scholarly defense of the status quo in rupee-sterling relations. Apart from the importance of its conclusions, the book is distinguished by its erudite analysis of the pros and cons of currency appreciation, and of exchange-rate policies generally, along modern general equilibrium lines. In a Foreword, Professor V. L. D'Souza recommends the book to "all those who are looking for a suitable criterion on which adjustment in exchange rate should be based." The book also deserves careful study by those interested in the prospects of the rupee under India's Third Five-Year Plan.

HASKELL P. WALD

Graduate Faculty of the New School

ANDREN, NILS. *Modern Swedish Government*. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. 1961. 252 pp. Sw. Kr. 15 (paperbound), 19.50 (clothbound).

A dual economy entails serious problems of power allocation and coexistence between the public and the private sector. In the drift toward more and more government participation in the economy, are popularly elected officials able to control an entrenched and ex-

panding bureaucracy, or is the democratic base of a nation itself threatened by the welfare state? Sweden, the democratic, industrial nation that has perhaps gone furthest in a program of social legislation and government control, provides an interesting and encouraging case study in answering this question. Mr. Andren's book shows how the Swedish people, with the ability to compromise conflicting social views and a deep feeling of public responsibility, have evolved a system that maintains individual freedom and a truly representative government in conjunction with the necessary administrative machinery of the economic situation. The major work of the bicameral parliament, which operates smoothly and without delaying tactics, is done through a joint-committee system, with the five major political parties proportionately represented in the parliament's various functions and responsibilities. The large administrative civil service, removed from party politics and any "spoils system," is kept in check by legislative surveillance and public awareness.

Mr. Andren presents a comprehensive, rather detailed, yet thoroughly readable description of the organization and operation of contemporary government in Sweden. His exposition is thorough and also critical, as he analyzes various constitutional reform measures now under study by a royal commission. The criticism remains within national borders, however, and no attempt is made to consider the Swedish model as a paradigm for other nations with populations many times greater than Sweden's seven and a half million.

ERNEST H. PREEG

New York City

KOVNER, MILTON. *The Challenge of Coexistence: A Study of Soviet Economic Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1961. vi & 130 pp. \$3.25.

In this tightly written and well documented study Mr. Kovner proposes to complement earlier works that have concentrated on the "what" and "how" of the Soviet trade drive, by answering the important question of its motivation, the "why." To do that, he obviously has to reach far back into the ideological and political background of Soviet and communist strategy, an undertaking that seems presumptuous in such a small format and leaves the author open to challenges of his method and his selection principles. In the very instructive chapters in which he discusses Soviet trade policies in concrete detail, the rationale of their political motivation emerges with great clarity. But where he tries to relate these policies to an ultimate

goal of communist world domination, he indiscriminately quotes Soviet statesmen and Comintern politicians, without allowing for the possibility that ideology is often at variance with actual policy or may have difficulty in adjusting itself to reality. Despite the wealth of appropriate quotations, he has not convinced this reader that Soviet trade policies are understandable only in terms of the ultimate goal, or that they could not be explained in terms of an ordinary imperialistic power struggle as practiced by a latecoming contender trying to muscle in under the conditions of an anti-imperialist age. In fact in one place, when citing recent communist predictions of a necessary split between the "colonial bourgeoisie" and the revolutionary classes (p. 93), the author admits that "such theoretical speculations have not as yet effected any reversal of the Soviet policy," which continues to consist in "courting friendly state-to-state relations with non-Communist neutral governments." Nor was this policy invented by Khrushchev. It goes back to the time when Stalin flirted with Chiang Kai-shek and King Amanullah of Afghanistan, or even when Lenin courted Reza Shah and Kemal Pasha.

This is not to deny that from the standpoint of Russian imperialism total control (incorporation, annexation, or satrapal government) is preferable to a mere alliance, or that communism has over czarism the advantage that party government gives firmer assurances of stability than other forms of satrapy. But the Yugoslav example, which the author has examined in lucid detail, should have suggested to him that worldwide communist government is not enough unless it secures Russian supremacy. The author recognizes that Soviet encouragement of "non-capitalist paths of development" in ex-colonial nations (p. 111) is a means to that end; but this reviewer has found in Mr. Kovner's admirable presentation of facts enough support for the conclusion that this is so only because we in the West have made it so. As long as we fight "socialism" instead of Russian imperialism we will continue to push underdeveloped countries into the enemy camp.

HENRY PACTER

Graduate Faculty of the New School

HAHN, LORNA, with introduction by Senator John F. Kennedy. *North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood*. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1960. xii & 264 pp. \$6.

As its subtitle suggests, the events described in this volume are principally twentieth-century, with the major emphasis on the period since World War II. Adopting a chronological approach, the author

traces the rise of nationalism in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, shuttling back and forth among these three countries as their aspirations and embroilments with the French become intertwined. In each account the very recent and almost synthetic character of the nationalist movements becomes clear as the indigenous Berber-Arab populations grapple with economic exploitation and political deprivation. In each case we encounter in almost classic sharpness exemplifications of the slogan "too little and too late."

The book has two major motifs, one dominant and one recessive. The readily discernible pattern is the gradual unfolding of a regional character, the Maghreb. Not that differences are lacking between the more sophisticated, Western-oriented Tunisia of Bourguiba and the fierce, illiterate, traditionalist Moroccan society. But what is seen are the elements held in common: the folk heritage and recent French subjugation, a need to define relationships *vis-à-vis* the West and the Arab League, the formidable task of converting relatively underdeveloped subsistence economies into viable modern economies (if possible, within planned regional development), and a pressing challenge to redefine Moslem faith and folkways for twentieth-century living. The interdependence of Tunisia's and Morocco's fates, which becomes clear as they are sucked into the maelstrom of the Algerian war, heralds a unified Maghreb—with the possible inclusion of Libya. Miss Hahn's second thesis, enunciated in her Preface and reappearing in the course of the book, is the special role reserved for the United States. She would have this country extend economic aid and technical assistance to the Maghreb; in her judgment we should have tried to hasten termination of the Algerian fighting, and we erred egregiously in not supporting the North African countries at the United Nations, despite French sensibilities. Her reasoning is based on our national self-interest as well as on American altruism: "They can provide us with . . . useful products . . . and . . . prop up our sagging Middle East defenses. . . . They can give us . . . sincere friends in the Arab-Asia-Africa world." To the present reviewer this is wishful thinking.

Miss Hahn's obvious revulsion against the oppressive policies and harsh tactics of France does not blind her toward North African xenophobia, stupidities, and atrocities. Nor does she romantically regard the attainment of a Levantine sovereignty as the be-all-and-end-all of national struggle. Only in Tunisia does there appear to be a deep appreciation of political democracy and an abhorrence of bigotry. In Morocco and Algeria extremist elements bear deep rancor

against such of their countrymen as have been "soft" toward France, thereby diverting thought from constructive work. Just as serious are the stupendous economic tasks of creating employment for the demobilized, developing a climate of confidence for the inducement of foreign investment capital, and eradicating poverty. The author argues that reasonable success in these and related matters would provide such pro-Western leaders as Bourguiba with their best chance of resisting the siren calls of Cairo and Moscow. On questions of historical judgment, this reviewer would quarrel on one point. Miss Hahn's appraisal of Moslem-Jewish relationships in Morocco is something less than realistic. Despite the powerful influence of Nasserism in Morocco and centuries of discrimination, Miss Hahn blandly maintains that "save for some occasional, isolated anti-Jewish demonstrations—which occur in New York also [sic]—Jewish North Africans were no better and no worse off than their Moslem compatriots." Recent intelligences from Morocco and Algeria scarcely lend support to this complacency.

Possessing many of the attributes of an able study, the book is never-

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theless for this reader a disappointment. It is disappointing because the author, a competent political scientist and regional specialist, fails to capitalize on her knowledge and her literary flair to produce a vital coherent study. If she is writing for the general, slightly informed reader, the book is highly confusing. It is cluttered with names of minor political personalities, whose policies and contributions merge in a huge blur; excerpts from political documents are inserted into the record with little interpretation; not a single map is provided. And if aimed at the informed reader, the book is lacking in depth. For this purpose it should provide not a journalistic recital of developments but penetrating analysis, based on adequate treatment of underlying forces, and hence a thematic organization and a synthesis of discrete facts into meaningful wholes, such as the political-psychological needs of France in North Africa, Arab-Berber rivalries, European-minded native elites versus traditionalism, the role of the "colons."

ELMER N. LEAR

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